GREECE/MACEDONIA: GREEK NAME NEGOTIATOR ON STATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000671

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: GREEK NAME NEGOTIATOR ON STATE
OF AFFAIRS


Classified By: CDA Tom Countryman 1.4 (b) and (d)

ATHENS 00000671 001.5 OF 003


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Ambassador Speckhard and DCM met May 13 with Greek
name negotiator Vassilakis to press for robust Greek
engagement in resolving the name issue and to probe Greek
positions. Vassilakis said FM Bakoyannis is determined to
resolve this issue quickly, but the GOG is pessimistic much
progress can be made until after the June Macedonian
elections. Meanwhile, the Greek and Macedonian negotiators
are working with Nimetz on some of the "less controversial"
issues. When pressed on the need for Greece to generate new
ideas and proposals, Vassilakis was circumspect, stating that
it would not be helpful for Greece to put new ideas on the
table right now, as they would likely be rejected in the
context of the Macedonian elections. However, Vassilakis
said Nimetz has a good sense of what Greece can and cannot
accept.


2. (C) On a settlement itself, Vassilakis noted that there
are names acceptable to Greece being floated, adding that it
is positive that they have not yet surfaced in the press.
Vassilakis cautioned that PM Gruevski's insistence that a
settlement contain an explicit affirmation of the use of the
term "Macedonian" for ethnicity and language would be a deal
breaker for the Greeks, adding that this issue will need to
be carefully managed. Finally, he declined to respond to the
question whether Greece could agree to a settlement that did
not require a change in Macedonia's constitutional name, but
did allow that there could be differences in Macedonia's
"internal" and "external" name. On this point, however, he
also said Greece would expect any implementing Security
Council resolution to require Macedonia to inform bilateral
partners of the need to use the new name in bilateral
relations ) a significant hardening of Greece's position.
Finally, Vassilakis recognized the need for prompt reaction
to reports of ongoing "incidents and problems," but termed
U.S. efforts to confirm such incidents "unhelpful." When
Ambassador Speckhard pushed back, noting the importance to
Greece and Macedonia for Washington to have accurate details
of such incidents, Vassilakis suggested U.S. and Macedonian
officials seek to obtain further information through the
Greek Embassy in Skopje. End Summary.

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Current Activities - Lower-Key
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3. (C) Ambassador Speckhard opened by noting Washington's
expectation that Athens and Skopje would continue active
negotiations on the issue, even during and immediately after
the Macedonian election campaign. We still believed it would
be possible to reach an agreement by July 9, allowing
Macedonia to "catch up" with Croatia and Albania. Vassilakis
said that he and his Macedonian counterpart, Ambassador
Dimitrov, are actively working with UN envoy Nimetz on some
of the "less controversial" issues, such as the non-exclusive
use of the term "Macedonian" for commercial activities.
Vassilakis was pessimistic that progress on major issues
could be made before Macedonia's June elections, and would
not say when pressed whether negotiations would accelerate
after the elections. He did reiterate, however, that Foreign
Minister Bakoyannis remains determined to resolve this issue
soon, adding that she had been deeply frustrated it had not
been resolved prior to the Bucharest Summit.


4. (C) Ambassador Speckhard pressedht now; nor is it helpful for
the U.S. to call publicly for either side to put down new ideas.
Any new Greek proposal would immediately become part of the
Macedonian election debate and would likely be rejected
out-of-hand. Similarly, if either Washington or Skopje put
"new ideas" on the table now, these could easily be
publicized and then discredited in Greece, to no one's
benefit. Vassilakis clarified, however, that Nimetz has a
clear understanding of the Greek position, and has a "good
sense" of what Greece can and cannot accept.

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A Deal from the Greek Perspective
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5. (C) Ambassador Speckhard reiterated the importance of
active and creative Greek engagement. In reply, Vassilakis
laid out some elements of a possible deal from the Greek
perspective.


