Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS313
2008-03-04 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN,

Tags:  PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR 
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VZCZCXYZ9489
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0313/01 0641508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041508Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1351
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0295
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000313 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN,
AND VISA WAIVER

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000313 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV CMGT CVIS MK NATO AF GR SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS ON MACEDONIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, AND VISA WAIVER Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 3 meeting, FM Bakoyannis told Ambassador Speckhard that she will tell NATO FMs March 6 that Greece is not ready for a NATO invitation for Macedonia and expects Alliance solidarity on this issue. Greece remains ready to make a deal on a composite name -- using "upper" or "new" Macedonia -- but will not go much further. Greece is ready to negotiate on the basis of the Nimetz proposal, but believes Skopje is unwilling to do so. Ambassador Speckhard noted that this is not our understanding of Skopje's position, emphasized the strategic importance of a NATO invitation for Skopje for regional stability, and requested that Greece show maximum flexibility in the Nimetz talks. ¶2. (C) On Kosovo, FM Bakoyannis made no commitments on recognition, but said Greece is using its good offices to keep Belgrade focused on its European future. Ambassador Speckhard thanked her for recent public comments by the Greek Ambassador in Belgrade. Ambassador Speckhard asked that Greece provide greater support for ISAF -- specifically requesting embedded trainers (OMLTs),helicopters, and a lifting of the caveat limiting deployments to Kabul. Bakoyannis said Greece is providing an OMLT, but cannot lift the caveat or provide helicopters at this time -- a point she had also made to NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer earlier in the day. Finally, the Ambassador pressed for Greece to take advantage of the opportunity to move forward on the visa waiver program (VWP) by concluding the proposed MOU. Bakoyannis said Greece must consult with the EU, but will not await a global U.S.-EU agreement in this area before moving forward. End Summary. -------------- Macedonia Name - NATO FM Meeting -------------- ¶3. (C) Bakoyannis said her recent meetings in Washington had been a good chance to explain just how sensitive this issue is in Greece; 82 percent of Greek citizens object to any name with the term "Macedonia." Nonetheless, Greece is ready to negotiate on the basis of the Nimetz proposal (it can "be the beginning of a discussion"),although Greece believes that some points should be changed. However, Greece needs a partner, and Macedonian name negotiator Dimitrov said
"no to everything" in last weekend's New York meetings. Skopje is saying that the issue is a "bilateral issue." This is not correct. Ambassador Speckhard said our understanding of the Macedonian position is different, and we believe that Skopje remains ready to negotiate. ¶4. (C) Bakoyannis said she will tell NATO Foreign Ministers at the March 6 informal ministerial that "Greece cannot accept an invitation for Skopje as long as good neighborly relations are not assured." She noted that Greece is an Ally and Macedonia is an aspirant. Greece will ask all Allies to "help us persuade them to go in the right direction," but will also make clear that Greece "expects Alliance solidarity" on this issue. Greece will support an invitation to Croatia and Albania. As a footnote, Bakoyannis said that when Greece was a NATO aspirant, its own entry was delayed for two years. ¶5. (C) Bakoyannis reiterated that Greece cannot accept a name that "describes the kind of democracy the country has," ruling out "constitutional," and "independent." The name cannot "monopolize Macedonia." The name must show that it is "part of Macedonia" but not the "Bulgarian or Greek Macedonia." Greece could accept "upper" or "new." She added "we need a clear solution that is erga omnes and final." Bakoyannis said the Greece has "gone as far as it can," adding, "our government will not fall on this issue. Once was enough." ¶6. (C) Bakoyannis said she believed that the U.S. is "trying to do what it can," and noted that Skopje needs to "work out its judgment for itself." PM Gruevski can choose to present his people with "a positive package" of successful entry into NATO and Greek support for EU accession. She added that Greece "expects the U.S. to help us." Should Greece and Macedonia agree on a new name, the question of how other nations might use that name will be "crucial." It would be "very important to know" if the U.S. would use the new name in bilateral relations, as this would be a "big help." ¶7. (C) Ambassador Speckhard reiterated the importance of negotiating in good faith and in demonstrating maximum flexibility. He reiterated that the U.S. is impressing on Skopje the importance of coming to closure with Greece on this issue, but emphasized that the U.S. cannot force either Macedonia or Greece to accept a particular plan. The FM replied that she had more faith "than anyone in Greece in the U.S. capability to deliver a solution." The Ambassador encouraged Bakoyannis to think about how any veto of