VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI ON BASRA OPERATIONS,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001051

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI ON BASRA OPERATIONS,
COUNTERING IRANIAN INFLUENCE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S) During an April 1 meeting, the Ambassador and Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi discussed the situation in Basra
and the aftermath of the recent showdown with Sadrist forces
there. Hashimi described how he had supported PM Maliki
during the Basra campaign, putting personal differences aside
to safeguard national interests. The PM's unilateral,
uncoordinated moves, though, would have to be addressed by
the national leadership once the Political Committee for
National Security and the Executive Council are convened.
Hashimi railed against pernicious Iranian influence in the
country, calling for "reciprocal punishment" to repel its
interference inside Iraq. The Armed Forces, too, must be
professionalized to protect national, versus sectarian,
interests and militias must be dissolved. Respect for the
nation's security, he said, was what he tried to impress on
Sadrist representatives when he met with them on March 28.
Hashimi also complained of a lack of support from neighboring
Arab states in Iraq's struggle against Iran, particularly
Saudi Arabia. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador was joined by NSC Senior Director for
Iraq and Afghanistan, Brett McGurk, Special Assistant Ali
Khedery, and POLOFF (note-taker). The VP was joined by
Political Advisors Khalil al-Ezzawi and Saif Abdul Rahman.
The meeting was held in the Baghdad compound of Jalal
Talabani where the VP and senior staff have been staying
since a mortar attack on his IZ office on March 28 killed and
wounded many of his security agents.

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Political Aftermath of Basra Campaign
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3. (S) After expressing condolences for the deaths of three
of VP Hashimi's security detail from a March 28 mortar
barrage that struck his International Zone office, the
Ambassador sought Hashimi's views on the Basra campaign and
its political ramifications. Hashimi said he was urging
President Talabani and VP Abdel-Mehdi to return to Baghdad at
once, to address the serious political ramifications of the
Basra campaign and its aftermath. Hashimi said he refused
Abdel-Mehdi's suggestion that he come to Irbil for meetings
("to hell with that, I told him"),and reiterated the urgent
need to convene the Political Council for National Security
(PCNS) in Baghdad to chart the way forward. Hashimi noted
that his plans to depart Iraq for the U.S., Europe and
regional capitals might have to be delayed (Note: His staff
later called to confirm the VP's decision to delay the trip.
End note).


4. (S) Hashimi said that he and his colleagues had "taken a
hard choice to support the PM in fulfilling his "mission" in
Basra, leaving political differences aside in recognition of
broader national interests. Hashimi said he had been in
touch several times with the PM during and since the crisis,
even offering to join Maliki in Basra (the PM declined the
offer). Maliki, he said, put himself "in a corner," in full
light of all Iraqis. Despite the PM's refusal to consult
other leaders ahead of the operation, "we decided to not make
this a personal issue," he said. "We will have to sit face
to face with him soon to discuss events," but for now we must
support the PM and his objectives. Still, military means are
insufficient to address the present political situation. It
will take years to address the problems in Basra and tackle
the complex political, social, and economic dimensions to the
situation, he said. We must devise a package of achievable
objectives, to allow the PM to save face, and the Iraq
Security Forces and Coalition to follow up to ensure success.
Then, he added, we need to re-evaluate the entire Iraqi
political situation to determine how to build a functioning
central government and regain the post-Surge momentum.

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Iranian Interference Unacceptable
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5. (S) The interference by Iran and other neighbors into
Iraqi affairs was unacceptable, Hashimi railed, and must be
repulsed. The Vice President asked rhetorically what the
U.S. would do to help the GOI protect its borders, and help
rid the Iraqi government of "pro-Iranian cabinet members"
supportive of Tehran's agenda. The U.S./Europe fight with
Iran over the nuclear file, he said, can no longer be
transferred into Iraq. We must act in concert with the U.S.
and Arab allies to confront Iranian interference in Iraq,

BAGHDAD 00001051 002 OF 002


responding in kind if Tehran takes harmful steps, he said.
"If Iran is now the major player in Iraq, he warned
obliquely, I will have to be pragmatic and assess what sort
of 'life-saving chances' we have before us." Hashimi said
there could no longer be business as usual; if the Iranians
do something negative in Iraq, we must take "reciprocal steps
to punish them."


6. (S) It is shocking, Hashimi continued, that armed
sectarian militias were simply absorbed into the Iraqi
Security Forces but not neutralized as militias. The ISF
requires professionalism to safeguard national security. No
one, the U.S. and UK included, he complained, is "taking
care" of this issue adequately. The UK built our national
Army, he continued, but has ignored the issue since the start
of this war. The Army must be rebuilt, the Badr Brigade must
be dissolved, and the PM cannot be allowed to "kidnap the
future of this country."

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Hashimi Warns Sadrists to Stand Down
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7. (S) Hashimi said that in his March 28 meeting with a
delegation of Sadr leaders (led by Nassar and Hassan
al-Rubaie),he told them that they have a key decision to
make. If the events in Basra provokes a civil war, he told
them, Hashimi and his colleagues would blame the Sadrists for
starting it. The time was now to support the PM, to sit down
and talk through their complaints, he told them. Hashimi
said he believed his admonishment may have led to the public
order by Moqtadad Sadr to his followers to lay down their
arms and cease the violence. The Ambassador thanked Hashimi
for his stance and his efforts aimed at restoring order.
Unity of purpose among Iraqi patriots, he said, was the key
to challenging Iranian trouble-making and to rebuilding the
country. Iran would surely continue efforts to destabilize
Iraq, but it could never "take over" its Arab neighbor. The
GOI must unify around national interests, eliminate
extremists, and work to split reasonable Sadrists from the
Special Groups and adherents of violence. Encouragingly, the
ISF has found its feet in the past few days, taking back
checkpoints and the Om Qasr Port in Basra, he added. As in
Lebanon, the Ambassador cautioned, Iran worked to pit groups
(i.e., Shias) against each other to maximize its pernicious
influence; they are taking the same tack in Iraq.

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Saudis Out To Lunch
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8. (S) The Ambassador remarked on the virtual silence of
Arab states on recent events and the lack of Arab support to
the GOI in light of its confrontation with Iran. Responding
to the Ambassador's advice to press Arab capitals to step up
to the task, Hashimi said he was in touch recently with the
Saudi Foreign Minister at the OIC Summit in Senegal. Though
the Saudi prince professed to fully comprehend the challenges
in Iraq, the al-Saud he said, were frozen in place by their
disdain toward Maliki personally. Hashimi sought USG help in
convincing the Saudis and others to alter their approach.
The Egyptian President and other Arab leaders had promised to
send Ambassadors to Baghdad, but had not followed through.
BUTENIS