JAM IN BAGHDAD -- HOW STRONG IS IT?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001036 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR IZ SUBJECT: JAM IN BAGHDAD -- HOW STRONG IS IT? Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is a joint Embassy political-Baghdad PRT cable. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY: Jaysh Al-Mahdi's (JAM) show of force in Baghdad since March 23 has demonstrated its potential to bring Iraq's capital to a standstill for a limited period, but not without alienating large segments of the local population and losing many fighters. The JAM offensive left many of Baghdad's residents angry and somewhat shaken, and has also offered a rare glimpse of the extent and the limitations of JAM's political and strategic power in Baghdad. CF presence standing side by side with ISF neutralized JAM's military action to a series of random terror acts. Cautiously hoping that a tenuous ceasefire would hold, Baghdad residents began on April 1 to settle back into the lives they led before eight days of conflict locked most of them in their homes. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BAGHDAD BEGINS RETURNING TO "NORMAL" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) AFter eight days JAM's influence subsided. Baghdad residents began leaving their homes April 1 to travel to markets, work, and school throughout most of the city, while Sadr City and some neighboring areas began to also stabilize. Locals reported that Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA) units were manning checkpoints. Markets and households began to replenish food supplies, though food and fuel prices generally remained significantly higher than they were before March 23. Many Amanat workers returned to work and began to deplete the massive piles of trash that had accumulated over the previous eight days throughout Baghdad's nine central districts. Access to regular hospital services remained limited in areas such as Sadr City, but emergency cases reportedly received treatment. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces only confronted JAM in a limited number of Baghdad's neighborhoods, and much of the city's population felt the deprivations of war after several days of conflict, indicating that a pitched battle between Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and JAM could precipitate a localized humanitarian crisis in parts of Baghdad. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JAM'S SUCCESSES: QUICK AND DIRTY -- AND RELIANT ON FORCE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The speed and the extent to which JAM members prevented movement and spread fear through large swathes of Baghdad was breathtaking. 48 hours after their first protests and manifestations of "civil disobedience" on March 23, we saw the first spike in JAM initiated violence, causing the IA to implement a vehicle ban which, along with apprehensions of JAM mortar and rocket attacks, led to the closure of streets, schools, businesses, and markets throughout Baghdad's central districts. In the Shia-majority areas that they controlled, they sent out snipers, implanted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs),and started launching mortars and rockets at Coalition Forward Operating Bases, Joint Security Stations, and the International Zone. They limited movement through Sadr City and parts of several surrounding districts, to include Kadhamiya, 9 Nissan, northern Adhamiya, and western Rashid. ¶5. (C) JAM also intimidated many members of the ISF and several key provincial leaders into defection, compliance, or silence. In the midst of the crisis, several elected representatives and government employees made the instinctive calculations. Policemen in the vicinity of Sadr City reportedly abandoned their posts rather than confront JAM members; some of these deserters may have either joined JAM or facilitated its actions. Iraqi Army soldiers in Shia-dominated areas reacted similarly, though to a much lesser extent. IP required CF support to stay at checkpoints in hot areas in eastern Baghdad, according to numerous local reports and media accounts. IA performed adequately in western Baghdad with CF support, according to Baghdad EPRTs. Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Mueen al-Khademy (ISCI) released a bold PC statement March 27 asking citizens of Baghdad not to side with the "criminals and outlaws" seeking to destabilize the city. Mayor Saber al Essawi (ISCI) made a radio announcement that the Amanat is continuing to provide its services to all areas of Baghdad, asking for patience as Amanat staff were also "suffering" from the curfew. But Governor Hussein Tahan (ISCI) remained conspicuously silent during a time of crisis in his province. Shatha Al-Obeidi, Governor Tahan's media advisor, told PRToff that the governor seemed to want to avoid discussing the conflict raging in Baghdad for fear that taking a position could hurt him or PC members in upcoming elections. BAGHDAD 00001036 002 OF 003 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JAM'S WEAKNESSES: LIMITED APPEAL BEYOND CORE