GREECE/MACEDONIA: GREEK NAME NEGOTIATOR ON STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000671 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: GREEK NAME NEGOTIATOR ON STATE OF AFFAIRS Classified By: CDA Tom Countryman 1.4 (b) and (d) ATHENS 00000671 001.5 OF 003 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador Speckhard and DCM met May 13 with Greek name negotiator Vassilakis to press for robust Greek engagement in resolving the name issue and to probe Greek positions. Vassilakis said FM Bakoyannis is determined to resolve this issue quickly, but the GOG is pessimistic much progress can be made until after the June Macedonian elections. Meanwhile, the Greek and Macedonian negotiators are working with Nimetz on some of the "less controversial" issues. When pressed on the need for Greece to generate new ideas and proposals, Vassilakis was circumspect, stating that it would not be helpful for Greece to put new ideas on the table right now, as they would likely be rejected in the context of the Macedonian elections. However, Vassilakis said Nimetz has a good sense of what Greece can and cannot accept. ¶2. (C) On a settlement itself, Vassilakis noted that there are names acceptable to Greece being floated, adding that it is positive that they have not yet surfaced in the press. Vassilakis cautioned that PM Gruevski's insistence that a settlement contain an explicit affirmation of the use of the term "Macedonian" for ethnicity and language would be a deal breaker for the Greeks, adding that this issue will need to be carefully managed. Finally, he declined to respond to the question whether Greece could agree to a settlement that did not require a change in Macedonia's constitutional name, but did allow that there could be differences in Macedonia's "internal" and "external" name. On this point, however, he also said Greece would expect any implementing Security Council resolution to require Macedonia to inform bilateral partners of the need to use the new name in bilateral relations ) a significant hardening of Greece's position. Finally, Vassilakis recognized the need for prompt reaction to reports of ongoing "incidents and problems," but termed U.S. efforts to confirm such incidents "unhelpful." When Ambassador Speckhard pushed back, noting the importance to Greece and Macedonia for Washington to have accurate details of such incidents, Vassilakis suggested U.S. and Macedonian officials seek to obtain further information through the Greek Embassy in Skopje. End Summary. -------------- Current Activities - Lower-Key -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Speckhard opened by noting Washington's expectation that Athens and Skopje would continue active negotiations on the issue, even during and immediately after the Macedonian election campaign. We still believed it would be possible to reach an agreement by July 9, allowing Macedonia to "catch up" with Croatia and Albania. Vassilakis said that he and his Macedonian counterpart, Ambassador Dimitrov, are actively working with UN envoy Nimetz on some of the "less controversial" issues, such as the non-exclusive use of the term "Macedonian" for commercial activities. Vassilakis was pessimistic that progress on major issues could be made before Macedonia's June elections, and would not say when pressed whether negotiations would accelerate after the elections. He did reiterate, however, that Foreign Minister Bakoyannis remains determined to resolve this issue soon, adding that she had been deeply frustrated it had not been resolved prior to the Bucharest Summit. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Speckhard pressedht now; nor is it helpful for the U.S. to call publicly for either side to put down new ideas. Any new Greek proposal would immediately become part of the Macedonian election debate and would likely be rejected out-of-hand. Similarly, if either Washington or Skopje put "new ideas" on the table now, these could easily be publicized and then discredited in Greece, to no one's benefit. Vassilakis clarified, however, that Nimetz has a clear understanding of the Greek position, and has a "good sense" of what Greece can and cannot accept. -------------- A Deal from the Greek Perspective -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Speckhard reiterated the importance of active and creative Greek engagement. In reply, Vassilakis laid out some elements of a possible deal from the Greek perspective. ¶6. (C) The Name: Although he did not want to be drawn into discussions of particular names, Vassilakis acknowledged that there are three possible names being floated (Northern, Upper, and Vardar). He indirectly made clear that Greece could accept any of these three names under the provision that they precede the term "Macedonia." Vassilakis noted positively that none of these names had yet been mooted in the press, adding that if they did surface during the Macedonian election campaign, they would likely be individually rejected, in one capital or the other. ¶7. (C) Adjective for Identity and Language: Vassilakis said PM Gruevski's apparent insistence that a settlement contain explicit affirmation of the term "Macedonian" for ethnicity and language "a deal breaker." The Greek Parliament would not ratify an agreement that required Greece to accept the existence of a "Macedonian" nation and language, and it was important that this be understood. During this meeting, Vassilakis did not say that Greece could tacitly accept continued use in Macedonia of this adjective for their people and language, with the text of an agreement being silent on this point. However, he has previously made this assertion to the DCM. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Dealing with the adjective for identity and language will be difficult. Nimetz has already floated language on non-exclusive use of the term "Macedonia" for commercial purposes. Walking the fine line of avoiding reference to "Macedonian" ethnicity and language while including provisions on non-exclusive use of the adjective is likely to pose a challenge. However, we assess that this ssue will be a red-line for the Greeks, and tha inclusion of an explicit reference to a "Macedonian" ethnicity and language would make any deal dead on arrival in Athens. We understand the need for PM Gruevski to address the name issue in his campaigning, but continued public statements that an agreement must explicitly contain a reference to Macedonian language and nationality will make a solution harder, not easier, to reach. End Comment. ¶9. (C) Scope of Application/Erga Omnes: Although the Ambassador pressed for GOG flexibility on not requiring Macedonia to change its constitution, Vassilakis did not go farther than noting differences between an "internal" and "external" name. He also observed that this formulation would make negotiations "more complicated" as it would be essential to delve into the weeds on key details such as the name (or names) to be used on passports, etc. He did not respond when asked directly whether Greece could sign a deal that did not require Macedonia to change its constitutional name. However, he did state that Greece would want any implementing Security Council Resolution to require Skopje to inform its bilateral partners that the new name should be used for all bilateral relations. (Comment: This new suggestion that a UNSCR should place the onus on Skopje to require use of the new international name for bilateral relations is a significant hardening of the Greek position - the only major hardening of the Greek position post-Bucharest we can identify. End Comment). -------------- Bilateral Incidents -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador asked Vassilakis about recent incidents involving border crossings, overflights, landing rights, etc., stressing the importance of good trans-border cooperation and the need to respond quickly when incidents occur. The DCM suggested that Greece seek to establish a mechanism with Macedonia to respond immediately to any such incidents, adding that perhaps the Vassilakis-Dimitrov channel would be a means to this end, separating fact from rumor and speeding corrective action. Vassilakis did not respond favorably to this idea, adding that it was also "not helpful" when the U.S. Embassy inquired to GOG ministries on such incidents, as the U.S. could be portrayed as advocating on the Macedonians' behalf. The Ambassador reiterated the importance to both Greece and Macedonia for Washington to have an accurate picture of the details of these incidents, adding that we would continue to follow-up reports ofs nt, but said that U.S. interests might be better met by encouraging the Macedonians to engage directly with the Greek Embassy in Skopje on these incidents, adding that U.S. bilateral inquiries might also be best directed to the Greek Embassy in Skopje. -------------- Comment: Pressing Ahead -------------- ¶11. (C) We will continue to press Vassilakis and other senior Greek interlocutors to engage actively and constructively on the name issue, emphasizing the importance of btaining results prior to the July 9 signing of the NATO accession protocol by Croatia andAlbania. Even if the two sides moved rapidly toward a solution after the June 1 elections, the potential requirement for a referendum in Macedonia, as well as the ratification process of the Greek Parliament (which Vassilakis said could occur only after the GOM's referendum) make the July 9 goal exceedingly tight. End Comment. COUNTRYMAN