BADR'S HADI AL-AMRI ON BASRAH CRACKDOWN AND TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001033 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: BADR'S HADI AL-AMRI ON BASRAH CRACKDOWN AND TALKS IN TEHRAN Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Badr Organization strongman Hadi al-Amri told us April 2 that the recent GOI crackdown in Basrah was a largely successful and long-overdue first step in "the surgical removal of the disease of armed militias," a process that will continue in the coming days. Hadi claimed that Prime Minister Maliki's hand was forced by Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups that were eager to create a pretext for terminating Muqtada al-Sadr's recently-extended JAM freeze order and thus fomented violence in various parts of Iraq in the two weeks preceding Maliki's Basrah "Operation Charge of the Horsemen." Hadi said that future "disease eradication" will focus on Basrah and the marshes around Amarah, "the open door into Iraq" for movement of arms and money from Iran, adding that he understood our point that GOI security operations must be conducted in a non-partisan manner. The gruff former militia leader expressed support for the "Awakening" of southern tribes as key to holding GOI security gains. Hadi was a member of a three-person United Iraq Alliance (UIA) delegation that traveled to Iran late last week to complain of Iranian supply of arms to JAM, a visit that ended with Sadr's March 30 stand-down order for JAM fighters. Hadi divulged his dismay that Iranian officials "spoke the language of Sadr" when they insisted that the Basrah operation was a politically-motivated USG-GOI plot to destroy the Sadrist movement, and they hotly denied providing arms to JAM. He also spoke at length about the need for U.S.-Iranian dialogue to dispel misconceptions both sides have about the other, opining that Tehran is ready for talks that produce real results. End Summary. Eradicating the Disease, Plucking the Weed -------------- ¶2. (C) Hadi said that JAM had instigated the violence, running through a timeline of attacks in south-central Iraq beginning in mid-March that forced the GOI to react. The goal of such violence, in his view, was to create a pretext for the termination of Muqtada al-Sadr's recently-extended JAM freeze order: "JAM succeeded fully in this goal." The gruff, plain-speaking Badr chairman hailed Maliki's "Operation Charge of the Horsemen" as a largely successful and long-overdue first step in "the surgical removal of the disease of armed militias" and claimed the operation was never meant to be directed at JAM. In fact, he asserted, Maliki believed that Sadrists would cooperate in cracking down on Basrah's armed criminal gangs, but instead they claimed the operation was a politically-motivated attempt by its Shia political opponents to destroy the Sadr movement. He lauded the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for being able to contain Sadrist counter-attacks in various towns in south-central Iraq and Sadrist strongholds in Baghdad. Hadi said that future "disease eradication" will focus on Basrah and the marshes around Amarah, "the open door into Iraq" for movement of arms and money from Iran and an area Hadi knows well from his Saddam-era days as a gun-running resistance fighter. The one-time militia leader and current senior CoR member assured Polcouns that he well-understood our point about the importance that GOI security operations be conducted in a non-partisan manner. ¶3. (C) Returning to his pet theme about the need for cracking down on armed groups ("there is no other solution") but using different rhetorical imagery, Hadi likened the presence of militias to that of a garden weed: if handled early, a weed can be plucked and killed with two fingers, but great effort and heavy tools will be needed to accomplish the same end if the weed is not dealt with in a timely fashion. Hadi claimed the Basrah operation "showed us the nature and weaknesses of the enemy and the size and scope of their weaponry." He stated that the operation was a type of wake-up for Iraqis about the reality of armed groups, "a good thing because we now better understand that all is not well in Iraq." He complained that Western media analysis of the Basrah operation falsely portrayed Sadr as the winner, adding that the press is confused "because American officials kept telling them for many months that the Iraq situation is good and stable." He said the GOI should find employment opportunities to draw people away from armed groups, but should employ the same tactics and degree of force now used against AQI to deal with those who refuse to leave such groups. Even though Hadi and ISCI/Badr were strongly opposed to southern "Awakening" only a few weeks ago and they frequently accused the USG of abetting such movements among Shia tribes, Hadi expressed strong support for the "Awakening" of southern tribes as key to holding ISF security gains. Speaking in Tongues in Tehran -------------- BAGHDAD 00001033 002 OF 002 ¶4. (C) Hadi joined Dawa's Ali al-Adib and a Dawa Tanzim representative to form a three-person United Iraq Alliance (UIA) delegation that, in consultation with Maliki, traveled to Iran late last week to voice complaints to Iranian Government officials about the supply of Iranian arms to JAM. Hadi said the visit was particularly important as it marked the first time that the UIA had spoken on this topic with a single voice to Iranian officials. Hadi said that the group spoke frankly to the Iranians about Iran's provision of arms and training to Sadrists and demanded an end to these practices. In reply, the Iranians hotly denied that they supplied such assistance and demanded evidence to support the accusations. Furthermore, Hadi was dismayed to find that Iranian officials "spoke the language of Sadr" by insisting that the Basrah operation was a politically-motivated USG-GOI plot to destroy the Sadrist movement, and they cited recent POTUS media statements of support for the operation as proof of collusion. They also accused the delegation of "speaking with the American tongue." Hadi said the group pushed back hard, asking sarcastically whether the JAM's weapons simply fell to them from the sky, and attempted to shame the Iranians by pointing out that Tehran's actions do not match its words about concern for Iraq's Shia. Hadi sighed that "the Iranians told us again and again that they support Maliki and do not arm JAM, but nevertheless we Iraqis have a disaster on our hands." Regarding direct negotiations between the UIA team and Muqtada al-Sadr, Haitham al-Husseini, a senior aide to Hadi's boss ISCI Chairman Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, told us separately that the delegation extracted the best deal they could in Sadr's March 30 nine-point stand-down order for JAM fighters, which he claimed represented a Sadr "concession" that was made after an entire night of nasty, heated discussion and considerable Iranian pressure upon the Iraqi cleric. Haitham said ISCI/Badr remains concerned that Sadr's March 30 statement did not expressly acknowledge the GOI's right to control and impose the rule of law in Sadrist stronghold neighborhoods. "Need for Dialogue between Great Satan and Axis of Evil" -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Hadi spoke at length about the need for U.S.-Iranian dialogue to dispel misconceptions both sides had about the other. Employing an Iraqi adaptation of a famous Talleyrand maxim, Hadi intoned that "there is no haram and halal in politics, only interests" and he claimed that U.S. - Iranian dialogue will be in the interests of both countries and of Iraq. Describing himself as an "expert" on Iran who lived among Iranians for many years, Hadi stated that the Iranians are tough and stubborn but ready to move beyond game-playing and engage in a conversation that will produce something real. Polcouns replied that we do not seek discussions simply for the sake of holding discussions and believe that discussions must produce results. He noted that Iran appears to have a serious misunderstanding regarding the aim of ongoing discussions between the USG and the GOI over a long-term strategic relationship, adding that Iran needs to hear from Iraqis that their relationship with the U.S. is not directed against Iran. Hadi closed the meeting by stating that the time had come for dialogue "between the Great Satan and the Axis of Evil." CROCKER