GREEK PM MAY RAISE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH OSSETIA WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY: ADDED SIPDIS CAPTION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PREL GG RS GR
SUBJECT: GREEK PM MAY RAISE ABKHAZIA/SOUTH OSSETIA WITH
PUTIN

REF: SECSTATE 40673

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN. REASONS 1.4 (B) AN
D (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with Charge, MFA SecGen
Agathocles and PM deputy diplomatic advisor Bitsios affirmed
Greek support for Georgian sovereignty and the worrisome
nature of the Kremlin's latest moves to establish
"mechanisms" in dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
(reftel). Both also appeared ready to recommend that PM
Karamanlis raise the issue with Putin in Moscow at the end of
the month, particularly in light of the EU Presidency's
declaration on the subject. They were skeptical about its
impact, however, since Putin was unlikely to be able to see
beyond comparisons with Kosovo. The main agenda item for
Karamanlis's visit would be energy, though it was unclear
whether a deal on South Stream would be signed. END SUMMARY.


CHARGE: GEORGIA SHOULD BE ON TOP OF PM'S MOSCOW AGENDA
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In his April 21 meeting with MFA Secretary General
Agathocles, which was also attended by chief of the MFA A5
Directorate for CIS Affairs Ambassador Nikolaos Tsamados,
Charge pushed forcefully for PM Karamanlis to discourage
Russian President Putin from moving forward with implementing
the Presidential Instructions on creating "mechanisms" for
dealing with Russian citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
when the two leaders meet during Karamanlis's scheduled April
29 visit to Moscow. In delivering reftel points, Charge
noted that Karamanlis was in a unique position to make the
arguments to Putin due to the leaders' personal rapport,
traditional Greek/Russian ties, and the fact that Karamanlis
would be the first EU/NATO leader to see Putin since the
instructions were issued. Charge noted Secretary Rice's call
to Russian FM Lavrov on the issue and said discouraging the
Kremlin from implementing the Abkhazia/South Ossetia
instructions should be "at the top of Karamanlis's agenda" in
Moscow.


3. (C) Agathocles noted that he had spoken to the Georgian
ambassador on the subject and that Greece believed Georgia's
latest offer on autonomy to Abkhazia was reasonable and a
good step. He said Greece had stressed to Russia in their
previous discussions on Georgia Greece's support for
Georgia's sovereignty and that the "Russians don't like our
blunt position." This time, however, Agathocles was unsure
how seriously Putin would take a Greek intervention. Greece
was supporting discussions on the matter at the EU and the
issuing of the EU Presidency's declaration on Georgia of
April 18 would provide Karamanlis with ammunition to use with
Putin. Nevertheless, Agathocles said Putin was likely to
counter with strong references to Kosovo. Moreover,
Agathocles believed Russia's latest steps were unlikely to
lead to actual recognition of the rebellious regions by the
Russian government and were Qntgst
European countries, but Greece would work on strengthening
coordination next year when it headed the OSCE. Charge
countered that, all this notwithstanding, it was important
for Putin to hear from Karamanlis Greece's -- and the EU's --
discouragement on issuing the instructions. Agathocles
conceded the point, and in the end it appeared that the MFA
would likely recommend the PM raise the issue with Putin in
their meeting.


5. (C) Charge delivered a similar tough message to the PM's
deputy diplomatic advisor Bitsios, adding that Russia's
instructions on the rebellious regions set a bad precedent
and would not be tolerated by any other sovereign state,
including Russia, if directed at it. Charge said we hoped
that the EU Presidency's declaration and a strong personal
message by Karamanlis could make a difference with Putin.
Bitsios responded that the instructions were "exactly what we
were afraid of" when Kosovo made its UDI. He went on to
argue similarly to Agathocles that Putin was likely to
counter any Greek message with references to Kosovo. Like
Agathocles, Bitsios appeared ready to advise PM Karamanlis to
raise the issue with Putin but skeptical that it would have
any impact.

ENERGY ISSUES
--------------


6. (C) Both Agathocles and Bitsios said the primary agenda

ATHENS 00000563 002 OF 002


item for Karamanlis's visit to Moscow was energy.
Agathocles noted standard Greek concerns about getting enough
Azeri gas to fill TGI and argued that Nabucco and South
Stream were not competitive. In any case, Tsamados argued,
we should not get "too spun up" on the gas deals since the
amounts of money involved paled in comparison to the
write-downs that Wall Street firms were taking on the credit
crisis in the States. Bitsios, contrary to press reports,
said he did not know whether Greece would sign a deal on
energy in Moscow at the end of the month. There were
on-going discussions but "we're not there yet."
Nevertheless, Bitsios was adamant in noting Greece's great
need for gas. The country lacked its own resources and would
run out in five years if it didn't make some kind of deal --
whether with the Russians or some other party -- now. "We
have no choice," he argued, "we need gas wherever we can find
it."

COUNTRYMAN