Macedonian NATO membership would influence regional stability and the prospects for a negotiated settlement to this issue. Bakoyannis maintained that Skopje has more to lose than Greece, adding that it would "not be a catastrophe if Skopje is not in NATO," affirming that the NATO veto is Greece's "real fallback" should negotiations not conclude with satisfactory results. The Ambassador warned that Greece had as much to lose as Skopje if no solution is found. Instability on its doorstep risks potentially much greater consequences for Greece and the region if this issue is not managed well. ¶8. (C) Immediately after the meeting with the FM, DCM discussed the name issue with the PM,s deputy diplomatic advisor, Constantinos Bitsios. For the first time in many discussions of the issue, Bitsios expressed a personal opinion that a bilateral agreement with Skopje would come only after the Bucharest summit. He said that the GoG would do its utmost to preserve as positive a climate as possible to make that achievable, particularly in the statements of government officials. He noted that he had spent the last few days acting as a "pharmacist, handing out tranquilizers" to media sources and MPs who had ratcheted up speculation about "U.S. pressure." DCM noted PM Karamanlis' recent statements of inflexibility in the Parliament and advised Bitsios to keep in mind that statements that seem moderate in the domestic context can still seem provocative in the other capital. -------------- Kosovo -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Speckhard expressed our appreciation for recent statements by the Greek Ambassador in Belgrade urging the Serbian Government to be responsible and condemning violence. The Ambassador encouraged Bakoyannis to continue to use Greece's good offices in turning Belgrade to its future as part of Europe and away from violence. ¶10. (C) Bakoyannis said that things will be "tense for a while." Greece is particularly concerned about the North of Kosovo, and she had asked NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer to pay particular attention to the region. She highlighted in particular the need for special care to ensure the protection of cultural/religious sites as she believed the worst thing that could happen would be the destruction of a church, monastery or other Serbian cultural site. She affirmed that Greece forces will remain in KFOR and that Greece will press for the ESDP mission to "go and stay and be active." Bakoyannis said Greek officials are in frequent contact with Serbian officials, noting that she would speak with FM Jeremic March 4. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶11. (C) Ambassador Speckhard noted the critical need for all allies to do more in Afghanistan and requested that Greece provide helicopters, additional embedded trainers (OMLTs), and lift its caveat limiting deployment to Kabul. ¶12. (C) Bakoyannis said that NATO Secretary General de Hoop Schaeffer had raised the need for further contributions to Afghanistan with her and other Greek officials earlier in the day. She had discussed with Defense Minister Meimarakis how Greece could best help and had decided to provide an OMLT. She said Greek officials have been in contact with NATO officials on the issue; although Greece had offered 8 officers, for now NATO only seeks 3. Greece also stands ready to take over operations of the Kabul airport, and is ready to redeploy a mobile hospital unit (that was withdrawn last year). She had also discussed provision of helicopters with Meimarakis, who reported that Greece could not spare any helicopters at this time -- due to the need to have them deployed in the Aegean. Meimarakis had told her that Greece may be able to provide helicopters to ISAF next year, when Greece will have concluded a purchase of additional helicopters. Bakoyannis said Greece is donating 15 Leopard Tanks to the Afghan National Army. On caveats, she said that Greece is "among 22 countries" that have caveats in Afghanistan, and that is unlikely to change. -------------- Visa Waiver -------------- ¶13. (C) Ambassador Speckhard said that we had made substantial progress in the past six months in our ongoing effort to obtain visa waiver status for Greece. However, this progress could stall should Greece await EU action before negotiating and signing the proposed bilateral MOU. Bakoyannis affirmed Greece's strong interest in participating in the visa waiver program, noting that Greece has taken major steps to qualify. However, Greece is also in the EU and in Schengen, and if Greece is asked "to do more" than other countries it would be "difficult." She noted that she had told DHS A/S Barth in Washington that Greece wants "the same status and requirements" as the other EU states, but does not want "extra" or "special measures." Her bottom line was that Greece cannot be "in a more difficult position than France or Germany." And, whatever Greece does on this issue must be "coordinated" with the EU. ¶14. (C) However, Bakoyannis agreed with the Ambassador that Greece could not await a comprehensive EU-U.S. agreement before moving forward on VWP. Greece is reviewing the MOU signed by the Czech Republic. At the end of the day, the Ministry of Interior needs to confirm that the MOU is "acceptable." Ambassador Speckhard noted that EU members already within VWP may not share Greece's interest in a rapid and flexible resolution of the MOU issue. He affirmed that the U.S. is "ready to engage as quickly as possible" on the issue, and awaits the GOG response to our draft MOU. SPECKHARD

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