ANATOMY OF A BAGHDAD RECONCILIATION EFFORT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001005 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM PINR PHUM IR IZ SUBJECT: ANATOMY OF A BAGHDAD RECONCILIATION EFFORT: MAHMOUDIYA QADA REF: A. 2007 BAGHDAD 2847 ¶B. 2007 BAGHDAD 3840 Classified By: Deputy Polcouns Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. ¶2. (SBU) Introduction: Reconciliation movements in Baghdad quickly spread through the province following the surge of Coalition Forces and the success of the "Anbar Awakening." Unlike other areas in Iraq with more homogeneous populations, reconciliation in Baghdad must take root amidst a combustive admixture of competing rural, urban, tribal, militia, and political interests. To capitalize on local efforts toward reconciliation, Coalition Forces and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) had to quickly and carefully broker local agreements designed to maintain security gains, while working to sustain peace through the provision of essential services, bolstering local governance, and creating economic opportunities -- all the while encouraging the Government of Iraq (GOI) to get into the mix. This cable is the first in a series that examines the evolution of reconciliation in Baghdad Province, offering a case study of its development in Mahmoudiya Qada (county). Subsequent installments will cover Tarmiya, Arab Jabour, and Sadr City, among other areas. End introduction. ¶3. (C) Summary: A delicate reconciliation movement is advancing in Baghdad Province's Mahmoudiya Qada -- once a notorious part of the "Triangle of Death." In October 2007, Mahmoudiya sheikhs -- 18 Sunni and 13 Shia -- met in the spirit of reconciliation to determine ways to restore stability. The sheikhs focused on security, governance, economic issues, rule of law, and "social well-being" in a conference hosted by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP),in close coordination with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division (2-10 BCT) and its embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT-4). The conference was the culmination of a four-month initiative undertaken by USIP at the request of those Mahmoudiya local government, tribal, and civil society leaders tired of the havoc wrought by AQI, militias, and criminal gangs. Shortly after the conference 2-10 BCT was replaced by 3/101 BCT, who continued to work closely with the ePRT and Iraqi counterparts to improve security and bring stability and normalcy back to Mahmoudiya. 
¶4. (C) Summary cont'd: The respite from violence, however, is a fragile one: tribal power struggles, political rivalries, under-manned Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),poor essential services, insufficient economic opportunities, and weak provincial and local governments continually threaten to undermine progress. On March 9, Provincial Council (PC) Rural Services Committee (RSC) Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani (reftel) traveled to Mahmoudiya to further reconciliation and strengthen the tie between the provincial and local governments. Even as the local and provincial governments slowly address locals' needs and follow up on conference promises, spoilers continue to pose challenges almost one year after Mahmoudiya reconciliation efforts began. End summary. -------------- Mahmoudiya and the "Triangle of Death" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Approximately 475,000 people from roughly 50 Shia and Sunni tribes live in Mahmoudiya, which lies 20 miles south of central Baghdad. Bordered by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Mahmoudiya was renowned before the war for its rich agriculture, busy wholesale produce markets, and convenient transportation links to Baghdad City. Before 2003, the area was largely tribal and Sunni. Saddam Hussein stood up arms factories and rewarded loyal cadres with land and villas in the area in an attempt to gird Baghdad against the Shia-dominated south. Following the regime's collapse, violence increased and massive population displacement ensued, which undermined civil and tribal authority structures and destroyed Mahmoudiya's social fabric and infrastructure. Sunni insurgents and AQI made Mahmoudiya a stronghold, attacking Coalition Forces, ISF, and the local population. Today large numbers of Shia have moved to live along Mahmoudiya's arterial lines leading into Baghdad, while the Sunni remain primarily in the countryside. -------------- -------------- The Surge Brings Security, Concerned Local Citizens, and Hope for Reconciliation -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In May 2007, Mahmoudiya tribal leaders approached Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B) to announce that they were forming an alliance to fight AQI, Shia extremist groups, BAGHDAD 00001005 002 OF 004 and Iranian influence. They also requested Coalition help. MND-B reported that Mahmoudiya tribal leaders clearly viewed this as a fight for their homes, families, villages, cities, and country, and would take up the fight with or without Coalition support. Multinational Division-Central (MND-C) assumed the task to help build an outer security belt to Baghdad's southern and western approaches, and military operations by 2-10 BCT in the spring and summer of 2007 helped produce dramatic improvement in the overall security situation in Mahmoudiya. Coalition and Iraqi Army (IA) forces succeeded in capturing or killing large numbers of AQI and other insurgents. As tribal leaders' predicted, AQI extremism and brutality led many locals to turn on AQI elements, beginning in West Zaidon in the Youssifeya area of western Mahmoudiya. Reconciliation gestures, patterned after the success of the Anbar Awakening, prompted further talks between Mahmoudiya tribal leaders and Coalition Forces. Initial security arrangements turned into a formal Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) movement, which BCT commanders credit for much of the improved security. (Note: CLC