SCENESETTER: ADMIRAL FITZGERALD VISITS ATHENS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 000469 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018 TAGS: GR NATO ODC PARM PGOV PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: ADMIRAL FITZGERALD VISITS ATHENS Classified By: Ambassador Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Welcome to Athens. We look forward to hosting your visit which comes at an important time, during the Bucharest Summit, in the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. As you know, Greece is an important NATO ally and strategic partner of the U.S., as well as a member of the European Union. Athens was transformed for the better by the 2004 Olympic Games. Greece is less idiosyncratic politically than in the past and more internationally involved. Relations with Ankara, while not trouble-free, are better than in the 1990's, and Greece is one of the most steadfast advocates of eventual full EU membership for Turkey. -------------- POLITICAL CLIMATE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) National elections were held in September 2007 and Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis of New Democracy, Greece's center-right party, won another 4 years in government. However, New Democracy won by a narrow margin and maintains a razor thin majority of only one seat after losing 13 seats in Parliament. Strong gains by the far right and left parties as protest votes and hard line views on Macedonia have had an impact on U.S. dialogue with the GoG on Macedonia's NATO accession, and it has been even more difficult to persuade Athens to increase its contribution to ISAF and other NATO missions. The economy is performing well, aided by good growth in the Balkan region and Greece's adoption of the Euro in 2002. ¶3. (C) While the probability of any major military confrontation is remote, much time and energy is spent in the military stand-off with Turkey. Both sides are unable to resist the frequent temptation to poke the other in the eye. The Greeks parse very carefully any U.S. statements over Cyprus or the Aegean, with an eye towards scoring points against the other side. We encourage all senior visitors to carefully word any reference to those two problems. The GoG dearly wants recognition of the Greek role and contributions to stability in the Balkans. In particular, the US military to military relationship with Greece is the strongest bilateral relationship we have and the Greek military is very eager to maintain that strong relationship. Your visit will reinforce the US commitment to that relationship. -------------- MEETINGS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) You are scheduled to meet with three primary military interlocutors; Deputy Defense Minister Tousoulos, CHOD General Demitries Grapsas and the new Chief, Hellenic Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral George Karamalikis. Although military issues are important and will be the likely focus of your meetings, five very important political issues dominate Greek thinking and will also be addressed during your meetings with General Grapsas and Deputy Minister Tousollous. Each is addressed below. -------------- MACEDONIA -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece objected to the Republic of Macedonia's name. Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" a usurpation of their heritage and warn that it could encourage irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same name. In 1995, the U.S. helped broker an "Interim Accord" between ATHENS 00000469 002 OF 004 Greece and Macedonia positing that Greece would not object to the use of the name, "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) until the two countries could decide on a mutually acceptable solution through UN-led negotiations. The U.S. decision in November 2004 to recognize the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name in bilateral relations touched off a storm of controversy in Greece. We have repeatedly urged both sides to lower the rhetoric and engage in negotiations led by Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United Nations. Positions have hardened as the April 2008 NATO Summit approaches with the possibility of a NATO invitation to Macedonia. Greece has made clear it will veto the invitation absent a settlement of the name issue, notwithstanding its commitment in the "Interim Accord". We continue to urge both countries to work for a mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process. If your Greek interlocutors raise this contentious issue, they will make the point that future members must strengthen security for all allies. For Greece, this cannot happen in the case of Macedonia until it recognizes the need for good neighborly relations and a recognition in the name issue. -------------- KOSOVO -------------- ¶6. (C) Greece has not recognized Kosovo's independence, although we continue to encourage the Greeks to do so. In the lead-up to Kosovo's independence, the Greeks consistently expressed concerns about the prospect of Kosovo's independence over Serbia's objections. Greek antipathy largely stemmed from a knee-jerk affinity for the Serbian position (based, among other things, on Orthodox solidarity), but also from concerns of a possible negative precedent for Cyprus and a possible reactionary response in Serbia that could destabilize the region. However, the Greeks have not resisted or further complicated Kosovo's independence. They did not object to EU decision making on a Rule of Law Mission, they have pledged substantial personnel to the EU Rule of Law Mission, they have pledged to maintain their force levels in KFOR, and they have provided staff for the International Civilian Office (ICO). We continue to make the point that Kosovo requires friends in the region who are committed to its success, political stability, and economic growth. The Greeks accept this point, but also assert that it is important to maintain Serbia's European orientation; Greece has been among the most active players in the EU in engaging with Serbia post-Kosovo independence and in encouraging Serbia's European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. The Greeks maintain two mechanized infantry battalions in Kosovo. These are subordinate to the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Division in Edessa, one of their few 'high readiness units'. -------------- ENERGY ISSUES -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as an energy pipeline hub to western Europe. We see the most significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnecter (TGI),which could be the first pipeline to carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through Russian-controlled pipelines. It is an important step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy diversity and security for Europe, and we have actively encouraged Greece to contract for gas from Azerbaijan. Greece