STUCK BETWEEN AN ARROGANT MAN AND A MAD MAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ IR
SUBJECT: STUCK BETWEEN AN ARROGANT MAN AND A MAD MAN

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: Wearing his mediator hat, Dr. Ahmed Chalabi
spoke with PolCouns on April 3 to discuss Basra and the
Iranian involvement in the conflict, as well as the
subsequent Sadrist movement to oust Maliki. Chalabi urged
the USG to take great caution in dealing with the Sadrists,
and indicated that the Sadrists were pleased with restraint
in U.S. public statements during the clashes in Basra.
Noting that "Maliki was not defeated, but he did not achieve
his goals in Basra," Chalabi outlined Iran's concerns over
the negotiations of the Strategic Framework Agreement. End
Summary.

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"Maliki was not defeated, but he did not achieve his goals"
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2. (C) Dr. Ahmed Chalabi noted that the Iranian role in Basra
was clear: groups trained by Iran led the fight against the
army. While the Iranians were taken by surprise, they
responded quickly by taking sides with Jaysh al-Mehdi and
sending in weapons and resupply. According to Chalabi,
Maliki is livid over the Iranian involvement.


3. (C) When the GOI could not achieve its publicly stated aim
of ridding Basra of the Special Groups, a delegation was sent
to Iran to negotiate with them, and President Talabani went
to the border to meet with Qasim Sulaimani and al-Sadr. In a
later phone call with Chalabi, Sulaimani confided to him that
"we are stuck between an arrogant man (Maliki) and a mad man
(al-Sadr)."


4. (C) While the Sadrists were surprised by the timing of the
operation in Basra, Chalabi said that the recently detained
Hajji Shibl had warned him that the Sadrists were expecting
an attack by the GOI, but that he was confident that their
preparations would repel any such attack. Chalabi
interpreted this to mean that the Sadrists were receiving
information directly from the command within Basra.


5. (C) Chalabi said that since Basra, the Sadrists have
noticed the careful statements of the USG, and that they
still continued to seek dialogue. Although they are cautious
of engaging with USG officials, Chalabi opined that many
Sadrists would now be more open to dialogue with the U.S..
He also said that it was wise to publicly differentiate
between the Special Forces groups and the "valid" JAM forces.

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Sadrists want Maliki out
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6. (C) In an effort to help quiet things down and to pursue a
reconciliation effort, Chalabi met with CoR Speaker Mashadani
and Qasim Daoud last week. They sought methods to preserve
the authority of the national government, promote rule of
law, and end military operations. As a result of this
meeting, Mashadani agreed to form a committee within the CoR.
However, at the last minute, Mashadani pulled out, saying he
was being pressured by the USG to stop. According to
Chalabi, President Talabani also said to him that he desisted
in calling for a meeting of the leadership because the USG
told him to support Maliki.


7. (C) Chalabi indicated that Maliki was refusing to execute
the decisions of the Parliament's committee. He noted that
Sadrist CoR member Baha al-Araji would hold a press
conference shortly to discuss the issue, where he would
attempt to appeal to PM Maliki's sense of patriotism.
Al-Araji later used the press conference to announce that the
Sadrists will enter a decisive battle against Maliki, in the
absence of GOI commitment to the committee's decisions.
There was little, if any, appeal to Maliki's sense of civic
duty.


8. (C) According to Chalabi, the Sadrists will continue to
try to replace the PM through a vote of no confidence, even
if they do not have full political buy-in. He noted that the
Sadrists could still use Iran to influence both the Kurds and
the Shia United Iraqi Alliance in order to gain the required
votes. Chalabi also noted that the Sadrists were planning
popular protests against Maliki to generate public sentiment
against him.


9. (C) Chalabi also said that Talabani thinks Maliki should
be removed, but not right now. He noted that Massoud Barzani
does not like Maliki but that he is more concerned about the
Iranian hand extending into Iraq. However, he pointed out
that Nechirvan Barzani is more likely to support Iran,
indicating that Nechirvan had already lobbied to remove
Maliki.

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Iran worried over SFA
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10. (C) Chalabi noted that Iran says that it has an interest
to see a stable Iraq but that they are more concerned with
the future relationship of Iraq with the U.S. Iran is most
concerned with Iraq's proposed Strategic Framework Agreement
with the USG. Without any further understanding of the
agreement, Iran will oppose it. As a solution, Chalabi
suggested that the USG talk with them bilaterally about the
issue, and not only through the trilateral mechanism.


11. (C) During the previous meetings with the USG, Chalabi
said that Iran felt as it was being lectured; Iran heard the
U.S. admonishments against the weapons flowing into Iraq, but
it wanted a more substantive conversation with the USG. In
the future, the Iranians would also rather exchange messages
through the Swiss Embassy than Mowafuq Rubaie.


12. (C) Chalabi said that Iran is not in an offensive mood;
it has a defensive frame of mind. He was quick to note,
however, that it is difficult to perceive this defensive
posture considering their shipments of weapons into Iraq.
Ultimately, Iran is concerned and afraid that the U.S. will
attack them.

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The conditions within Sadr City
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13. (C) Chalabi visited Sadr City earlier this week, where he
noted the situation within the neighborhood was dire. In a
visit to a local hospital, he said that he saw 395 wounded
and 80 dead, the vast majority of whom were civilians.
Chalabi has already delivered medicines and sacks of flour to
the area, and he hopes to bring 30,000 sacks of flour by the
end of the week. The curfew is lifted but only foot traffic
is allowed to proceed. Citizens of Sadr City are still being
shot at by snipers, and the U.S. soldiers near the entrance
are very nervous. He stressed that the GOI needed to do
something.

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Attacks on green zone
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14. (C) Claiming that the attacks on the International Zone
were a direct result of CF participation in AIR strikes in
Basra, Chalabi conceded that MNF-I acted with restraint which
helped him, he claimed, to negotiate a gradual cessation of
attacks on the International Zone. Chalabi will continue to
try to get some assurance from the Iranians that they will
not use Sadr City as a base for rocket attacks.

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Other concerns in the south
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15. (C) Chalabi characterized portions of the south as flash
points, especially Diwaniyah, noting that continued civil
disobedience could cause the situation to deteriorate all
over again. In Karbala, Chalabi said that he had a video
showing the Chief of Police ordering the police to shoot
specific individuals on sight, because there was no more room
within the jails. He noted that the police arrested over 500
people in the city, and killed others in the street.


16. (C) Concluding, Chalabi said that Iraq needs the USG here
for a long time. In his opinion, if there had been no U.S.
presence in Sadr City then there would currently be a total
rampage in Baghdad. Chalabi offered that it is clear to the
man in the street that the Maliki administration is in power
only because the USG supports it. But, the GOI needs to make
it possible for the USG to support it and not act without
coordination.
BUTENIS