Scenesetter for Ambassador Tahir-Kheli's visit, June 2-5

UNCLAS ATHENS 000743

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TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SOCI GR
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Ambassador Tahir-Kheli's visit, June 2-5

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FROM AMBASSADOR SPECKHARD TO AMBASSADOR TAHIR-KHELI


1. (SBU) Dear Ambassador Tahir-Kheli, we are looking forward to your
visit. I wanted to offer you the following background information
that you may find interesting in preparing for your trip. I look
forward to the opportunity to meet and discuss some of these issues
in more detail when you are here. The Embassy stands ready to
assist to make your visit a productive and enjoyable one. We have
prepared for you several meetings and roundtables with women
actively involved in NGOs, women entrepreneurs, and female Members
of Parliament.

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INTRODUCTION
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2. (SBU) Greece's center-right New Democracy government of Prime
Minister Kostas Karamanlis seeks to maintain good relations with the
U.S., though the U.S.-Greece partnership is complex and at times
challenging. Greek-U.S. military-to-military cooperation is good,
particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete, and Greece
is among the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment.
Greece's participation in NATO, however, is politically sensitive
with weak public support for NATO operations. Some of the Embassy's
priority goals in Greece include:

-- Promoting stability in the Balkans in light of Kosovo's
declaration of independence and Greece's veto of Macedonia's bid to
join NATO until the name issue is resolved;

-- Further cooperation in combating Greek domestic and international
terrorist threats and in strengthening Greek borders against
transiting terrorists;

-- Increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and stability in the Aegean
and on Cyprus;

-- Encouraging Greece to contribute to European energy security
through diversification as Greece develops as an energy transit hub;
and

-- Expanding trade with the U.S.


3. (SBU) You can reinforce our message of support and cooperation
in furthering women's empowerment, particularly in the Middle East.
Although the USG faces a difficult political environment following
the recent events in the Balkans and the NATO Summit, your presence
highlights Secretary Rice's commitment to creating a forum for
dialogue to address challenges faced by women throughout the world,
especially in the Middle East.


4. (SBU) You can help advance our agenda in combating trafficking
in persons (TIP) by highlighting the issue in your informal
conversations and in reiterating our desire to work cooperatively to
make more progress on the issue this coming year.

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TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ISSUE
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5. (SBU) During your visit, the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report is scheduled to be released publicly by Secretary Rice on
June 4. Until then, we cannot confirm Greece's TIP ranking. Greece
will be demoted from Tier Two to Ter Two Watch List because of a
lack of evidene of increasing efforts to combat TIP and lackluster
implementation of the TIP Action Plan. Greece has yet to ratify a
2004 child repatriation agreement negotiated with Albania, shelters
remain underutilized and convicted traffickers are not serving
imposed sentences. We also are concerned with inadequate protection
of dentified and potential trafficking victims. You can expect
that your Greek interlocutors ill raise their disappointment in
Greece's TI ranking with you. Many Greeks are likely - bu wrongly
-- to see the TIP ranking demotion as "payback" for Greece's veto of
Macedonia's NATO membership. In your conversations, it would be
helpful if you emphasized the following:

-- We know that Greece has a strong commitment to addressing women's
issues.

-- We wish to work in partnership with Greece to combat more
actively trafficking in persons. We do not doubt Greece's political
commitment in this area, but more needs to be done on the ground.

-- We would particularly encourage the Prime Minister's appointment
of a senior coordinator on TIP issues, who would have the political
clout and authority to direct the various Greek agencies working on
TIP issues.
-- (If asked) Our TIP rankings are based solely on TIP-related
criteria, and this was not/not a political decision. Attributing
Greece's TIP ranking to the Macedonia name issue is not only
incorrect; it also diverts attention from the real issues that need
to be addressed.

