RRT ERBIL: BARZANI ADVISOR SUPPORTS CRACKDOWN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001015 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PTER EPET IZ SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: BARZANI ADVISOR SUPPORTS CRACKDOWN ON JAM, SAYS KRG MIGHT REMOVE ASHTI IN CABINET SHUFFLE Classified By: Erbil RRT U.S. Team Leader Jess Baily for Reasons 1.4 (b ,d) This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message. ¶1. (C) Summary: Dr. Fuad Hussein, a key advisor to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani, told RRTOFF that Barzani voiced his support to PM Maliki's crackdown on criminal gangs and militia in Basra in a March 31 phone call. The call, the first conversation between the two leaders, reportedly pleased Maliki. Hussein also attributed the delay in the upcoming KRG cabinet reshuffle to Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani's resistance to ceding either the Ministry of Finance or Energy to the PUK. Most surprisingly, Hussein indicated that President Barzani was considering sacking KRG Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami in a move to break deadlocked negotiations on national hydrocarbon legislation, if the GoI removed Minister of Oil Shahristani as well. Hussein also attributed continued opacity and inefficiency in the KRG budget process to mistrust between the PUK and KDP, and mistreatment by the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad. End Summary. Support for Maliki -------------- ¶2. (C) During a March 31 meeting with RRT Erbil U.S. Team Leader, Dr. Fuad Hussein, KRG President Masoud Barzani's chief of staff, reported that Barzani had called PM Maliki that morning in Basra to voice his support for the government's assertion of its authority against JAM and criminal gangs. This was the first time Barzani had spoken to Maliki in months, and the Prime Minister was reportedly delighted with the call. That said, Hussein then criticized the GoI's lack of planning for the operation and concluded that Sadrists emerged from the fighting with the upper hand. "The point was not to negotiate with JAM and that's just what Maliki will do," he added. KRG Cabinet Shuffle Imminent; Ashti Possible Loser -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Hussein has recently served on a three-man committee to reorganize the KRG and reduce the number of ministries. Asked whether the lack of any announced changes reflected disagreements between the PUK and KDP, Hussein reported that the politburos of the two parties have agreed to have 18 ministerial positions and up to five "ministers of region" (junior ministers) to replace the current 27 ministries and 15 ministers of region. The ministries of finance, interior and peshmerga affairs, which have remained divided between the PUK and KDP despite the unification agreement of 2006, will be merged. Other merges include Trade with Industry, Water Resources with Agriculture, Youth with Culture and, most notably, Electricity with Natural Resources to form a Ministry of Energy. The problem, however, remained what coveted portfolio to give the PUK, whose deputy leader and KRG Vice President Kosrat Rasoul is still smarting over not becoming KRG Prime Minister at the end of 2007. According to Hussein, the PUK wants either the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Energy, and PM Nechirvan Barzani has resisted ceding either one. Hussein reported that the problem would be resolved soon. As one of the few people who can speak only to Nechirvan, he had just met the PM to emphasize that he had to give up one; the PUK didn't care which. He told Nechirvan that preserving the KDP's relations with the PUK was important to President Barzani and thus to Nechirvan's relationship with his uncle. ¶4. (C) Hussein also indicated that the KRG was ready to remove Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami, the architect of the KRG's oil law and contracts with international oil companies. "We know this is what the British and Americans want, and his statements have caused us a lot of problems," he explained. Hussein criticized Ashti's lack of political acumen, his disinterest in managing the ministry and frequent absences. "We cannot have a minister with a laptop," he added. Hussein said he has repeatedly complained to Nechirvan about Ashti but stopped during the past two months as Nechirvan remained firm his support of Ashti. Now, he said, the PM understands the situation. If the PUK takes the Energy portfolio, they might replace him with PUK politburo member Imad Ahmed. Even if the KDP retains the position, Hussein said President Barzani was prepared to remove Ashti if PM Maliki (with ISCI support) sacks Minister of Oil Shahristani. According to this view, ridding discussions of the two ministers, mutual animosity will help the KRG and the central government to reach agreement on national hydrocarbon legislation. Such a move might not happen immediately, and Ashti could still be retained as a consultant. In six months, Hussein stated with confidence, BAGHDAD 00001015 002 OF 002 he will not be minister. KRG Budgets. . . or Lack Thereof -------------- ¶4. (C) After listening to RRT's current emphasis on budget execution and fiscal transparency in the KRG, Hussein said he acknowledged the need for greater planning and transparency and attributed the KRG's problems to the lack of trust between the PUK and KDP on the one hand, and to troubled relations with Baghdad on the other. The "cold war" mentality of the 1990s, when the PUK and KDP withheld information from each other, particularly about customs revenues, still pervaded the system. This explains the continued existence of separate ministries of finance. But even without this political problem, the GoI Ministry of Finance treatment of the KRG hampers even the best planning efforts. Currently, Hussein explained, KRG ministers submit their operating and capital budgets to the Council of Ministers, but rarely receive information back. The KRG simply doesn't know how much money Baghdad will give it and when, aside from funds for provincial reconstruction. Approximately every two weeks, the KRG must write to the GoI MoF to request funds. After the KRG meets payroll and other operating costs, the MoF funds projects depending on what is left in the drawer. Often a minister must make a separate request to MoF for a particular project and just hope it will receive funding. Hussein explained that even he suffered from this system. In 2007 he sent in a budget for the Executive Office of the President, but never heard anything and had to scrounge funds from various sources. He was so mad, he said, he documented these problems in a letter to the Council of Ministers. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Hussein's comments on budgets and fiscal transparency track with what RRTOFFs hear from other ministries and departments. The problems with Baghdad are real, and mistrust dominates the relations between the ministries of finance in Erbil and Baghdad. Nonetheless, our interlocutors confuse budgets with cash flow. Nothing prevents the KRG from publishing its budget and expenditures. The RRT is working actively with various ministries, the Kurdistan National Assembly and others to ensure more transparency in public finance. There is strong support for such openness from many quarters, and the impending merger of the two KRG ministries of Finance could improve the situation. ¶6. (C) Comment (cont.): Hussein's description of the upcoming shuffle in the KRG cabinet tracks with what we hear from other sources. His view on the fate of Dr. Ashti was more surprising, given Ashti's leading role as chief negotiator for the KRG on national hydrocarbon legislation and with oil companies on production sharing agreements. Hussein's scenarios concerning Ashti's removal may reflect his frustration with Ashti's style and public remarks as much as the Barzanis' desire to break the deadlock on hydrocarbon legislation. It is also possible that Ashti might be removed as minister, but play a quieter role as a consultant. This would keep him out of the political fray in Baghdad but still involved with international oil companies. End comment. CROCKER