GOG TO EMB SKOPJE DCM: POSITION FIRM BUT READY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001299 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GR MK SUBJECT: GOG TO EMB SKOPJE DCM: POSITION FIRM BUT READY TO DEAL Classified By: DCM DEBORAH MCCARTHY. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greece is prepared to make a deal on the name dispute with Macedonia "tomorrow," senior Greek officials told visiting Embassy Skopje DCM Navratil in meetings August 22 in Athens, but Greece's position on a composite name and its universal international usage -- "ergo omnes" -- remains firm. GOG officials conceded that the "Skopjans" had a right to their own cultural and national identity, but they believed these issues were best left out of negotiations. Greece views PM Gruevski as intransigent and believes he does not want a deal. Embassy Skopje DCM reported that the view in Skopje is a mirror image: Gruevski believes PM Karamanlis is just as inflexible and also distrusting that the GOG would ever reach agreement with Macedonia. Navratil also noted that Gruevski's negotiating style seems to be to maintain the hard-line all the way to sudden agreement. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Embassy Skopje DCM Navratil and POL/ECON Chief Burger attended meetings with PM Karamanlis' diplomatic advisor Ambassador Constantinos Bitsios and MFA Secretary General Agathocles, along with Embassy Athens Charge d'Affairs McCarthy and A/PolCouns Carter August 22, 2008, to discuss the Macedonian name issue. While Navratil made clear that he and Burger were not representing the GoM and that the USG was not part of the Nimetz negotiations, they sought to offer clarification of the situation in Macedonia for GoG officials and to gain greater understanding of the Greek position to help our interlocutors in Skopje understand it better without the smokescreen of testy exchanges in the press. BITSIOS -------------- ¶3. (C) Bitsios quickly rehearsed the overall Greek position: Macedonia as a geographic term includes northern Greece and parts of Bulgaria and Albania, as well as the country Greece calls FYROM, whose use of the name "Republic of Macedonia" attempts to assert exclusive claim to the entire territory. Thus, Greece insists on an adjective to remove this implicit claim on Greek lands. ¶4. (C) Bitsios argued that agreement on a name and its scope of use is the crux of the problem. Greece is not intent on taking a position on the adjective "Macedonian" to describe the country's language and people. However, Greece was forced to take a position on this issue because the Macedonians have done so. If Macedonia does not insist on this being part of the agreement, Greece will not do so. If it does insist, "we have good arguments" for why the adjective would require modification. ¶5. (C) Use of a new name "ergo omnes" is the only way, Bitsios asserted, to solve the issue. Without this approach, the competition between Greece and Macedonia for third countries to recognize bilaterally would continue without end. While the new name would be required in all international fora, Greece would not object to the informal use of the term "Macedonian" in referring to the country, for example participants in international meetings referring to their "Macedonian colleagues," "the Macedonian position," etc. However, Greece would not be able to put this into a formal agreement. ¶6. (C) Bitsios pressed for our assessment of PM Gruevski, adding that the GoG is convinced he does not want a deal. Embassy Skopje DCM Navratil responded that Gruevski's impression of PM Karamanlis is exactly the same: Greece is pursuing a hard line and opposes progress. Bitsios demurred: Greece is ready to make a deal "tomorrow morning." Indeed, he added, Greece is tired of looking like "a foolish pest" in international fora as it seeks to prevent the use of Macedonia's constitutional name. He asserted that aside from the name issue, bilateral ties are generally good: trade and people-to-people relations are extensive and positive. A solution on the name would not only clear the path for Macedonian NATO membership and EU negotiations, but would also improve bilateral ties further. MFA SECGEN AGATHOCLES -------------- ¶7. (C) While asserting that the GOG was not interested in history, Agathocles nevertheless begin by hinting that PM Gruevski harbors dark plans for territorial claims on Greek territory. He cited photos of Gruevski laying a wreath at an official event in front of a crude map showing Macedonian territory extending deep into northern Greece, as well as Macedonian MOD and school history textbook maps showing the same configuration. He said he had heard Gruevski tell a domestic audience that Macedonia's capital will one day include Thessaloniki. (This was new to us.) For now, he continued, Macedonia is acting as an "enemy" of Greece. ¶8. (C) Only Macedonia's agreement to change its name will reassure Greece that Skopje has given up on claims on Greek territory. While "they really don't meet NATO standards," a mutually acceptable deal on the name is essential to open the door to membership in the Alliance and to a date for EU negotiations. Without a change, Greece would stand opposed. ¶9. (C) Agathocles asserted that the GoG accepts that the Macedonians have an identity; however, they (Macedonians) have no right to claim a cultural heritage for a geographic region beyond its boundaries He accused the Gruevski government of using the issue of Macedonian identity as a smokescreen to derail the name negotiations and foment Macedonian irredentism. ¶10. (C) According to Agathocles, once a name is agreed upon the "secondary issues" will fall into place. Athens does not have a timetable for negotiations, but Agathocles said Greece is prepared to resolve the issue "tomorrow" and certainly in ¶2008. If Macedonia wants to be a partner, it must act like a partner and pursue good neighborly relations. Agathocles argued that Athens showed good faith in negotiating the Interim Accord in 1995 and again when PM Karmanlis made the bold and historic decision to accept the word "Macedonia" in a new composite name. Yet the Macedonians responded by putting additional issues on the table, such as the Macedonian minority in Greece and the church issue, "endlessly" provoking Athens through letters and the media. ¶11. (C) Agathocles said that he personally thought "New Macedonia" would be the best option for a name and would satisfy Greece's view that Macedonia has no valid claim to regional antiquities or lineage from Alexander the Great. However, he made clear that Greece's position regarding a geographic modifier is firm. NEGOTIATION / TACTICS -------------- ¶12. (C) DCM Navratil noted that PM Gruevski and his team have consistently maintained to us that they want to reach an agreement that opens the way to NATO and the EU. He urged that Greece refrain from concluding on the basis of Gruevski's outward posture that he doesn't want to settle this, and shed some light for both Agathocles and Bitsios on what we have observed of PM Gruevski's negotiating tactics: he will remain unyielding up to the last minute then suddenly make a deal. Agathocles responded by saying that he has been involved with many negotiations and no one who has taken that approach gets what they want. Bitsios similarly expressed perplexity at Gruevski's tactics, noting that rather than a negotiating ploy, Gruevski's approach appeared designed to guarantee a deal was not reached. SPECKHARD