SADRIST SEEKS USG HELP IN "CLIPPING SATAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000103 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SADRIST SEEKS USG HELP IN "CLIPPING SATAN'S TOENAILS" REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 3375 (BADR-SADR ACCORD) ¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 3821 (IRAN IS EVERYWHERE) ¶C. 07 BAGHDAD 4048 (GOD AND SADR) Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Jawad al-Hasnawi, a senior Sadrist Trend official and Deputy Governor of Karbala province, told us January 10 that he and a growing number of other Sadrists have come to the conclusion that Iran, not the United States, is Iraq's greatest nemesis, and he proposed that the USG work together with him and like-minded colleagues to "clip the toenails of Satan" by ridding Iraq of what he characterized as rampant Iranian penetration at all levels. Relating a convoluted tale of his violent expulsion from Karbala by alleged Iranian confederates within the GOI and ISF, he complained that Sadrist arch-enemy ISCI/Badr and the Hakim family "manage" Iraq on behalf of their Iranian masters while duplicitously passing themselves off as democratic friends to an all-too-gullible USG. The intense and bearded 30-something Hasnawi readily acknowledged that Iran has also infiltrated the Sadrist Trend, particularly the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),and said Moqtada al-Sadr's six-month "freeze" order is an attempt by the fiercely nationalistic and virulently anti-Iranian Sadr to flush out elements who are paid by Iran - often through ISCI/Badr - to discredit the movement and attack Coalition Forces. He claimed Sadr has already decided to extend the freeze beyond its scheduled late-February expiration, and is keen to change the movement's focus from "legitimate resistance" to delivery of public services. Hasnawi grew visibly tense and replied in the negative when asked whether Sadr was aware of our meeting, but claimed that, as a member of Sadr's Political Committee and a future senior leader of the movement, he is in a position to establish an indirect line for us to Sadr by introducing views to Moqtada that are often compatible with USG perspectives and thus gradually change Sadr's fiery worldview. We intend to arrange future meetings with Hasnawi in order to glean further insight into the Sadrist movement. End Summary. America is Bad But the Persians are Worse -------------- ¶2. (C) Hasnawi, an intense and bearded man in his mid-30s who introduced himself as the Deputy Governor of Karbala and a member of the Political Committee of the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS),was accompanied by the even more intense and dour Ghalib al-Dami, who introduced himself as a Sadrist member of the Karbala Provincial Council. They were joined halfway through the meeting by Ibrahim al-Sumaydaei, a chain-smoking Sunni lawyer who is often interviewed on Arab satellite television news programs for his glib "Baghdad ground truth" commentary. Sumaydaei, who confided that he once worked in Saddam's intelligence service, brokered the meeting out of a claimed nationalistic desire to foster understanding between "moderate" Sadrists and the USG (we thought it imprudent to ask the Sadrist interlocutors whether Sumaydaei had divulged to them his shadowy Baathist past). ¶3. (C) Hasnawi's dominant and recurring message during the 90-minute meeting was that Iran - not the United States - is the real occupying power in Iraq, and the Iranians and their Iraqi confederates are well on their way to controlling Iraq's political, economic, and Shia religious life at the national level and throughout the southern and central Shia-majority provinces. Acting on age-old ambitions to dominate Iraq, he claimed, Iran is using Iranian citizens, Iraqi sympathizers (some with family ties to Iran),and paid agents to penetrate the Iraqi government, intelligence, and security forces at all levels and do Tehran's bidding. In addition, he claimed that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (an Iranian national) and the rest of the senior Shia religious establishment are beholden to Iran. Characterizing Karbala as the center of gravity for Iran's comprehensive and concerted infiltration campaign, he claimed the town is awash with long-term Iranian residents (not merely religious pilgrims) and that Persian is heard more often than Arabic on Karbala streets. ¶4. (C) Hasnawi said he naively attempted several months ago to alert Karbala government officials such as the provincial governor (a member of the Dawa party) and police chief (a Badr official) of the extent and scope of Iranian activity. Rather than acting on his tip, however, Hasnawi claimed the officials alerted their fellow Iranian confederates of his discovery and orchestrated acts of harassment against him that included the assassination of Hasnawi's bodyguards, an arson attack on his house, the arrest of his brother, and the issuance of a warrant for his arrest that was rescinded only after Moqtada al-Sadr's top lieutenants weighed in with BAGHDAD 00000103 002 OF 003 "Arab" GOI senior officials. He claimed the harassment happened to coincide with a larger anti-Sadrist offensive launched by the ISF in the wake of the late-August 2007 Shabbaniyah violence at Karbala's holy shrines: Hasnawi insisted that the violence was a staged set-up by Sistani gunsels and ISCI/Badr intent on killing Sadrists, but he conceded