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MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE
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6. (SBU) Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" an
infringement on their heritage and warn that it could encourage
irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same name. We
have repeatedly urged both sides to engage in negotiations led by
Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United Nations and have
stated that the U.S. would accept whatever solution Athens and
Skopje agreed upon through the negotiations. In the aftermath of
Greece's vetoing the NATO invitation at the April 2008 NATO Summit
in Bucharest, we continue to urge both countries to work for a
mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process. There has
been little progress in this area, pending the completion of
Macedonia's June national elections. The Administration is hopeful
that an agreement could be reached by July 9th, when Croatia and
Albania will sign the NATO Accession Protocol to officially launch
accession talks. Greek counterparts, however, are skeptical this
target can be met, given the time it will take to organize and
empower a new government in Skopje. The government of Greece,
however, is signaling its desire and intent to move swiftly in
finding a solution after the elections.

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ENERGY ISSUES
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7. (SBU) Greece has a new role as an energy pipeline corridor to
Western Europe and can contribute positively to European energy
security through rapid completion of the Turkey-Greece-Italy
Interconnecter (TGI),which is the first pipeline to carry Caspian
gas to Europe without going through Russia or through
Russian-controlled pipelines. It is therefore an important step in
realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing European
energy diversity and security. TGI will also help Greece: whereas
currently 80 percent of Greece's natural gas supplies come from
Gazprom, once TGI becomes fully operational by 2012, this dependence
could be reduced to under 50 percent.


8. (SBU) Greek cooperation on energy with Russia has increased
significantly over the past two years. On April 29, PM Karamanlis
and outgoing Russian President Putin signed an agreement on
cooperation on the South Stream gas pipeline. While some view this
pipeline as a competitor to TGI, TGI is far more advanced in design
and development and likely will not be impacted. Meanwhile, Greece,
Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed to support the
Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and share
ownership, which we support insofar as it is commercially feasible.


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VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
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9. (SBU) Greece is the only one of the original fifteen EU
member-states that do not participate in the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program (VWP). Secretary Rice sent a letter to DHS Secretary
Chertoff in August 2007 to officially nominate Greece for the
program, after Greece introduced a new biometric passport that meets
all ICAO standards. A DHS-led team of technical experts visited
Greece in November and positively assessed its eligibility. Another
team from the interagency Terrorist Screening Center just completed
a successive negotiation with the Greeks on a terrorist database
agreement, which is required for Greece's entry into the VWP. Other
VWP negotiations remain ongoing (Greece asked for a short pause in
February to consult within the EU but has since provided us with a
counter-proposal for an MOU.) Greece's inclusion in the VWP would
boost the U.S. image, and we are working hard to make this happen
this year.

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GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
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10. (SBU) Against the sway of public opinion, Greece remains
supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and understands that a
Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term strategic interest.
Greece and Turkey still differ on issues such as Aegean
air-/sea-space demarcation. The recent cancellation of a
Greek-initiated Aegean exercise, when NATO declined its support,
aggravated relations, yet rapprochement remains the overall
leitmotif of their bilateral relations. On Cyprus, the February
2008 election of Cyprus President Demetris Christofias is widely
seen as a new opportunity for progress. His presidency has
witnessed the opening of the historic Ledra Street crossing between
the two sides and a renewed energy to implement the UN-brokered July
8th 2006 agreement designed to reach a mutually acceptable solution
to the Cyprus problem, although many of the tough political issues
remain to be addressed.

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KOSOVO
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11. (SBU) Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008,
shortly after Serbia's January 2008 elections. Kosovo has been
formally recognized by more than 40 United Nations Member States,
including 19 individual EU member-states, though a number, including
Greece, have not. Despite this, Greece maintains substantial
military forces in NATO's Kosovo force and is providing personnel
and support to the EU's "Rule of Law Mission" in Kosovo. The
Administration has encouraged Greece to recognize Kosovo in the
interest of supporting stability. We welcome Greece's ongoing
efforts to urge Serbia to take a forward-looking approach to its
future in the European and Euro Atlantic community.

SPECKHARD