C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: ATTIYAH AND MASHHADANI STAND BY MALIKI, OPTIMISTIC
ON NEXT COR SESSION

Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reaons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: In separate April 3 conversations with
Polcouns, COR Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and COR Deputy
Speaker Sheikh Khalid al-Attiyah both proclaimed their
support for PM Maliki's government. Attiyah stated that all
Sadrists had ties to Iran, while Mashhadani offered a more
nuanced view, explaining that the Sadrists were reacting to
years of neglect by the central government. Both
parliamentary leaders recognized the importance of preserving
legislative momentum and addressing key legislation,
including the passage of an Elections Law. Mashhadani and
Attiyah were also both receptive to offers of assistance from
the U.S. Embassy's Constitutional and Legislative Affairs
unit (CLA). End Summary.

Attiyah: UIA is firm and unified
--------------


2. (C) Attiyah proclaimed that the UIA was "firm, unified,
with one vision," noting that the Kurds and even Tawafuq were
supporting PM Maliki. He said he expected Sadrist attempts
to force through a vote of no-confidence but called it a
"desperate, failing effort." Attiyah rejected the notion
that the Basrah offensive, occurring immediately before the
April congressional testimony, was poorly timed. Instead, he
said, it strengthened the position of the government and
demonstrated a new resolve to enforce law and order. Attiyah
agreed that there were different strands within the Sadr
movement and that the GOI should pursue a dialogue with
moderates. "But in general," he added, "all the parts of the
Sadr movement share something: their relationship with Iran."
Attiyah speculated that the goal of Iran was to put pressure
on the U.S. by supporting the Sadrists as a Hizbollah-style
movement and called this strategy "unacceptable." When
Polcouns noted that intra-Shia violence was not in Iran's
interests, Attiyah agreed but admitted he "couldn't fully
understand" Iran's intentions. Attiyah predicted there would
be no moves towards regions formation after the law went into
effect on April 11.


3. (C) Attiyah agreed there were many important laws facing
the COR. He said the COR was still waiting for a draft of <

br>the elections law and speculated that the COR would "maybe be
allowed" to hold a reading on hydrocarbons legislation.
Attiyah predicted that the next week of the COR would be
devoted to a discussion of the Basrah crises. Attiyah
welcomed the proposed assistance from the Political Section's
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs (CLA) unit and asked
to see the proposed "course catalogue" of training offered to
MPs as well as the U.S. report of political issues that
should be resolved prior to the final drafting of an
elections law.

Mashhadani: "Awed" by PM Maliki's bravery
--------------


4. (C) Mashhadani praised PM Maliki as his "old friend from
the resistance." While conceding that Maliki has some faults
- "Is he a smart leader? No. Is he a professional leader?
No." - the speaker proclaimed himself "awed" by Maliki's
bravery, noting that Maliki was willing to confront the
Sadrists and stayed in Basrah to direct operations despite
the great risk to his life. Mashhadani noted that several
politicians, including Adil Abdel Mehdi and Ayad Allawi, were
conspiring to replace Maliki but said they were "mistaken"
and announced his personal support for the PM, "at least
until October 1." Asked about the meeting of PCNS scheduled
for April 6, Mashhadani caustically noted that it was meeting
"too late," saying that he was "annoyed and sad" that
President Talabani did nothing to help PM Maliki during the
recent crisis. "I will try to cooperate," he said, "but we
will just sit around and drink coffee and talk" during the
PCNS.


5. (C) Maliki said he was developing different strategies to
deal with national issues, including Sunni outreach and
reconstruction. He said his message to politicians was "stop
trying to overthrow the government and start working towards
the real agenda." Provincial elections, he said, were the
solution to many of Iraq's problems, because strong,
representative provincial governments could "fill in the
constitutional gaps" left by the central authority. Those
currently trying to overthrow the government, he concluded,
"are fools, terrorists, or working towards a foreign agenda."


6. (C) Despite this harsh stance Mashhadani was conciliatory
towards the broader Sadr movement, explaining "I spent time
with them in prison. I understand their mentality." The
Sadrists, he explained, "want to be the equal of Badr. The
conflict between Badr and Sadr is very old, and will not be

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resolved until there is a balance between the two" and they
coexist "like two stallions in the same stable." He
described the Sadrists as the most anti-Iranian of Shia
groups and called them "the party of the street."
Unfortunately, he noted, they do not have good leaders,
because the core Sadrist leadership had all been killed by
Saddam. The problem, Mashhadani said, is that the Sadrists
continue to be neglected even as ISCI and Badr, supported by
Iran, control the government and Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has
"millions in his bank accounts in Paris and London."
Everything the Sadrists do, he added, is a reaction against
this neglect. Mashhadani said the solution was to give
Sadrists their "rightful" positions within the government,
including security posts, and target poor areas like Sadr
City with reconstruction projects. Mashhadani pronounced it
"strange" that Hakim can visit Washington despite his ties to
Iran while the Sadrists remain isolated.


7. (C) Looking ahead towards the upcoming COR session,
Mashhadani identified two sets of priorities: In the
short-term, these were the elections law, the law regulating
political parties, and COR relations with the UN.
Longer-term priorities included the hydrocarbons law and the
law regulating the composition of ministries. Mashhadani
seemed impatient to receive a draft elections law - "If you
get it to me, I'll make sure it passes" - but agreed that
several political issues needed to be resolved to ensure the
law was passed. He laughed with agreement when Polcouns
noted that "many people do not understand what an open-list
system means." Mashhadani was very receptive to assistance
from the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs (CLA) unit
but cautioned that any COR leadership meetings with UNAMI and
elections advisors should be done collectively, rather than
in individual sessions, to save time and reduce suspicion
among COR members. Mashhadani also asked several times for
U.S. assistance for an NGO that operates a "youth parliament."
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