has found itself in the cross hairs of an intense effort by Russian Gazprom to block TGI through any of a number of means, including proposing a competing pipeline ATHENS 00000469 003 OF 004 called the Southstream. The Russian aim is to block the provision of Azeri gas to Europe through Greece. Although Greece relies on natural gas for less than 5 percent of its energy needs (but plans to expand this amount significantly under EU greenhouse gas guidelines),80 percent comes from Gazprom, making Greece reliant on continued Russian goodwill in the short-medium term. ¶8. (SBU) Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed to construct the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and have their national oil companies share ownership. We support this initiative insofar as it is commercially feasible. The Embassy and Washington agencies have been actively promoting with Greece the need for increased European energy security and diversification. It will be useful for you to reinforce U.S. appreciation for Greece's courage in standing up to Russian pressure on gas issues and to build contacts with Central Asian suppliers. -------------- GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term strategic interest. The Cyprus issue, however, is the sticking point. The issue has been stymied since the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan to reunify the island in a 2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan). While Athens quietly backed the Annan Plan, the Greek Government also believed it should stand by the Government of Cyprus and the vote of theGreek Cypriots. The Greeks are cautiously optimistic with the new opportunities aising from the election of Cypriot Christofias and his stated intent of working with the Turkish Cypriots to resolve the issue. They remain suspicious that Turkey may not be as committed to achieving a permanent settlement to the issue, and particularly worry that the Turkish General Staff (TGS) may stymie Turkish Cypriot efforts to make progress. ¶10. (SBU) Although Greece and Turkey still differ on issues such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, rapprochement remains a leitmotif of their bilateral relations. During 2004, there were 500 mock dog fights attributed to the demarcation disputes between the two countries. In 2006, the number was reduced to 150 but tensions again arose in May 2006 when a Turkish F-16 collided in international airspace with a Greek F-16. Both governments quickly brought the situation under control successfully averting a potentially explosive situation. Both sides adhere to the provisions of an informal CBM where both suspend close aerial activity from June to September to avoid potentially destabilizing incidents during peak tourist season. Additionally, there is a great deal of reoccurring dissension related to the issue of over-flights of demilitarized Aegean islands during NATO exercises. This controversial issue repeatedly emerges often forcing the withdrawal of Greek support for NATO exercises in the region. ¶11. (S/NF) We understand the Greeks are preparing to submit plans to NATO to request NATO support for an exercise over the controversial island of Agios Efstratios. Should they raise this issue during your visit, we recommend you simply note our expectation that the Greeks follow the policy guidance they have received from CC-AIR Izmir Commander Lt Gen McFann exactly, that any deviation from these letters would automatically result in the withdrawal of NATO support, and that the question of whether NATO can support this request will be evaluated once the plans are submitted. As ATHENS 00000469 004 OF 004 you are aware, the Izmir policy letters specify that the mission must be on the 3 month forecast; it must provide Izmir specific flight details no later than 14 days prior to the flight and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) must be shared with the adjacent CAOC no later than 1 day prior to the flight -------------- -------------- GREEK MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO GWOT AND ELSEWHERE -------------- -------------- ¶12. (C) At every opportunity, and at every level, we encourage the Greeks to contribute more to the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recently, the Ambassador met with Minister of Defense Meimarakis and pressed him hard for a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Dai Kundi, heavy lift helicopters, more personnel in the OMLT in Jalalabad, and removal of the caveats. He did not reject any of the requests outright but has yet to respond. We encourage you to repeat those same requests during your meetings with the Deputy Minister and the CHOD. We recommend that you lead off by acknowledging and expressing appreciation for ongoing Greek support at Souda and for the MOD's commitment to provide personnel to the U.S. embedded training team in Kabul. Greece offered an OMLT with the provision that the Kabul-only caveat could be met. NATO came back with two options: a Greek-led OMLT in Jalalabad (which is outside the 60 kilometer caveat but within NATO's RC-Capital region) or to provide staff to a U.S. embedded training team in Kabul. Greece has opted for the latter, thus far. ¶13. (C) Although Greek contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan are limited, Greek contributions to other important GWOT initiatives are substantial and should not be overlooked. When Turkey refused to allow the U.S. coalition to operate from bases in their country during the last war, the USAF moved 6 KC-135 tankers from Incirlik to Souda Bay Airfield where the Greeks helped fuel them. For U.S. ground forces, the Souda Bay port complex and the airfield allowed the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to quickly shift from the north to the south in time for the start of the war. Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights a year and participates in OAE/OEF, KFOR, and UNIFIL. Although it is fine to thank them privately during meetings, Greek public sentiment is strongly anti-war, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they would like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments. ¶14. (C) A very important part of our engagement with Greece is our robust ship visit plan. The Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS),the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Hellenic National Police have been very supportive opening 12 additional ports for ship visits from 6th Fleet vessels. The security surveys for these ports are finished and new ports are under consideration. Last year, 73 US ships visited 10 different Greek ports outside Souda Bay and this year, 14 ships have visited 5 different ports. The ongoing Lebanon crisis has necessitated several recent cancellations but once that situation changes, we hope to see an increase in visits. Additionally, we look forward to hosting a carrier visit this year. SPECKHARD