Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ATHENS1326
2008-09-18 07:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

FM BAKOYANNIS PLEDGES ENGAGEMENT ON NIMETZ

Tags:  PREL GR MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTH #1326/01 2620725
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180725Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2510
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1191
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0389
S E C R E T ATHENS 001326 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL GR MK
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS PLEDGES ENGAGEMENT ON NIMETZ
PROPOSAL, HIGHLIGHTS REDLINES, AND ASKS FOR VISA WAIVER

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD.
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T ATHENS 001326

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL GR MK
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS PLEDGES ENGAGEMENT ON NIMETZ
PROPOSAL, HIGHLIGHTS REDLINES, AND ASKS FOR VISA WAIVER

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL SPECKHARD.
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) To help lay the groundwork for New York meetings on
the Macedonia name issue, on September 16 Ambassador
Speckhard spoke with Foreign Minister Bakoyannis to urge her
not to reject the most recent Nimetz proposal, to engage
constructively in negotiating textual changes Greece may need
to be able to close the deal, and to avoid publicly
criticizing the proposal or the Macedonian government in the
press to score political points at home.


2. (S) The Foreign Minister said that in spite of strong
political pressure, she and PM Karamanlis had agreed that
they should not lose the momentum and push forward for a
deal. She then highlighted two redlines:

-- Greece would never formally accept that their neighbors
would be called "Macedonians;" and

-- Greece needed a "strong recommendation" in any
implementing UNSC resolution for bilateral countries to use
the new name (and a signal from the U.S. that we intended to
do so as well).


3. (S) Bakoyannis said she would continue to do her best to
get an agreement in the face of a difficult domestic
political situation and a great deal of opposition, but she
asked that the U.S. help as well. In this regard, while
there could be no trade off, she emphasized that movement on
visa waiver (VWP) for Greece was critical to create positive
feelings in the U.S.-Greek relationship that could help
counter the critics that are arguing that Greece should 7aitQ
until the next Administration before reaching an agreement on
the name issue. Ambassador Speckhard repeatedly emphasized
the impo2tance mf en%agifg actively with Nimetz on his mkst
recent propksal and avoiding any crit)cism of the proposal kr
the Macedonians. On VWP, the Ambassador noted his ongoing
commitment to moving this issue through the bureaucracy. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Pressing the Greeks to Engage Constructively
--------------


4. (S) Ambassador Speckhard spoke with FM Bakoyannis by phone
on September 16 (Bakoyannis was in Paris for meetings with
France/EU and then on her way to New York for the UNGA) to
highlight our desire for Greece to engage constructively on

the most recent Nimetz proposal and to avoid any situation
where Greece is publicly criticizing the Nimetz proposal or
the Macedonian leadership -- and thus undercutting prospects
for success. The Ambassador emphasized that Greece should
not reject the Nimetz proposal and should engage Nimetz on
the specifics by negotiating potential textual changes that
Greece may need in order to reach a deal.


5. (S) Bakoyannis responded that in spite of pQssure by the
opposition and many in the government to wait for the next
U.S. Administration, she was determined to maintain the
momentum to see if they could get a deal. She said she had
discussed this with Prime Minister Karamanlis who shared the
view that "they should not give into the opposition." Greece
will not reject the most recent Nimetz proposal, and there
will be "no break" in the negotiations. Bakoyanns said she
and PM Karmanlis want to "move forward, given the current
momentum." However, she returned repeatedly to the difficult
domestic political context an unhelpful actions by
Macedonian PM Gruevski - who has "insulted Greece" and daily
was making very unhelpful statements. She specifically asked
that the U.S. put "greater pressure" on Gruevski to tone down
the rhetoric. The Ambassador noted that we have encouraged
the Macedonian government to avoid rhetoric, but he also
reiterated the importance of not responding to perceived
slights from the Macedonians.

--------------
Redlines
--------------


6. (S) While noting that Greece is still "formulating its
reply" to Nimetz on his most recent proposal, and without
going into details of the proposal, Bakoyannis said that she
and PM Karamanlis had two "clear red lines" that they would
be sharing with Nimetz:

-- Ethnicity: Greece could never sign off on an agreement in
which its northern neighbors were called "Macedonians". She
noted that thetwo and a half million GrQould not understand this."
Left unstated
was the fact that PM Karamanlis is one of them. There feeded
to "e so-e way to distinguish them from Greek Macedonians.
(NOTE: PM Advisor Bitsios has told us in the past that while
they understood that in reality their neighbors would
informally be called "Macedonians," they could never agree to
a document where this was formally or officially established.
END NOTE.)

-- Bilateral Usage: Greece will insist on that a implementing
UNSC resolution contain a "strong recommendation" for
bilateral countries to use the new name. In this context,
she added that Greece needed a signal that the U.S. intended
to use the new name bilaterally. If other countries weren't
going to use the name, "Gruevski would have won" and there
would be no real benefit to Greece to an agreement.

-------------- --------------
Improving the U.S./Greece Bilateral Climate - VWP
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Bakoyannis said that she believes it is still possible
to get an agreement and "creative solutions" can be found to
solve the remaining issues if there is a will in Skopje. She
pledged that she will conQnue to do her best to reach an
agreement, in spite of a difficult domestic political
situation, which would mitigate against such steps. (NOTE:
Karamanlis' ruling New Democracy party is now polling lower
than major opposition party PASOK for the first time since
Karamanlis took office. END NOTE). She then said that she
needed U.S. "help," and asked where VWP stood. The
Ambassador responded that there has been some movement on the
proposed bilateral MOU and that it was back with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),but that he was not
yet in a position to share a U.S. response to Greece's
proposals.


8. (S) Bakoyannis said she was trying to keep an open mind
amidst rumors that VWP had been held up for political reasons
or to punish Greece, but was finding it increasingly harder
to do so. She noted that postponing VWP played into the
hands of the opposition and fed public attitudes to encourage
waiting for the next Administration, adding that most believe
the next U.S. Administration may be more "understanding" of
Greek priorities. Bakoyannis reiterated that she and PM
Karamanlis were committed to solving the name issue, but the
U.S. must help to create a more positive environment for
U.S.-Greek relations, given how politically tough this was.
VWP was an important part of this. Ambassador Speckhard
noted his ongoing commitment and efforts to move VWP for
Greece through the U.S. bureaucracy, and promised to pass
back to Washington the Foreign Minister's observations in
this area, but did not respond further to her on this issue.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (S) Although the easiest thing for the Greeks is to stall
on the name issue, given the current domestic political
environment, the FM seemed genuine in her willingness to take
the political risk and push forward on a deal if a way could
found to accommodate their red lines. The fact that she
invoked the PM's name adds credibility to this view. The
Greeks also appear to believe that Gruevski is under pressure
because he may suspect any future U.S. Administration will be
less sympathetic to his cause. As a result, while remaining
skeptical about the chances for success, they remain open to
any further movement from Skopje to reach agreement.


10. (S) COMMENT CONT.: However, the FM remains politically
exposed on this issue given her pro-U.S. image in Greece. The
recent articles linking the U.S. lack of responsiveness on
VWP to the name issue only make matters worse. While
explicit linkage between VWP and the name issue would be
politically embarrassing and could undermine an agreement,
she and the PM need to be able to show concrete benefits of
the U.S.-Greek relationship to be able to go the final mile
on the name negotiations.
SPECKHARD