SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DAVIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000020 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON GR SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DAVIS ¶1. (SBU) INTRODUCTION: Welcome to Athens. We look forward to hosting your visit, which comes at an important time in the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. Greece is a NATO ally and strategic partner of the U.S., as well as a member of the European Union. The center-right New Democracy government of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis -- re-elected by a slim majority in September 2007 elections -- seeks to maintain good relations with the U.S., though the U.S.-Greece partnership is complex and at times tumultuous. Greeks have a deep respect and affection for American culture and Americans in general dating to the Marshall Plan and earlier, but there also exists an anti-U.S. bias in the Greek media and body politic, stemming from, among other things, perceived U.S. support of the Greek military junta (1967-74). Similarly, Greek-U.S. military-to-military cooperation is good, particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete, which plays a key role in supporting U.S. military operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, including Iraq. Greece also is among the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment. At the same time, Greece's participation in NATO is politically sensitive with weak public support for NATO operations. ¶2. (SBU) You are likely to find the Greeks to be warm and hospitable hosts but also staunch defenders of their interests, particularly on issues touching on national identity and territory. Some of the Embassy's priority goals include: 1) promoting stbility in the Balkans, given Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence and the Republic of Macedonia's hoped-for invitation to join NATO this spring; 2) further cooperation in combating Greek domestic and international terrorist threats and in strengthening Greek borders against transiting jihadists; 3) increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and stability in the Aegean and on Cyprus; and 4) expanding trade with the U.S. and encouraging Greece to contribute to European energy diversity as it develops as an energy transit hub. The following are several current issues that may come up in your discussions with Greek officials and others. MACEDONIA NAME ISSUE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece objected to the Republic of Macedonia's name. Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" a usurpation of their heritage and warn that it could encourage irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same name. In 1995, the U.S. helped broker an "Interim Accord" between Greece and Macedonia positing that Greece would not object to the use of the name, "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) until the two countries could decide on a mutually acceptable solution through UN-led negotiations. The U.S. decision in November 2004 to recognize the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name in bilateral relations touched off a storm of controversy in Greece. We have repeatedly urged both sides to lower the rhetoric and engage in negotiations led by Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United Nations and have stated that the U.S. would accept whatever solution Athens and Skopje agreed upon through the negotiations. Positions have hardened as the April 2008 NATO Summit approaches with the possibility of a NATO invitation to Macedonia. Greece has threatened to veto the invitation absent a settlement of the name issue. We continue to urge both countries to work for a mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process, and we emphasize the importance of full compliance with the 1995 Interim Accord. KOSOVO -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Kosovar Albanians desire independence from Serbia; Serbia insists on maintaining sovereign control, while granting extensive autonomy to Kosovo. In January 2006, the UN appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead negotiations between the two sides. Unable to reach a negotiated settlement, he presented his proposal to the UN Security Council in April 2007. His plan calls for a multiethnic Kosovo with the language, education, and cultural aspects of all communities protected and promoted and the Serbian Orthodox Church to be safeguarded. The NATO-led Kosovo force would continue to provide security and an international civilian representative would oversee the settlement. Belgrade objects to the plan. The Security Council was unable to take action because of divisions within the Council. (Russia has actively and Greece passively supported the Serbs; the U.S. believes Kosovar independence is inevitable given the failure by December 10 of the U.S./EU/Russia "Troika" negotiations to find an agreed solution.) We, therefore, support the Ahtisaari plan as the best way of avoiding further destabilization of the region ATHENS 00000020 002 OF 002 that could follow an indefinite postponement. We anticipae elections in Serbia in January followed shotly thereafter by a declaration of independence by Kosovo. The EU and many member-states are likely to recognize an independent Kosovo, though a number of EU members, including Greece, have shown hesitation. ENERGY ISSUES -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as an energy pipeline hub to western Europe. We see the most significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnecter (TGI),which could be the first pipeline to carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through Russian-controlled pipelines. It is an important step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy diversity and security, and we have actively encouraged Greece to contract for gas from Azerbaijan. Greece has found itself in the cross hairs of an intense effort by Russian Gazprom to reach a long-term contract with the GOG for Russian natural gas, effectively blocking out Azeri gas from the pipeline. Although Greece relies on natural gas for less than 5 percent of its energy needs (but plans to expand this amount significantly under EU greenhouse gas guidelines),80 percent comes from Gazprom, making Greece reliant on continued Russian goodwill in the short-medium term. ¶6. (SBU) Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed to support the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and share ownership. We support this initiative insofar as it is commercially feasible. The Embassy and Washington agencies have been actively promoting with Greece the need for increased European energy security and diversification. It will be useful for you to reinforce U.S. appreciation for Greece,s courage in standing up to Russian pressure on gas issues and to build contacts with Central Asian suppliers. VISA WAIVER PROGRAM -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Greece is the only one of the original EU 15 not participating in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The Attorney General approved Greece for inclusion in the VWP in 1999, subject to Greece's completing reforms of its passport security and accountability procedures. But Greece failed to meet the deadline, and no new countries have been admitted since 9/11. Greece has since introduced a new biometric passport that meets all ICAO standards and recalled all those previously issued. On August 31, 2007, Secretary Rice sent a letter to DHS Secretary Chertoff officially nominating Greece for the program. A DHS-led team of technical experts visited Greece in November to assess eligibility. The team is now preparing its formal report, and we expect the findings to be positive. A final decision is likely during 200`n in the VWP would boost e. The program wouldavel to Greek citize.ports and thfer on issues such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, rapprochement remains a leitmotif of their bilateral relations. Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term strategic interest. The Cyprus issue, however, is the sticking point. The issue has been stymied since the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan to reunify the island in a 2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan). While Athens quietly backed the Annan Plan, the Greek Government also believed it should stand by the Government of Cyprus and the vote of the Greek Cypriots. There has been little progress to date on the issue and discussions remain stalled. SPECKHARD