DAWA PARTY OFFICIAL ON BASRAH OPERATION AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001027 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2023 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR SUBJECT: DAWA PARTY OFFICIAL ON BASRAH OPERATION AND UIA-SADR NEGOTIATIONS IN IRAN Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Dawa Party official Haidar al-Abadi told us April 1 that Iraqi public opinion, as demonstrated through claimed pro-GOI demonstrations in Basrah and elsewhere, and the Najaf-based Marja'iyah are strongly behind PM Maliki in his efforts to deal firmly with militias and armed criminals through "Operation Charge of the Horsemen" in Basrah. Haidar conceded that the operation pointed up some Iraqi Security Force (ISF) shortcomings and that the GOI must come up with a workable plan to disarm Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, which he claimed fared poorly in clashes with the ISF. He asserted that Maliki consulted with and received support from United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem and other UIA leaders in advance of the operation, and gained the blessing of Shia Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani for the operation's goal of cracking down on armed criminal groups. Haidar provided a second-hand account of a visit to Iran of a UIA delegation late least week to vent UIA outrage over Iranian supply of arms to Sadrists, an accusation denied by Iranian interlocutors. According to Haidar's account, the Iranians brought Muqtada al-Sadr into direct negotiations with the group and Sadr's innate cowardice and heavy Iranian pressure produced Muqtada's March 30 nine-point stand-down order for JAM fighters. Though Haidar was clearly in full pro-Maliki spin mode regarding the Basrah operation, we find largely credible his account of the UIA delegation's visit to Tehran. End Summary. U.S. Military and Western Press Wrong About Operation -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) A close Maliki ally and confidante who claims to have been in frequent contact with the PM throughout the latter's stay in Basrah, Haidar gushed about "unprecedented" Iraqi public support, as demonstrated through claimed pro-GOI demonstrations in Basrah and elsewhere in south-central Iraq for Maliki's crack-down on armed criminal groups. Haidar groused that the GOI-operated "Al-Iraqqiyah" broadcast network had reported on the Basrah operation with a pro-Sadrist slant, which he attributed to Sadrist intimidation of network personnel. He also claimed Western media analysis that portrays Maliki as the loser and Sadr and Iran as victorious in the battle for Basrah "has it completely wrong, in fact "the opposite is true". He complained that such articles often feature disparaging comments from unnamed U.S. military sources about Iraqi Security Force (ISF) incompetence. ¶3. (C) Haidar said the operation was carried out in "an Iraqi way" that eschews meticulous preparation as favored by Americans: "Americans plan for days, Iraqis just go out and do it" he explained with a laugh. He conceded that ISF performance fell short in intelligence, logistics, and quick reaction support, but said such operations are necessary for ISF development in the same way a child must learn to walk unassisted, with inevitable bumps and falls. Looking ahead, he said the ISF will focus on purging disloyal elements from its ranks; increase its intelligence capacity; and work with the GOI to incorporate southern Shia tribal members into the ISF by forming a southern "Awakening" movement of the sort that Haidar and Dawa (along with ISCI/Badr) opposed strongly just a few weeks ago. More important, he said the GOI would work up a plan to "clip the Sadrist claws" once and for all by disarming them, though he conceded this was a formidable task. Showing a Single UIA Face to Iran and Sadr -------------- ¶4. (C) Haidar said that, contrary to reports that Maliki failed to consult anyone before launching the Basrah operation, the PM consulted and received advance support from Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and ISCI Chairman Abdel Aziz al-Hakeem and other UIA leaders (ISCI and other UIA sources confirmed Haidar's statement). He also said he prepared the ground for a lengthy telephone conversation between Maliki and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who reportedly blessed the goal of the operation and directed his top preacher, Sheikh al-Karbalai, to express words of support for the operation in his March 28 sermon from Shia Islam's holiest shrine in Karbala. ¶5. (C) Haidar claimed that the turning point of the Basrah operation came when a three-member UIA team comprised of ISCI/Badr's Hadi al-Amri, Dawa's Ali al-Adib, and a Dawa Tanzim representative flew to Tehran on March 28 to vent united Shia outrage over Iranian arming of Sadrist elements with advanced weapons that were being used to kill other Iraqi Shia. (We will report Septel delegation member Hadi BAGHDAD 00001027 002 OF 002 al-Amri's account of the Tehran talks). Haidar said he had been slated to be part of the group but begged off because, unlike the other members, he is not fluent in Farsi and would have slowed down discussions with his need for interpretation. Rather, he said he stayed in almost constant contact with the group Maliki and shuttled messages back and forth with the PM. He said the delegation made it clear to the Iranians that they were in Tehran on behalf of the UIA and Iraq's Shia and not the GOI or Maliki. Their main "blunt" message was that continued Iranian supply of arms to the Sadrists will bring Iraq and Iran into direct conflict. He said the Iranians vehemently denied they provided arms to the Sadrists and demanded hard evidence for claims to the contrary ("the Iranians never admit things like that," Haidar intoned, "even to their best friends") and rebutted a delegation accusation that a certain Iranian intelligence officer was present in Iraq directing JAM training and operations by calling the named individual at his Tehran home and summoning him to the meeting venue. He said the Iranians were convinced that the Basrah operation was the product of a plot between the USG and Maliki to destroy the Sadrists, and they cited public POTUS statements of support for the operation and Maliki as conclusive proof of USG-GOI collusion. Haidar maintained that the Iranians were so taken aback by the implicit threat of direct Iraq-Iran conflict, which they interpreted to mean that Iraq might permit the USG to use Iraqi territory or airspace for military strikes against Iran, that they adjourned the discussions and, on their own initiative, brought Muqtada al-Sadr to Tehran from Qom for direct negotiations with the delegation. ¶6. (C) Haidar said Sadr arrived the night of Saturday March 29, already sullen and testy after Maliki had refused to accept his telephone call two days into the Basrah operation, and the talks between Sadr and the delegation were rancorous with numerous shouted exchanges. In the end - and under heavy Iranian pressure - Haidar said Sadr dropped his two major demands: one, that he receive advance notification regarding GOI arrest of his people (instead, the GOI promised that all arrests would be accompanied by a warrant) and two, amnesty for ISF personnel who sided with Sadrists during the fighting. Sadr appointed two Sadrist Trend officials to serve with the three UIA negotiators on an "implementation committee" to ensure that Sadr's 9-point stand down order and GOI arrest and detention procedures are followed pursuant to the Tehran agreement. Haidar said this committee is particularly important because it quickly became apparent to the UIA negotiators that Sadr had not been provided accurate information about the situation in Iraq: with two trusted Sadrists as part of the committee, Sadr will thus have reliable sources of information. ¶7. (C) When asked about Sadr's reply to delegation assertions that Sadrist ranks are full of criminals and mafia gangs who purport to act in Sadr's name, Haidar said the Shia cleric replied something to the effect of "so what, the GOI is also full of criminals and gangs" (with an exceedingly wry grin, Haidar remarked "I must admit Sadr is correct on that score.") Haidar claimed that Sadr's concessions on his two main demands - along with his refuge in Qom - displayed a cowardly nature, and that Sadrists are grumbling that the Tehran agreement was a GOI "trap" into which Sadr was led by the Iranians and given nothing in return for his concessions. He said the UIA will send a follow-up delegation to Tehran in the coming weeks for further discussions, including a possible meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. CROCKER