Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS575
2008-04-23 13:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREEK VIEWS ON APRIL 29 GAERC ISSUES

Tags:  EUN GR PGOV PREL 
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VZCZCXRO5703
OO RUEHAG RUEHKW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTH #0575/01 1141312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231312Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1685
INFO RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000575 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: EUN GR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: GREEK VIEWS ON APRIL 29 GAERC ISSUES

REF: A. ATHENS 563

B. ATHENS 115

C. SECSTATE 10263

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAUL CARTER. REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000575 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 TAGS: EUN GR PGOV PREL SUBJECT: GREEK VIEWS ON APRIL 29 GAERC ISSUES REF: A. ATHENS 563 ¶B. ATHENS 115 ¶C. SECSTATE 10263 Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR PAUL CARTER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) On April 23, DepPolCouns discussed issues likely to be addressed at the April 29 EU Foreign Ministers meeting (GAERC) with MFA European Correspondent Antonia Katzourou. Katzourou said the GAERC agenda was to be announced on April 24 but agreed that many of the following topics were likely to be raised and offered the following comments on Greece's positions: -- IRAN: Katzourou expected a discussion on UNSCR 1803. As a matter of principle, FM Bakoyannis was generally opposed to escalating sanctions, preferring a policy of engagement. While not questioning the nefarious nature of many of Iran's actions and treatment of human rights issues, Bakoyannis believed that harsh sanctions were likely to harden Iran's position rather than elicit a positive response and that improved trade ties and lessened tensions were a better enticement. In this case, Greece would like to see the 1803 measures implemented, see how they go, then decide on next steps. -- WESTERN BALKANS: Greece was watching the situation closely and was aware of UNMIK's problems. Greece was part of EULEX (having offered 30 policemen) and was very concerned about difficulties on the ground. (NOTE: Greece has not recognized the newly independent Kosovo. END NOTE.) For Greece, stabilityin the Balkans was the paramount consideration. As for Bosnia, Katzourou believed the EU would have agreed conclusions and agree with the U.S. position on the importance of signing the SAA as soon as possible. The Netherlands still had (unspecified) problems, thus there would be further discussion in Brussels on April 24 prior to the GAERC. Greece would have liked to have seen an SAA signed with Serbia before its elections but recognized this was unrealistic. Nevertheless, Katzourou expected a general discussion on Serbia. -- GEORGIA: DepPolCouns informed Katzourou of Charge's April 21 discussion of ref a points on Georgia/Russia with MFA SecGen Agathocles and the PM's deputy diplomatic advisor Bitsios. She was unsure whether the topic would be discussed at the GAERC since the EU Presidency Declaration on Georgia of April 18 already represented the common EU position. On Greece's position specifically, she n
oted that Greece maintained good relations with both Georgia and Russia and thus was in a difficult position. She agreed that the Declaration provided PM Karamanlis with a good basis for discussion of the issue with Putin during the PM's April 29 visit to Moscow, though she, like Agathocles and Bitsios, could not say whether Karamanlis would raise the issue. She underscored Greece's respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity but at the same time believed it was important for Georgia to show "restraint." -- LEBANON/SYRIA: Katzourou believed there would be a general discussion of Middle East issues at the GAERC but no specific discussion of Lebanon/Syria. Greece agreed with the U.S. position on the importance of the election of Lebanon's president soon. But, while Greece did not underestimate Syria's negative role, Greece believed it was important to keep channels to Damascus open in order to have influence. She said the last EU Gymnich meeting had noted that, while Syria was part of the problem, it also needed to be engaged as part of the solution. The problem, of course, was getting Syria to act as a real part of the solution. -- MIDDLE EAST: Greece strongly supported the Annapolis process. The situation in Gaza now, however, was very difficult, and she noted growing EU skepticism on the immediate way ahead. There was considerable discussion on how to improve the Gaza situation but no official discussion recently of the idea -- supported in the past by Greece -- for sending an EU PKO to Gaza (refs b and c). At the Paris donors' conference, Greece had pledged two million euro for each of the next three years for specific Palestinian projects (not for the general Palestinian budget) and was ready to participate in the June Berlin conference on reinforcing the Palestinian police. -- ZIMBABWE: Greece and the EU agreed with the U.S. position on the need for the immediate release of the election results but also shared skepticism about the legitimacy of the results if they showed anything other than victory for the opposition. She said a working group in Brussels would discuss the issue Wednesday and that the GAERC would have ATHENS 00000575 002 OF 002 agreed conclusions. The problem was, given the situation on the ground, there appeared to be few options for influencing a positive outcome. She said Greek diplomats noted the situation in Zimbabwe was now almost unbearable, with food and fuel essentials becoming increasingly difficult to find. -- BURMA: Greece agreed with the U.S. analysis of the situation in Burma, particularly with regard to the sham nature of the upcoming referendum on the regime's draft constitution. She expected the EU to renew its restrictive measures for another year. As for extending their severity, she said that would depend on developments (the EU had already stiffened its measures several months ago). -- IRAQ: Katzourou had little to say on Iraq, noting that PM Maliki had been well received in Brussels. Greece had a small embassy in Baghdad but it was difficult to staff because the MFA offered few bonus incentives to interest candidates. -- CHINA/OLYMPICS/TIBET: Katzourou did no expect the GAERC to address the issue. Greece generally supported the U.S. position. It believed China's treatment of Tibet deserved condemnation but did not believe the Olympics was the forum to address such issues. -- PAKISTAN: Katzourou believed there would be an extensive GAERC discussion on Pakistan. She knew that the EU was exploring options for assistance but was unsure of the details. SPECKHARD

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