groups -- now called Sons of Iraq -- later helped to clear areas stretching from Abu Ghraib Qada down to Youssefiya in Mahmoudiya Qada. End note.) ¶7. (C) Anxious to take advantage of the fragile improvement in security, local government and tribal leaders worked with the ePRT, Brigade, and USIP to develop a reconciliation strategy. The first step was getting Mahmoudiya's fractious tribes to agree on a set of broad social, economic, and security goals. Getting buy-in from Sunni sheikhs in Mahmoudiya and abroad was essential. (Note: Many of these sheikhs are former Baathists that fled to Jordan after war broke out in 2003. End note.) Sunni sheikhs -- embittered over the loss of their positions and property and the detention of tribal members -- also feared the rise of Shia militias in Mahmoudiya. Consequently, many were actively supporting Sunni insurgencies in Iraq. ¶8. (C) Then, in August 2007, Mahmoudiya Qaim Makam (Mayor) Muayid formed a mixed Sunni-Shia delegation of local government and military leaders, tribal sheikhs, and civil society representatives to travel to Amman, Jordan to bring the Sunni sheikhs onboard. (Note: PC RSC Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani also traveled to Amman to participate in the talks. End note.) The Mahmoudiya sheikhs based in Amman initially received the Mahmoudiya delegation with suspicion and some hostility, but the delegation successfully convinced several key leaders to use their influence to support reconciliation initiatives, commencing with the creation of a tribal council in Mahmoudiya. (Note: These councils later grew in number in Mahmoudiya under several names, such as "support" and "awakening" councils. End note.) -------------- Reconciliation Formalizes, Stumbles, Then Breaks New Ground -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In September 2007, more than 200 Mahmoudiya tribal leaders met at an Iraqi Army base in Mahmoudiya to form a tribal council patterned after their Anbar neighbors. The council initially focused on assisting Coalition and ISF to identify terrorists and vet emerging Sons of Iraq (SOI) groups. Though inclusive of nearly all of Mahmoudiya's Sunni and Shia tribes, the meeting evolved into a venue for the airing of local grievances. (Note: The event was held largely at the behest of the Ministry of Reconciliation and Dialogue and dominated by the local Iraqi Army (IA) commander, General Ali -- exactly the kind of showcase meeting co-opted by GOI entities that the Amman sheikhs wanted to avoid. End note.) ¶10. (SBU) Anxious to revitalize the effort and raise its level of visibility, the Mahmoudiya tribal leaders pressed for a conference in Baghdad's International Zone. More than 30 Iraqi media outlets and international press covered the event. The 2-10 BCT and ePRT-4 provided funding, security, and transportation for the event and USIP worked with tribal leaders to craft an agenda and participants list. USIP's conference design emphasized developing solutions to current problems vice airing historic grievances. Conference participants worked in five topical groups -- security, governance, rule of law, economic issues, and social well being -- to identify three goals for each topic over a three-year planning horizon. On the final day of the conference, GOI representatives from the Prime Minister's Office, Implementation and Follow-Up Committee on National Reconciliation (IFCNR),Baghdad PC, and Mahmoudiya local government participated. (Note: PC RSC Chairman Mashhedani was the only provincial official that attended. Other notable absences were sheikhs from the West Zaidon area, which had led the rise against AQI earlier in the year. End BAGHDAD 00001005 003 OF 004 note.) The conference concluded with the announcement of 37 shared goals that the Mahmoudiya sheikhs committed to achieving over the next three years. GOI officials in attendance applauded the announcement and in turn committed to carefully considering areas for possible implementation. -------------- Political Machinations, Tribal Rivalries, and Weak Government Slow Down Progress -------------- ¶11. (C) In spite of initial success, political rivalries, tribal power struggles, and weak local and provincial governments stymied further progress. In November 2007, the Baghdad PC voted to replace the Mahmoudiya Qaim Makam (a Communist who had actively supported the reconciliation initiatives) with the previous Qaim Makam from the more politically influential (and Badr organization, ISCI party-affiliated) Kilaby tribe. (Note: Coalition forces detained the previous Qaim Makam, Abu Karrar Jabir al Kilaby, who was later released by the GOI. Abu Karrar, a former Iraqi Army Warrant Officer, is close to senior ISCI/Badr members and was not successful in his previous tenure as mayor of Mahmoudiya. Reports of an increase in local tensions followed the announcement. End note.) In addition, weak Mahmoudiya local councils did not follow up locally the shared goals agreed upon by the sheikhs at the October conference, neglecting to raise them in official meetings. Scant interaction between the Mahmoudiya local councils and the provincial government diminished further any possibility for action on the sheikhs' goals. ¶12. (C) By December 2007 belief in the sustainability of Mahmoudiya reconciliation appeared to be waning among all parties. Coalition Forces and USIP reported more complaints from Mahmoudiya sheikhs about the lack of follow up from the GOI. Frustrated with the lack of local and provincial government action, ranking Mahmoudiya sheikhs called on the Prime Minister's office to follow up on the GOI commitment made during the conference to consider their shared goals. (Note: PC members reported that while Prime Minister Maliki appeared "surprised" by the lack of GOI follow up, he did not order further action in support of the initiative. End note.) Reconciliation efforts began to lose further momentum in early 2008, although security remained intact under improving cooperation between 3/101 BCT, local ISF and growing numbers of