with evident sorrow that Sadr's enemies have succeeded in convincing the Shia street that Sadr and JAM bear full responsibility for the "desecration" and that the Sadrist public image has plunged as a result. Hasnawi and Dami said they are unable to return to Karbala for fear of violence and are thus unable to fulfill their duties as provincial government officials. ¶5. (C) While Hasnawi rattled off a list of senior GOI officials alleged to be Iranian moles (he listed, for example, former PM al-Jaffari and Dawa CoR leader Ali al-Adeeb and son),he reserved his strongest invective for the "Persian" Hakim family and their ISCI/Badr organization. He insisted that the Hakims and ISCI/Badr "manage" Iraq on behalf of their Iranian masters while duplicitously fobbing themselves off as democratic friends to the USG which, to Hasnawi's claimed "amazement," appears "blind" to the Hakims' pro-Iran allegiance. For example, Hasnawi intoned, ISCI/Badr routinely teams with Iranian intelligence to run the following scam on the USG using JAM members as bait: Iranian agents recruit JAM elements to attack Coalition Forces or the ISF and then give the "case files" to ISCI/Badr, which passes such information to the Coalition. As a result, Hasnawi continued with clear bitterness, JAM members are killed or arrested, "innocent" JAM are attacked in the process, the Sadrist image is further tarnished in USG eyes, and ISCI/Badr and the Hakims appear as "white doves of peace" to the Americans. He claimed ISCI/Badr sought a non-aggression truce with Sadr in late 2007 (ref A) out of weakness and desperation, but then quickly abrogated the agreement. He said the agreement is "dead" and has no practical effect. "When anything bad happens in Iraq," Hasnawi maintained, "Sadrists will always think the Hakims are behind it." ¶6. (C) Hasnawi claimed that anti-Iran sentiments have long been held throughout the Sadrist movement (ref B and C),and he paraphrased what he characterized as a favorite saying by Moqtada's late father Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr that, but for the Sadr family, "Iran would crush Iraq with an iron foot." In keeping with foot imagery, Hasnawi employed what we understand to be an earthy Iraqi peasant proverb by inviting the USG to work together with him and like-minded Sadrist colleagues to "clip the toenails of Satan" and rid Iraq of Iranian domination. He said that he was in a position to provide significant and detailed information of Iranian agents to the USG and he made no quid pro quo request. We note that Hasnawi's anti-Iran rhetoric and proffered intelligence regarding the identity of alleged Iranian agents are similar in tone and scope to the rumblings of a group claiming to be Sadrists from the Karbala, Najaf, and Diwaniyah areas that calls itself the "Mid-Euphrates Awakening" with whom MNF-I has had several engagements (ref C). Insights Into the Sadrist Trend -------------- ¶7. (C) Hasnawi denied press reports that Moqtada spends much of his time in Iran, insisting that in the past year Moqtada has visited Iran only twice - once on an "official visit" and once when he believed his life to be in danger - and both times he stayed only a short time. He stated with apparent conviction that Moqtada "hates and distrusts" Iran, but Hasnawi readily acknowledged that Iran has successfully penetrated the Sadrist Trend, particularly JAM. For this reason, he claimed that Moqtada ordered a six-month "freeze" on JAM military activity in order to expose pro-Iranian elements within the ranks. Hasnawi said that loyal Sadrists will report such elements to trusted "Arab" GOI authorities for arrest and prosecution, but he appeared flustered when we asked how the Sadrists could trust a government they claim to be under the complete sway of Tehran. He said that top Sadr lieutenant Salah al-Obaydi had already announced Moqtada's decision to extend the freeze order beyond its scheduled late-February expiration. Hasnawi said past Sadrist opposition to the USG presence in Iraq was thoroughly justified, claiming that international law permits the people of any nation to engage in "legitimate resistance" against armed foreign troops on their soil, but noted that attitudes toward the USG are beginning to soften to a limited degree as an increasing number of Sadrists start to believe that American troops will depart Iraq on their own accord but that Iranian agents will never depart unless driven out by force. ¶8. (C) He said Moqtada wants to transition the focus of his BAGHDAD 00000103 003 OF 003 movement away from "legitimate resistance" to delivery of public services, and that this consumes much of the efforts of the OMS Political Committee on which Hasnawi sits. He claimed the Sadrists can operate within a democracy and desire to work with any group, party, or individual (Sunnis and Kurds included) that supports Iraqi nationalism and unity. Hasnawi further claimed that the Sadrists welcome a civilian - not military - USG presence in Iraq and can have cordial relations with official American civilians. Hasnawi grew visibly tense and replied in the negative when asked whether Moqtada was aware of our meeting, but claimed that, as a member of the Political Committee and a future senior leader of the movement, he is in a position to establish an indirect line for us to Sadr by introducing views to Moqtada that are often compatible with USG perspectives and thus gradually change Sadr's thinking. CROCKER