GREECE/TURKEY: FALLOUT OF NATO DECISION NOT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000678 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MOPS TU GR SUBJECT: GREECE/TURKEY: FALLOUT OF NATO DECISION NOT TO SUPPORT AEGEAN EXERCISE REF: ANKARA 941 Classified By: CDA Tom Countryman for 14 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) We understand NATO authorities have informed Greek military officials that NATO will not provide support for the proposed May 20 "Noble Archer" exercise, which involved overflight of Agios Efstratios island (but which had excluded overflight of the island of Limnos, which has long been a NATO no-go area due to its disputed status). Given the recent (originating in 2000) and dubious nature of the Turkish claim that Agios Efstratios is also "demilitarized," coupled with U.S. public statements affirming Greek sovereignty over Agios Efstratios and questioning the Turkish "demilitarized" claim, we can expect a strong reaction from the Greeks, including: -- Hope for and encouragement of a firm NATO response to the Turkish threats to scramble fighter aircraft in response to a planned exercise involving aircraft from another NATO Ally operating under the control of NATO AWACs. There will be deep disappointment should there be no consequences for Turkey in response to such a threat; -- An increase in the number of Greek policy elites who share the popular perception that NATO is "anti-Greek," coupled with heightened negative linkage of the United States with NATO. The Greeks believe that application in this particular case of NATO's regular policy not to involve itself in disputes between Allies legitimizes the Turkish claim that the status of Agios Efstratios (and by extension many other Greek islands not explicitly addressed in past legal instruments) is somehow in question; -- A widely-held perception that this decision is partly in retaliation for the Greek veto of Macedonia's NATO membership and a potential hardening of the Greek position on Macedonia; -- A reduction in Greek willingness to work within NATO channels and with NATO authorities to address Aegean and potentially other issues. The Greeks believe that they had fully consulted with NATO civilian and military authorities for 14 months as the U.S. had encouraged, had submitted plans that met NATO's criteria, but that NATO had proven to be unable to discern between legitimate legal disputes and dubious claims. -- More speculatively, this could affect Greek cooperation at Souda Bay - a facility used by U.S. and NATO forces, and will likely negatively affect political decisions by Greece related to purchase of fighter aircraft. End Summary. -------------- --- NATO Notifies Greece No Support for Noble Arche -------------- --- aining event involves issues that are subject to disagreement among member nations that the Alliance can neither adjudicate or resolve, invoking NATO's long-standing practice of non involvement." Following the March 2007 experience when NATO withdrew support for a similar exercise that would also overfly the island of Limnos which has long been on NATO's list of "no go" areas because of Greek/Turkish disputes as to its demilitarized status - the Greeks began a 14-month process of consulting with NATO civilian and military authorities to develop an exercise that would be acceptable to NATO but still overfly AE. We understand that NATO SG de Hoop Scheffer recognized the need for NATO to differentiate between legitimate legal disputes and more dubious claims, including in discussions with the Greek PermRep at NATO. The plans submitted by the Greeks to NATO (e-mailed to EUR/RPM, EUR/SE, and Embassy Ankara 5/5/08) avoided the Limnos area, and were submitted in accordance with specific policy guidance from NATO authorities for planned exercises in the Aegean. -------------- Greek Reaction -------------- ¶3. (C) We expect a strong reaction from the Greeks resulting from the NATO decision, including: -- Interest in Consequences for Turkey: The Greeks will follow closely the question of whether or how NATO might respond to Turkish threats related to planning for "Noble Archer 2008;" they are likely aware that Turkey mooted the possibility of scrambling fighter aircraft to intercept the Greek aircraft training under "Noble Archer 2008," which - according to the submitted plans - would have been operating with support from NATO AWACs. Should there be no consequences for Turkey in response to such a threat, we cannot rule out the Greeks employing it in response to future Turkish plans for exercises that include NATO assets. -- Anti-NATO and Anti-U.S. Feeling: Although the Greek public is instinctively suspicious of NATO and equates NATO with the U.S., among policy elites there are more informed and nuanced