Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08BAGHDAD1045
2008-04-05 17:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED"

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ IR 
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VZCZCXRO4329
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1045/01 0961747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051747Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6659
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001045 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR
SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED"
SADRISTS, AND SFA

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001045 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: VP ADEL ON SECURITY CRACKDOWN, "CONFUSED" SADRISTS, AND SFA Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 5 meeting, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi told us that the time is ripe for harsh and decisive GOI action against the "cancer" of armed outlaw groups, a measure supported by the Iraqi political class and public and even by Iranian General Qasim Sulaimani. He said the overwhelming majority of Iraqis - even those who live in Sadrist strongholds - have turned against Sadrist extortion, shakedowns, and intimidation and are eager for the GOI to impose order and stability. He portrayed the Sadrists as confused and quickly losing influence on the Shia street. End Summary. Broad Support for GOI Removal of "Cancer" of Armed Outlaws -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Adel told NSC Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan McGurk, Amb. Marcie Ries, and Polcouns that, in the aftermath of the GOI crackdown in Basrah, there is broad political momentum and public support for the elimination of armed criminal groups in defense of the principle that only GOI security personnel should have a right to bear weapons. He praised the Basrah operation led by Prime Minister Maliki as a "good direction" that proved that a Shia government can deal harshly with Shia militias, but the GOI must follow-up and "settle" once and for all the "cancer" of JAM and armed criminal groups. He lauded GOI security force handling of the Basrah operation (he cited a report that showed only 3 percent of forces had deserted or misbehaved during battle) and for containing JAM violence in south-central Iraq, much of which is under provincial government control. Adel appeared genuinely unaware of Maliki's April 4 statement temporarily halting raids and arrests of militia members. ¶3. (C) Adel predicted a crackdown on JAM will vastly improve the security situation since JAM provides cover for the criminal acts of many groups, just as the GOI crackdown on AQI exposed and ended the criminality of other groups. Adel claimed that Iranian Quds Force Gen. Qasim Sulaimani had agreed with him (referencing a meeting between Adil, Talabani, and Sulaimani) recently that JAM needed to be dissolved, not just frozen. When asked how the GOI would achieve this result, Adel stated that the GOI should hit hard at key Sadrist strongholds like Sadr City on t
he theory that "once you take the capital the rest falls quickly into place." Warning that JAM would quickly adapt to "small GOI measures" and claiming that "we know these people and we know how to fight," Adel predicted that, as had happened with Kurdish rebels in 1975, the military wing the Sadrist Trend would give up the battle if the GOI struck hard and also followed a political track. ¶4. (C) Adel said the Political Council for National Security would likely devote much of its scheduled April 5 meeting to discuss this issue, and that the Presidency Council would convene prior to the meeting. McGurk urged the group to take advantage of the political climate to issue a statement affirming national unity based on the principles of the August 2007 Leaders' Communique, and also to address the issue of spending and investing the GOI's budget surplus. Adel confided that Maliki agreed before leaving for Basrah to hold an Executive Council meeting, but a meeting date had not yet been scheduled. Sadrists Confused, Popularity Dwindling -------------- ¶5. (C) When asked about the current direction and thinking of Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist Trend, Adel quipped that reading Sadr's moves is like predicting the odd bounces of an oblong American football rather than the predictable bounces of a round soccer ball: "the Sadrists are confused and Muqtada himself is confused." He said the Basrah operation defused the Sadrist's favorite rallying line that their fight is against ISCI/Badr since it is now a fight between a popularly-supported GOI and armed outlaws who carry guns against the government. Adel affirmed the right of the Sadrist Trend to operate as a political or cultural organization within the established political framework but could not operate as a "para-military group or a state within a state." He said the overwhelming majority of residents in Sadr City are against Sadr and all Iraqis are tired of JAM extortion, shakedowns, and intimidation. Regarding Sadr's Shia street influence, Adel said "when Sadr said the Eid should start on Thursday and Sistani said it should start on Friday, people followed Sistani." Adel complained that recent media coverage of the Basrah operation, particularly by USG-funded "al-Hurra" was negative toward the GOI and factually incorrect in many instances, possibly as the result of Sadrist intimidation of journalists. BAGHDAD 00001045 002 OF 002 Moving Ahead on the SFA -------------- ¶6. (C) NSC McGurk briefed on the results of the first round of SOFA talks among technical experts, asking that Adel weigh in with Maliki on the need for a parallel political-level discussion of the broader strategic framework agreement that sets forth our bilateral relationship in political, economic, cultural and other areas. Adel assured us he would discuss the matter with Maliki and National Security Advisor Rubaie, opining that it would be "very difficult" to meet our joint target of completing all related talks by the end of June - so as to permit CoR approval before the end of its summer session on July 31. BUTENIS

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