6. (C) The Name: Although he did not want to be drawn into
discussions of particular names, Vassilakis acknowledged that
there are three possible names being floated (Northern,
Upper, and Vardar). He indirectly made clear that Greece
could accept any of these three names under the provision
that they precede the term "Macedonia." Vassilakis noted
positively that none of these names had yet been mooted in
the press, adding that if they did surface during the
Macedonian election campaign, they would likely be
individually rejected, in one capital or the other.


7. (C) Adjective for Identity and Language: Vassilakis said
PM Gruevski's apparent insistence that a settlement contain
explicit affirmation of the term "Macedonian" for ethnicity
and language "a deal breaker." The Greek Parliament would
not ratify an agreement that required Greece to accept the
existence of a "Macedonian" nation and language, and it was
important that this be understood. During this meeting,
Vassilakis did not say that Greece could tacitly accept
continued use in Macedonia of this adjective for their people
and language, with the text of an agreement being silent on
this point. However, he has previously made this assertion to
the DCM.


8. (C) COMMENT: Dealing with the adjective for identity and
language will be difficult. Nimetz has already floated
language on non-exclusive use of the term "Macedonia" for
commercial purposes. Walking the fine line of avoiding
reference to "Macedonian" ethnicity and language while
including provisions on non-exclusive use of the adjective is
likely to pose a challenge. However, we assess that this
ssue will be a red-line for the Greeks, and tha inclusion
of an explicit reference to a "Macedonian" ethnicity and
language would make any deal dead on arrival in Athens. We
understand the need for PM Gruevski to address the name issue
in his campaigning, but continued public statements that an
agreement must explicitly contain a reference to Macedonian
language and nationality will make a solution harder, not
easier, to reach. End Comment.


9. (C) Scope of Application/Erga Omnes: Although the
Ambassador pressed for GOG flexibility on not requiring
Macedonia to change its constitution, Vassilakis did not go
farther than noting differences between an "internal" and
"external" name. He also observed that this formulation
would make negotiations "more complicated" as it would be
essential to delve into the weeds on key details such as the
name (or names) to be used on passports, etc. He did not
respond when asked directly whether Greece could sign a deal
that did not require Macedonia to change its constitutional
name. However, he did state that Greece would want any
implementing Security Council Resolution to require Skopje to
inform its bilateral partners that the new name should be
used for all bilateral relations. (Comment: This new
suggestion that a UNSCR should place the onus on Skopje to
require use of the new international name for bilateral
relations is a significant hardening of the Greek position -
the only major hardening of the Greek position post-Bucharest
we can identify. End Comment).

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Bilateral Incidents
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10. (C) The Ambassador asked Vassilakis about recent
incidents involving border crossings, overflights, landing
rights, etc., stressing the importance of good trans-border
cooperation and the need to respond quickly when incidents
occur. The DCM suggested that Greece seek to establish a
mechanism with Macedonia to respond immediately to any such
incidents, adding that perhaps the Vassilakis-Dimitrov
channel would be a means to this end, separating fact from
rumor and speeding corrective action. Vassilakis did not
respond favorably to this idea, adding that it was also "not
helpful" when the U.S. Embassy inquired to GOG ministries on
such incidents, as the U.S. could be portrayed as advocating
on the Macedonians' behalf. The Ambassador reiterated the
importance to both Greece and Macedonia for Washington to
have an accurate picture of the details of these incidents,
adding that we would continue to follow-up reports ofs nt, but
said that U.S. interests might be better met by encouraging the
Macedonians to engage directly with the Greek Embassy in Skopje
on these incidents, adding that U.S. bilateral inquiries might
also be best directed to the Greek Embassy in Skopje.

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Comment: Pressing Ahead
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11. (C) We will continue to press Vassilakis and other
senior Greek interlocutors to engage actively and
constructively on the name issue, emphasizing the importance
of btaining results prior to the July 9 signing of the NATO
accession protocol by Croatia andAlbania. Even if the two
sides moved rapidly toward a solution after the June 1
elections, the potential requirement for a referendum in
Macedonia, as well as the ratification process of the Greek
Parliament (which Vassilakis said could occur only after the
GOM's referendum) make the July 9 goal exceedingly tight.
End Comment.

COUNTRYMAN