views. However, the NATO decision not to support this exercise will certainly be major news in coming days. The Greeks believe that application in this particular case of NATO's regular policy not to involve itself in disputes between Allies legitimizes the Turkish claim that the status of Agios Efstratios (and by extension many other Greek islands not explicitly addressed in past legal instruments) is somehow in question. We anticipate an up-tick in public perceptions that NATO is "anti-Greek," and that the U.S. does not support Greek interests or take seriously Greek concerns. Furthermore, although we will reiterate U.S. views on AE's status, drawing on U/S Burns' remarks (para 5 below),and make clear that questions of whether NATO can support training exercises is a NATO matter to be taken up with NATO authorities, we will not be able to avoid the Greek government and media wanting to take the issue up with the U.S. and not/not with NATO. -- Macedonia: Although this NATO decision has no relationship with Greece's decision to block a NATO invitation to Macedonia, the Greek government and public is likely to see this as pay-back. We will do our utmost to challenge this perception, but a hardening of the Greek position on Macedonia is a likely consequence. -- Working with NATO: We have long encouraged Greece to play a more active and constructive role at NATO. Indeed one of Embassy Athens' highest policy goals is to see Greece move from a passive Ally to an active and constructive player at NATO. We expect the Greeks to be less willing to work with NATO authorities and within NATO channels to address Aegean issues, and potentially on other issues, given their perception that they worked with NATO civilian and military authorities for 14 months ) as we had encouraged ) and developed plans for an exercise that would meet NATO's criteria. -- Other Cooperation: More speculatively, a NATO-skeptic public could raise further questions about supporting U.S. and NATO operations from Souda Bay, Crete, potentially complicating operations there. This dynamic could also affect political decisions by Greece related to the purchase of the next generation of fighter aircraft. -------------- Background ) Recent and Dubious Claim on AE -------------- ¶4. (U) The Turks and Greeks have long disagreed about the status of certain islands in the Aegean, arising from differing interpretations of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1923 Lausanne Conference "Straits Convention," disagreement on whether/how the 1936 Montreux Convention revisited the demilitarization provisions of the "Straits Convention," and concerns with implementation of the "demilitarization" provisions of the 1947 Treaty of Paris. These disputes are long-standing. However, the question of the status of the island of Agios Efstratios (AE) is different, as it is not referred to in any of these legal instruments. It had long been held to be Greek sovereign territory with the same status as the rest of Greek territory, i.e. with no demilitarized status. This all changed when Turkey raised questions related to AE's status in the year 2000 as part of the planning and conduct of a NATO exercise, "Destined Glory 20." At that time TurkeQis issue, although a few Greek aircraft overflew Agios Efstratios during the conduct of the "Destined Glory" exercise, followed by Turkish objections. -------------- Cancellation of Noble Archer 2007 -------------- ¶5. (U) In 2007, Greece sought NATO support for a training exercise "Noble Archer," but included in its plans overflights of the island of Limnos. After review, NATO did not support the exercise, as Limnos has long been the subject of a Greek/Turkish dispute (Greece claims that the Montreux Convention amended Lausanne provisions allowing Greece to "remilitarize" Limnos and Turkey has long challenged this claim),and NATO policy has long been to avoid exercises related to Limnos. However, following cancellation of the exercise, the Greeks expressed concern that its cancellation could be construed also to support the more recent Turkish claims related to AE. In response to a request from Greek officials to affirm the U.S. view of Agios Efstratios' status then-Under Secretary Burns stated publicly on March 25, 2007: "It's obviously a very sensitive matter that it is a Greek island. There is no question about that. Our clear impression is that it is not demilitarized. Our stance is that this is an issue now for NATO to try to see if there can be an arrangement made to proceed with these military exercise and work out any differences that may or may not be there, because it is very important for NATO to be able to exercise and to be able to be present in all parts of NATO territory and the Eastern Aegean Sea as well." COUNTRYMAN