STUCK BETWEEN AN ARROGANT MAN AND A MAD MAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001043 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IZ IR SUBJECT: STUCK BETWEEN AN ARROGANT MAN AND A MAD MAN Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Wearing his mediator hat, Dr. Ahmed Chalabi spoke with PolCouns on April 3 to discuss Basra and the Iranian involvement in the conflict, as well as the subsequent Sadrist movement to oust Maliki. Chalabi urged the USG to take great caution in dealing with the Sadrists, and indicated that the Sadrists were pleased with restraint in U.S. public statements during the clashes in Basra. Noting that "Maliki was not defeated, but he did not achieve his goals in Basra," Chalabi outlined Iran's concerns over the negotiations of the Strategic Framework Agreement. End Summary. -------------- -------------- "Maliki was not defeated, but he did not achieve his goals" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Dr. Ahmed Chalabi noted that the Iranian role in Basra was clear: groups trained by Iran led the fight against the army. While the Iranians were taken by surprise, they responded quickly by taking sides with Jaysh al-Mehdi and sending in weapons and resupply. According to Chalabi, Maliki is livid over the Iranian involvement. ¶3. (C) When the GOI could not achieve its publicly stated aim of ridding Basra of the Special Groups, a delegation was sent to Iran to negotiate with them, and President Talabani went to the border to meet with Qasim Sulaimani and al-Sadr. In a later phone call with Chalabi, Sulaimani confided to him that "we are stuck between an arrogant man (Maliki) and a mad man (al-Sadr)." ¶4. (C) While the Sadrists were surprised by the timing of the operation in Basra, Chalabi said that the recently detained Hajji Shibl had warned him that the Sadrists were expecting an attack by the GOI, but that he was confident that their preparations would repel any such attack. Chalabi interpreted this to mean that the Sadrists were receiving information directly from the command within Basra. ¶5. (C) Chalabi said that since Basra, the Sadrists have noticed the careful statements of the USG, and that they still continued to seek dialogue. Although they are cautious of engaging with USG officials, Chalabi opined that many Sadrists would now be more open to dialogue with the U.S.. He also said that it was wise to publicly differentiate between the Special Forces groups and the "valid" JAM forces. 
 -------------- Sadrists want Maliki out -------------- ¶6. (C) In an effort to help quiet things down and to pursue a reconciliation effort, Chalabi met with CoR Speaker Mashadani and Qasim Daoud last week. They sought methods to preserve the authority of the national government, promote rule of law, and end military operations. As a result of this meeting, Mashadani agreed to form a committee within the CoR. However, at the last minute, Mashadani pulled out, saying he was being pressured by the USG to stop. According to Chalabi, President Talabani also said to him that he desisted in calling for a meeting of the leadership because the USG told him to support Maliki. ¶7. (C) Chalabi indicated that Maliki was refusing to execute the decisions of the Parliament's committee. He noted that Sadrist CoR member Baha al-Araji would hold a press conference shortly to discuss the issue, where he would attempt to appeal to PM Maliki's sense of patriotism. Al-Araji later used the press conference to announce that the Sadrists will enter a decisive battle against Maliki, in the absence of GOI commitment to the committee's decisions. There was little, if any, appeal to Maliki's sense of civic duty. ¶8. (C) According to Chalabi, the Sadrists will continue to try to replace the PM through a vote of no confidence, even if they do not have full political buy-in. He noted that the Sadrists could still use Iran to influence both the Kurds and the Shia United Iraqi Alliance in order to gain the required votes. Chalabi also noted that the Sadrists were planning popular protests against Maliki to generate public sentiment against him. ¶9. (C) Chalabi also said that Talabani thinks Maliki should be removed, but not right now. He noted that Massoud Barzani does not like Maliki but that he is more concerned about the Iranian hand extending into Iraq. However, he pointed out that Nechirvan Barzani is more likely to support Iran, indicating that Nechirvan had already lobbied to remove Maliki. BAGHDAD 00001043 002 OF 002 -------------- Iran worried over SFA -------------- ¶10. (C) Chalabi noted that Iran says that it has an interest to see a stable Iraq but that they are more concerned with the future relationship of Iraq with the U.S. Iran is most concerned with Iraq's proposed Strategic Framework Agreement with the USG. Without any further understanding of the agreement, Iran will oppose it. As a solution, Chalabi suggested that the USG talk with them bilaterally about the issue, and not only through the trilateral mechanism. ¶11. (C) During the previous meetings with the USG, Chalabi said that Iran felt as it was being lectured; Iran heard the U.S. admonishments against the weapons flowing into Iraq, but it wanted a more substantive conversation with the USG. In the future, the Iranians would also rather exchange messages through the Swiss Embassy than Mowafuq Rubaie. ¶12. (C) Chalabi said that Iran is not in an offensive mood; it has a defensive frame of mind. He was quick to note, however, that it is difficult to perceive this defensive posture considering their shipments of weapons into Iraq. Ultimately, Iran is concerned and afraid that the U.S. will attack them. -------------- The conditions within Sadr City -------------- ¶13. (C) Chalabi visited Sadr City earlier this week, where he noted the situation within the neighborhood was dire. In a visit to a local hospital, he said that he saw 395 wounded and 80 dead, the vast majority of whom were civilians. Chalabi has already delivered medicines and sacks of flour to the area, and he hopes to bring 30,000 sacks of flour by the end of the week. The curfew is lifted but only foot traffic is allowed to proceed. Citizens of Sadr City are still being shot at by snipers, and the U.S. soldiers near the entrance are very nervous. He stressed that the GOI needed to do something. -------------- Attacks on green zone -------------- ¶14. (C) Claiming that the attacks on the International Zone were a direct result of CF participation in air strikes in Basra, Chalabi conceded that MNF-I acted with restraint which helped him, he claimed, to negotiate a gradual cessation of attacks on the International Zone. Chalabi will continue to try to get some assurance from the Iranians that they will not use Sadr City as a base for rocket attacks. -------------- Other concerns in the south -------------- ¶15. (C) Chalabi characterized portions of the south as flash points, especially Diwaniyah, noting that continued civil disobedience could cause the situation to deteriorate all over again. In Karbala, Chalabi said that he had a video showing the Chief of Police ordering the police to shoot specific individuals on sight, because there was no more room within the jails. He noted that the police arrested over 500 people in the city, and killed others in the street. ¶16. (C) Concluding, Chalabi said that Iraq needs the USG here for a long time. In his opinion, if there had been no U.S. presence in Sadr City then there would currently be a total rampage in Baghdad. Chalabi offered that it is clear to the man in the street that the Maliki administration is in power only because the USG supports it. But, the GOI needs to make it possible for the USG to support it and not act without coordination. BUTENIS