Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS201
2008-02-13 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:
IRAN ELECTIONS: GREECE PREFERS EU STATEMENT IN
how-toVZCZCXRO6894 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHTH #0201 0441220 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131220Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1199 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000201
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC KDEM IR GR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTIONS: GREECE PREFERS EU STATEMENT IN
ADVANCE
REF: SECSTATE 13345
Classified By: DEPPOLCOUNS PAUL CARTER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000201
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC KDEM IR GR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTIONS: GREECE PREFERS EU STATEMENT IN
ADVANCE
REF: SECSTATE 13345
Classified By: DEPPOLCOUNS PAUL CARTER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) On February 12, DepPolCouns delivered reftel points on
Iranian elections and a third sanctions resolution to MFA A6
Directorate for Middle East Affairs deputy head Giorgos
Ayfantis. POLOFF also delivered sanctions points to MFA D1
Directorate for International Organizations, which handles
non-proliferation issues. The Greek response to the
sanctions demarche will be reported later septel.
2. (C) Ayfantis said the issue of Iranian elections required
formation of a common EU position. The EU, he said, regarded
formation of the European position on the elections as its
prerogative and had asked heads of missions in Tehran to
table proposals on how best to reach the Iranian population.
The issue was likely to be discussed at next week's GAERC
meeting, though Ayfantis was doubtful there would be agreed
conclusions because it was still early in the Iranian
election process.
3. (C) As for the Greek position, Ayfantis said Greece
recognized that there were risks in trying to appeal to the
Iranian population over the heads of the regime.
Nevertheless, it was evident that there was widespread
dissatisfaction, which reduced the risks of a regime
backlash. Also, the regime thus far was allowing assemblies.
4. (C) Ayfantis said it was important to wait to see how the
situation developed. The Iranian election process had few
preliminaries and only got into full swing shortly before
election day. The problem was that the Iranian regime tended
to approach elections the way the Russians have: the
balloting on election day was generally free and fair, but
problematic candidates were usually eliminated in advance
using various registration tricks, etc. Greece would like to
wait to see whether such shenanigans were taking place this
time before taking any action.
5. (C) Finally, Ayfantis noted that Greece would prefer not
to wait until after the elections for the EU to state its
position. A statement prior to the elections -- but once the
situation on the ground became clearer -- would serve to give
notice to the regime of European expectations and to alert
the Iranian population to the situation. If the situation
was developing poorly, Greece would advocate condemning the
entire process.
SPECKHARD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC KDEM IR GR
SUBJECT: IRAN ELECTIONS: GREECE PREFERS EU STATEMENT IN
ADVANCE
REF: SECSTATE 13345
Classified By: DEPPOLCOUNS PAUL CARTER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) On February 12, DepPolCouns delivered reftel points on
Iranian elections and a third sanctions resolution to MFA A6
Directorate for Middle East Affairs deputy head Giorgos
Ayfantis. POLOFF also delivered sanctions points to MFA D1
Directorate for International Organizations, which handles
non-proliferation issues. The Greek response to the
sanctions demarche will be reported later septel.
2. (C) Ayfantis said the issue of Iranian elections required
formation of a common EU position. The EU, he said, regarded
formation of the European position on the elections as its
prerogative and had asked heads of missions in Tehran to
table proposals on how best to reach the Iranian population.
The issue was likely to be discussed at next week's GAERC
meeting, though Ayfantis was doubtful there would be agreed
conclusions because it was still early in the Iranian
election process.
3. (C) As for the Greek position, Ayfantis said Greece
recognized that there were risks in trying to appeal to the
Iranian population over the heads of the regime.
Nevertheless, it was evident that there was widespread
dissatisfaction, which reduced the risks of a regime
backlash. Also, the regime thus far was allowing assemblies.
4. (C) Ayfantis said it was important to wait to see how the
situation developed. The Iranian election process had few
preliminaries and only got into full swing shortly before
election day. The problem was that the Iranian regime tended
to approach elections the way the Russians have: the
balloting on election day was generally free and fair, but
problematic candidates were usually eliminated in advance
using various registration tricks, etc. Greece would like to
wait to see whether such shenanigans were taking place this
time before taking any action.
5. (C) Finally, Ayfantis noted that Greece would prefer not
to wait until after the elections for the EU to state its
position. A statement prior to the elections -- but once the
situation on the ground became clearer -- would serve to give
notice to the regime of European expectations and to alert
the Iranian population to the situation. If the situation
was developing poorly, Greece would advocate condemning the
entire process.
SPECKHARD