APRIL 2 MEETING BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001052 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: APRIL 2 MEETING BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL PETRAEUS AND PM MALIKI Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Prime Minister Maliki, flushed with the success of recent ISF operations in Basrah, reviewed next steps with the Ambassador and General Petraeus on April 5. Maliki noted that he was dedicating $100 million dollars towards Basrah's reconstruction, and is using Tribal Support Councils to put thousands of southern tribesmen on three-month contracts before ultimately incorporating them into the security services. Maliki expressed interest in procuring armed helicopters to support Iraqi Special Operations Forces. He balked at attending the upcoming Neighbors' Conference in Kuwait (although he did not categorically refuse to go) and acknowledged that Iranian support for JAM Special Groups remains a continuing challenge that must be addressed jointly by Iraq's various political movements. End summary. Participants -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador and General Petraeus, accompanied by Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries and NSC Senior Director Brett McGurk, met April 2 with Prime Minister Maliki at his residence. Maliki was joined by NSA Mowaffaq Rubaie, Chief of Staff Tariq Abdallah, Media Advisor Yassin Majid, and Political Advisor Sadiq Rikabi. The Battle for Basrah -------------- ¶3. (S) The Ambassador began by congratulating Maliki on what appeared to be successful security operations in Basrah, Um Qasr, Zubeir and Abu Floos. A triumphant Maliki declared that, notwithstanding what al-Arabiyya TV and other media sources claimed, Muqtada al-Sadr's ceasefire statement had little impact on the outcome. To the contrary, said Maliki, Sadr's statement betrayed his weakness and was issued just a few hours after Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),backed by tribal volunteers, had taken to Basrah's streets. Moreover, Maliki implied that he had humiliated Sadr by refusing to speak with him or to negotiate any agreement with him. In addition, Maliki credited a change in plan with shifting the focus of the ISF from trying to clear neighborhoods ("that would have been bad") to instead focusing their efforts on conducting raids against criminals. "Despite the difficulties, I wasn't pessimistic. I was optimistic, even though when things were bad I thought I was going to have to remain there personally for two months to get things under control," said the PM. ¶4. (S) "Frankly, it was the Special Forces and the close air support that saved the day," Maliki continued. He expressed some disappointment that air support was not available earlier (a result of the GOI's failure to fully involve the Coalition in the operation's planning, as General Petraeus pointed out). Maliki noted that Iraqi air force planes were not yet capable of providing close air support, and asked whether the U.S. could sell combat helicopters to Iraq quickly. Maliki said he particularly needed helicopters to provide support to the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF),as well as to assist in patrolling the Iraqi-Iranian border. General Petraeus cautioned that helicopters were not a quick fix to the ISF's needs because of the long lead time required in terms of training pilots and maintenance crews. Maliki, undaunted, said he wanted to get the ball rolling. General Petraeus pledged to work it. Next Steps -------------- ¶5. (S) "What happened in Basrah was good . . . it gave the people and the tribes more courage to stand up against the militias. We need to build on that politically . . . They (JAM) were dealt a blow militarily, and they lost popular support," the PM summarized. Security operations in Basrah would continue, as ISF took control of major intersections and strategic buildings in order to make it more difficult for JAM to retake the streets should fighting resume. He then outlined next steps: 1) Maliki has dedicated $100 million dollars to reconstruction/services in Basrah; 2) he will dispatch a Reconstruction Committee to Basrah; 3) using the GOI's Tribal Support Councils, he has hired thousands of southern tribesmen on three month contracts, who will undergo further screening by a new intelligence committee and then be inducted into the ISF at the end of the three months. In addition, Maliki said he wanted to further develop the ISOF and to stand up a Quick Reaction Force to go after gangs/militias. He indicated that Thar Allah was his next target. With some prompting from the Ambassador, Maliki said he would meet with President Talabani on Saturday, April 5, after which he would attend a meeting of the Political BAGHDAD 00001052 002 OF 002 Council for National Security. The Executive Council would meet the following day. ¶6. (S) Maliki conceded that he had learned some lessons in Basrah. He noted that while some Iraqi Police (IP) units stood and fought, and some policemen gave their lives, many fled because they were either intimidated or loyal to the militias. He acknowledged the need for house cleaning, particularly amongst border police units on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier. As for the ports, they were once again operational after the civilian work force had returned to the job (Maliki said work had stopped for two hours because the Iraqi Army had been "tough" in disarming the Facilities Protection Service guards at the port). The next step, he added, was to weed out the JAM and Fadhilah militia members who had infiltrated the workforce. The Ambassador promised to send Maliki some ideas about how to develop the Um Qasr port, and Maliki suggested expanding the new security contract for BIAP to encompass the port as well. (NB - This prompted Maliki to digress on the subject of airport security badges, which he said would all soon be replaced; General Petraeus offered to arrange a briefing for the PM on what steps have already been taken over the past 4-6 months to tighten up security at the airport and clean out the militia influence.) Iran -------------- ¶7. (S) General Petraeus noted that the past week's fighting had revealed Iran's hand in Iraq, and the Ambassador stressed the need to send a strong message to Iran that its interference was unacceptable. "By God, we were very clear with them," said Maliki, who added the Iranians were initially unhelpful but ultimately became more supportive in dealing with Muqtada al-Sadr. Maliki acknowledged the need for Iraq's disparate political parties to speak with one voice to the Iranians. He then turned the conversation to the Arab neighbors, complaining of Kuwaiti ("when I say Kuwait, I actually mean a member of the Kuwaiti royal family"),Emirati, and Saudi support for militia fighters in the south, while the Syrians were training militants from Najaf. When the Ambassador pointed out that Maliki would have an excellent opportunity to deliver his message at the upcoming Neighbors' Conference in Kuwait, Maliki quipped that Neighbors' Conferences "were becoming as useless as Arab League summits" and said he could send a better message through a televised broadcast than by attending the Neighbors' Conference. Steering the conversation back to Iran, the Ambassador suggested that Maliki consider closing the Iranian Consulate in Basrah. Maliki agreed the Consulate was a problem (adding that he had to restrain his generals in the Basrah Operations Center from launching an attack on the Consulate since it was a diplomatic facility, even though it was serving as a weapons distribution center) and said that the Consulate was temporarily closed because its Iranian staff had fled to Iran with their families. Sadr City -------------- ¶8. (S) General Petraeus informed the PM that Coalition Forces would continue to control parts of Sadr City in order to prevent rocket and mortar teams from launching attacks from those areas. Maliki approved, adding that residents of Sadr City needed to learn that if they allowed militants to launch rockets from their neighborhoods, that they would pay a price -- even if it meant incurring civilian casualties. General Petraeus responded that MND-B had been launching precision strikes against rocket and mortar teams, either with guided missiles or direct fire. BUTENIS