Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1048
2008-04-06 07:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT MUTHANNA: POST-BASRAH ATMOSPHERICS

Tags:  PINS PGOV IR 
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VZCZCXRO4458
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1048 0970755
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060755Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6664
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001048 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018
TAGS: PINS PGOV IR
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: POST-BASRAH ATMOSPHERICS

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001048 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018 TAGS: PINS PGOV IR SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: POST-BASRAH ATMOSPHERICS Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is a PRT Muthanna reporting cable. ¶2. (C) The new OMS leader in Muthanna is known as Muhannad Abdulhussein al-Karbala'i (although there is suspicion that this is a pseudonym). He cooperated closely with Gov. Marzook during the outbreak of violence in late March, including reaching an agreement that, in exchange for preventing JAM violence, entailed the provincial government 1) allowing the Sadrists to re-open two closed OMS offices in Rumaytha; 2) promising to release the 50 detainees arrested by the Criminal Investigations Unit (CIU) on 23 and 24 March, as well as JAM members held by the CIU without sufficient evidence to bring to trial. Sadrists in Muthanna had sought government agreement to these terms for over a year. ¶3. (C) The curfews imposed by security services across the south during the recent fighting generated local anger against provincial governments. Rather than blaming the militias, citizens are criticizing the government for curfews that brought no increase in security and aggravated daily life by restricting movement and leading to fuel shortages and inflated prices of goods. In Muthanna, residents ask why they endured these hardships even though the province remained peaceful and view the restrictions as further evidence of the GOI's incompetence. ¶4. (C) Current public perception of the Sadrist movement in Muthanna is that it is a violent organization without a competent and credible political dimension. The Sadrists face the challenge of proving their political abilities and fielding a convincing slate of candidates when provincial elections take place. They are likely to reach out to respected, educated individuals who can put a respectable face on the relatively uneducated and unrefined masses associated with the Sadrist movement. Provincial elections will also put pressure on the Sadrists to reach out to tribes for support and talk to "foreigners." This last should help us in our PRT engagement efforts. ¶5. (C) Maliki,s ad hoc "Sahwa" start-up in Basra has attracted 800 tribesmen from Muthanna to sign up for the Iraqi Army. The tribesmen had to be "cleared" through the local Da,wa Party office and then went through what was jokingly called "the one hour IA training camp" before shipping south. Our local contacts predict that tribal demands for what are seen as "free jobs" in the IA will swell in Muthanna and the other southern provinces, as Shia tribes demand the same recognition and employment opportunities given to their Sunni counterparts through the "Sahwa" movement. BUTENIS

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