STRONGHOLDS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) JAM achieved an impressive show of force in Baghdad through brute intimidation. Muqtada Al-Sadr's (MAS) calls for broad civil action across the city brought JAM members and loyalists into the streets in a number of areas, including 9 Nissan district, northern Adhamiya, the Shula neighborhood of northern Mansour, and parts of Kadhimiya and west Rashid. But it did not inspire broad popular support in Baghdad. Quite the contrary - - a noticeable gap emerged between the substance of Sadr's demands (widespread sit-ins and demonstrations) and the actions of the majority of residents in Baghdad (sitting it out at home). ¶7. (C) One local PRT contact described it as "the Iraqis in the middle" -- those Baghdad residents who do not sympathize with JAM, but also do not represent or work for the government. These Iraqis caught in the middle -- Shia and Sunni -- experienced insecurity, threats, food shortages, the firing of rockets in front of their homes, the emplacement of explosives in their streets, house arrest, isolation, and a rapid deterioration in their purchasing power. As one resident disgusted with JAM told PRToff, "Maliki is weak. Here everyone is loyal to either their sect, JAM or money. We need a powerful, secular leader." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JAM'S "FOES": BADR- AND SUNNI-CONTROLLED AREAS RESIST THE TIDE, REMAIN CALM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Sunni areas stayed calm and seemed comparatively unaffected. Most residents in West Baghdad touted the security provided by "Abna al Iraq," the local Sons of Iraq. Though limited security incidents occurred in mixed areas, these "fault line" areas remained more calm and returned to normalcy more quickly than the Shia-dominated areas. Badr areas like Atifiya in Kadhamiya and along the Karada peninsula remained calmer than Sadr-controlled areas. One local contact told poloff that he now avoids Shia areas and travels through Sunni areas instead, "where nine months ago they were slaughtering people." There were reports of migrations away from restive JAM-associated Shia neighborhoods into calmer disticts, e.g. Shia leaving the JAM-dominated Shula neighborhood moving to stay with family in other Shia or mixed areas like Karada. Sadists and Badrists were said to be assassinating each other in at least one area -- the rural Zafaraniya neighborhood of Karada district. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Some Empathy for Sadr City, but JAM-Powerbase Limited in Baghdad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) JAM is very much in Baghdad an urban mass movement with weak appeal in rural areas. Surrounding qadas all held steady - - because tribal and Sunni residents know who the JAM members are. Over the past week, numerous reports shed light on different Baghdadi perceptions of Sadr City. Many feel sorry for Sadr City residents and believe that viable employment opportunities would have prevented this kind of unrest from ever occurring. Though blamed for senseless killings, local JAM were also described on occasion as "our sons" who must be "helped." There were frequent reminders that JAM is not the only "troublemaker" in Baghdad. Several people pointed out that Iraqis in general - but security forces in particular - located in or around Sadr City hesitate to kill local JAM for fear of tribal reprisals. (Comment: Allegedly, tribal law only goes one way-it does not apply to those who pledge loyalty to the government via service in the ISF. Killing ISF does not "count." End Comment.) For many Baghdad residents, blame for the violence was directed not just at JAM but at the GOI for failing to provide essential services. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - VERDICT: JAM CAN SHUT DOWN BAGHDAD, BUT THEY PAY A PRICE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (C) The protests that began Easter Sunday were not the massive uprising that we could expect were MAS to call an end to the freeze and urge all of his followers to rise up. Such a scenario could involve significantly more violence and last for a far longer period. Nonetheless, JAM's actions showed that its leaders can very quickly call on large numbers of loosely coordinated armed supporters. Despite command and control issues and confusion in Baghdad within and between mainline JAM and Special Groups, MAS turned the BAGHDAD 00001036 003 OF 003 action off around Mar 30 and most of his followers listened; he issued very clear instructions, which were distributed to all OMS offices: "get weapons off the streets." He could, of course, also turn the protests back on. The price for the mayhem they cause: dead JAM members and substantial loss of public support. Many locals fear that JAM will never surrender their weapons. One locally employed staff member at the Baghdad PRT warned of the many IP uniforms, vehicles, and weapons left in the hands of militia that will likely be used for kidnappings, extortion, or other terror-related activities. The sense of insecurity is compounded by the increased volume of IEDs and EFPs set up since March 23. BUTENIS