NSA RUBAIE ON PCNS, SOFA/SFA, BASRAH AFTERMATH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001042 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV IR IZ PINS SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE ON PCNS, SOFA/SFA, BASRAH AFTERMATH Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 4 meeting with Senior Director for Iraq and Afghanistan Brett McGurk and Polmilcouns, Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie agreed on the need to capitalize on the positive political atmosphere by releasing a strong, unified statement during the April 5 PCNS. He was relatively optimistic about SOFA/SFA negotiations and emphasized that JAM represented a criminal problem and needed to be dealt with using law enforcement measures. End summary. ¶2. (C) Rubaie said he expected two major issues to be discussed during tomorrow's PCNS: 1) the situation post-Basrah, or as he put, "after Muqtada's temper tantrum;" 2) SFA negotiations and the need to form an Iraqi negotiation team. McGurk suggested that the PCNS issue a strong statement, similar to the August 26 communiqu, that emphasizes GOI unity against criminals, the need for economic and political programs to follow military operations (including immediate investment of Iraq's budget surplus), and the importance of a long-term agreement with the U.S. Rubaie agreed on the need for a statement. Rubaie said it was "probable" that Tawafuq would rejoin the government, albeit without the IIP. He predicted that members of Sahwa would fill the IIP posts. ¶3. (C) On SOFA/SFA, Rubaie said the negotiations needed to be "marketed in a proper way." He explained that they should be linked to the formal end of the occupation and Chapter VII authority. McGurk emphasized the importance of the July deadline for the SFA. Rubaie said that, with the PM's blessing, the SOFA negotiations should "not be difficult" and predicted the Iraqis would want to discuss only "three to four technical points." Rubaie was intrigued by the notion that a SOFA provided the rules of the road for U.S. forces to operate on foreign soil - and did not automatically lock-in a permanent U.S. military presence. He asked for examples of countries that have a SOFA with the U.S. but do not have a permanent U.S. troop presence. McGurk asked about the likely composition of the Iraqi negotiation team for the SFA, suggesting that the 3 2 (Maliki, Talabani, Hashimi, Adil Mahdi, and Barzani) deputies would be well-suited to the task. Rubaie agreed, and noted again the importance of briefing Muqtada al-Sadr regularly on what the SOFA is all about - to correct misperceptions, even though Sadr will likely remain opposed. ¶4. (C) Rubaie said Maliki's April 4 statement announcing an end to raids against militants was delayed by one day to avoid being seen as a capitulation to Sadr's escalating threats. Rubaie stated that the U.S. needed to "radically" revise its strategy against JAM and emphasized that JAM was a criminal problem, not an insurgency, and needed to be dealt with using law-enforcement rather than military means. He explained that in the long-term the Sunni insurgency, especially AQI, remained the real threat to the Iraqi government. Rubaie divided the special groups into three categories: 1) JAM members who are loyal to Sadr; 2) Groups under the direct control of Iran; 3) Rogue groups operating independently. He added that two competing special groups had tried to trap him in Baghdad's Shula mosque and that one group was hoping to take him hostage while the other was trying to kill him. Rubaie recommended that the U.S. and GOI take advantage of Sadr's denial that JAM possesses heavy weapons to target individuals carrying such weapons, although he admitted he did not know if the GOI and Sadr shared the same definition of "heavy weapons." In response to McGurk's comment that it's hard to conduct arrest operations when the arresting party meets EFP ambushes and RPG barrages, Rubaie clarified that any violent response to police operations needed to be met with military force. He said the GOI should publicize the names of the most-wanted JAM leaders, and predicted that in response "nine out of ten" of the suspects would immediately flee to Iran. Afterwards, he suggested, the GOI could work with Sadrists, possibly through a committee or liaison office, to prosecute remaining criminals and "bring Sadr into our tent." ¶5. (C) Rubaie added that he was a writing a political and military "lessons learned" from the Basrah experience. He said it was clear that the ISF was incapable of operating without coalition logistics support, and quoted a military colleague who said that, without coalition support, the "Iraqis would have been forced out of Basrah the same way they were forced out of Kuwait." ¶6. (C) Rubaie agreed that the GOI should not "let Iran get away" with its interference in Iraqi affairs and suggested using the media to expose Iran's role in the recent violence. He said that during the shelling ISCI leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim warned the Iranians that they were "playing with BAGHDAD 00001042 002 OF 002 fire" by shelling the IZ and asked them to imagine the consequences if the rockets killed any senior U.S. leadership. McGurk agreed that escalation by Iran cannot go unchallenged. BUTENIS