SOIs. 3/101 BCT and ePRT-4 effectively utilized Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and USG civilian agency funding to begin local reconstruction projects and micro grants programs to spur local economic activity. However, sectarian tensions simmered as some Sunni sheikhs began to publicly criticize the Shia-dominated qada government of consistently failing to provide services to Sunni areas. -------------- - Rebuilding the Momentum....Reconciliation Redux -------------- - ¶13. (SBU) In February 2008, 3/101 BCT, ePRT-4, and USIP launched plans to restart reconciliation momentum. PRT Baghdad joined the effort with a plan to link sustained reconciliation and security to improved GOI services provision through more effective provincial and local government interaction. (Note: This initiative is part of PRT Baghdad's surge exploitation strategy. End note.) PC RSC Chairman Sobhe Mashhedani -- the only Sunni member of the PC -- agreed to champion the provincial government effort. As chair of the USG-GOI Joint Rural Planning Committee (JRPC),Mashhedani agreed that a provincial delegation to Mahmoudiya would follow up on essential services issues raised during the JRPC meeting on Mahmoudiya and streamline the PC's interaction with the local government. He also felt strongly that he needed to tell Mahmoudiya residents personally that any further progress on services depends on continued security, which makes reigniting reconciliation efforts critical. Mashhedani committed to delivering this message publicly and privately to Mahmoudiya government and tribal leadership. In order to reintroduce the outcomes of the October conference, USIP finalized a five-month "Media and Dialogue" project for Mahmoudiya to spread awareness of the sheikhs' goals and build grassroots momentum for pushing GOI action on them. ¶14. (SBU) On March 9, Mashhedani and other PC members traveled to the Mahmoudiya capital to launch the new USIP initiative and announce approved GOI projects alongside local government leadership. A smaller number of tribal leaders and local press gathered at the same IA compound used for the first reconciliation meeting in September 2007. After welcoming all, local IA Commander General Ali briefly commented on continued security in the area, then graciously BAGHDAD 00001005 004 OF 004 deferred to provincial and local government officials. (Note: General Ali's previous overbearing approach at the September 2007 meeting had changed -- a direct result of 3/101's efforts to mentor the influential IA commander on a more appropriate role for the army in local government and community affairs. End note.) Mashhedani evoked the October 2007 conference, claiming: "Now that security is here, you need all of us (the provincial and local government) to act and we will, but you must continue reconciliation here." Provincial and local officials announced key 2008-funded projects to improve services -- primarily potable and irrigation water -- in Mahmoudiya. (Note: Tribal leaders applauded these projects. Mahmoudiya experienced critical shortages of both last summer. End note.) They touted the importance of overcoming sectarian differences to continue security and facilitate better service provision and the return of internally-displaced persons. The new Qaim Makam passionately proclaimed: "We are Iraqis all -- we must remember this." Provincial representatives emphasized to the tribal leaders the importance of working with their local government to ensure that they are providing the best guidance to the provincial government regarding where to focus service provision and reconstruction projects. ¶15. (U) In a significant gesture of non-sectarianism, provincial and local government officials then traveled to the Sunni areas of Youssifeya in western Mahmoudiya. On the site of a Soviet-built electricity plant, hundreds of Sunni and Shia sheikhs and other residents gathered to listen. The optic of provincial representatives alongside local officials in the Sunni western areas of Mahmoudiya sent a powerful message. (Note: This was the first visit of the Shia-dominated local government of Mahmoudiya to Youssifeya. End note.) Mashhedani began the address: "This is a day of transformation and peace. We represent the GOI and are here to showcase improved security, listen to your needs directly, and ask how we can help." Carrying Mashhedani's message forward, GOI officials each spoke about continuing reconciliation and the bravery of the SOIs. They credited their ability to execute new projects to improve services in the area to Youssifeya's security. In front of local and international media, GOI officials voiced their strong commitment to improving the lives of all the citizens of Mahmoudiya. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) The failure of the GOI to underpin reconciliation efforts in Mahmoudiya with visible improvements in basic services, infrastructure, and agriculture may precipitate a strong turnout during provincial and local elections, with many voting against the leading local political parties (Dawa and ISCI/Badr). This result could alter the political make up of Mahmoudiya by introducing the possibility of a Sadrist majority in the capital of the qada, challenged by marginalized Sunni tribesmen and their rural backing. A complete failure by the GoI could even lead to a resurgence in violence, although MNC-I and the BCT believe this scenario is very unlikely. The March 9 Mashhedani visit helped foster the belief that there are tangible benefits to aligning with the local and provincial government. Now local and provincial leaders need to follow through. To help the GOI maintain positive momentum, the BCT, ePRT-4, and the Baghdad PRT continue working to bolster local government, spur provincial government action, and strengthen the link between the two. Whether this link can grow and improve without the assistance of the USG is the most important measure of the sustainability of recent progress in security and reconciliation in Mahmoudiya. End comment. CROCKER