GREECE/CYPRUS: GOG SUPPORTS UN PROCESS BUT WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001290

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDING PARA 6)

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR CY UN
SUBJECT: GREECE/CYPRUS: GOG SUPPORTS UN PROCESS BUT WORRIED
ABOUT TURKEY

REF: HOVENIER/EUR-SE E-MAIL OF 9/9/08

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) PM Karamanlis and FM Bakoyannis are pleased with the
momentum on Cyprus, sending positive signals about the
September 3 start of UN-brokered talks. Cyprus has been
center stage in Athens with visits from UN Special Envoy
Downer and Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou. PM Karamanlis
and FM Bakoyannis told Downer that they are pleased with
current developments but strongly questions Ankara's
commitment to -- and potential to spoil -- progress on
Cyprus. Karamanlis also emphasized to Downer that he can see
"no direct role" for Greece in the talks at this time.
According to MFA contacts, Kyprianou's visit was "not linked"
to the September 3 UN talks, although he expressed
appreciation for GOG support to the process. Beyond
consultations on the Cyprus negotiations, Kyprianou and his
GOG interlocutors also discussed EU issues, Kosovo and
Russia/Georgia. He also publicly stated that the G/C
acceptance of the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal
federation already constitutes a "massive concession." End
Summary.

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Pleased with Momentum - Skeptical About Turkey
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2. (C) UN Special Envoy Downer gave selected diplomats a
summary of his September 9 meeting with PM Karamanlis.
Downer reported that Karamanlis had expressed general support
for the process and its goals and was pleased with the
momentum of the talks. Karamanlis told Downer he could see
"no need" for direct Greek intervention in the process,
wanting to leave it to Christofias and the G/Cs. Karamanlis
did not lay out any Greek red lines.


3. (C) Downer reported, however, that Karamanlis was worried
about Turkey and its role in this process -- pointing to
three "different power centers" in Turkey on Cyprus: The
President/Prime Minister; the Foreign Minister; and the Chief
of the Turkish General Staff. Karamanlis had also wondered
aloud if any "backdoor deals" had been cut in the AKP closure
case that would affect Turkish positions on Cyprus.
Karamanlis also expressed concern that continuing domestic
political turmoil in Turkey could negatively impact the
Cyprus process. Summing up, Downer said Karamanlis had made
clear he questioned Ankara's support for the process.


4. (C) Karamanlis' International Affairs Advisor Marina
Skordeli confirmed Downer's impressions of his meeting with
Karamanlis to A/Political Counselor in a September 9 meeting.
Karamanlis had been "impressed" by Downer as he seems
"realistic but optimistic" and is approaching the
negotiations "in a pragmatic way." Karamanlis feels things
are "moving in the right direction." However, Karamanlis had
thought it important to emphasize to Downer two points:

-- Karamanlis is "not optimistic" about the role Ankara will
play in this process, and he is "afraid the process will
stall." It is not certain what Ankara's intentions are in
this process.

-- The relationship between Greece and the G/Cs is
"qualitatively different" than the relationship between
Turkey and the T/Cs. Greece cannot dictate to the
Christofias what to do in the negotiations -- and "even if it
tried, it wouldn't change things." Turkey, however, is in a
position to dictate to the T/Cs. It is important Downer
understand this inherent difference.


5. (C) MFA Cyprus Department Deputy Director Papadakis told
us that FM Bakoyannis had made the same points to Downer,
emphasizing Greece's satisfaction with current momentum,
offering Greece's good offices in facilitating any possible
solution, but expressing concern about Turkey being a
spoiler.

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U.S. Envoy? Downer Says Not Yet
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6. (C) In his September 8 meeting with Athens-based
diplomats, Downer said he did not think the U.S. should play
a special role on Cyprus at this time, suggesting more robust
U.S. engagement now "could be counterproductive." He added
that he anticipated special U.S. help would be needed later
in the process, particularly with Turkey, suggesting that
senior mil-to-mil contacts between U.S. and TGS officers
could be particularly important.

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Cyprus FM Kyprianou -- "Regular Bilateral Visit"
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7. (C) Meanwhile, Cypriot FM Kyprianou visited Athens
September 9, on the heels of Downer's visit. Papadakis told
us that Kyprianou's visit had "not been linked" to the
September 3 start of UN-brokered talks, although the issue of
the Cyprus negotiations had been "the main agenda item."
Kyprianou met with President Papoulias, PM Karamanlis, FM
Bakoyannis, Parliament President Sioufas, and main opposition
PASOK President Papandreou. According to MFA contacts, GOG
interlocutors reiterated Greek support for the UN-led process
and for the positions Christofias has taken in the
negotiations. Kyprianou reportedly pledged to keep Greece
fully briefed on developments within the negotiations.
Finally, Papadakis told us that the two Foreign Ministers had
also compared notes on EU issues, as well as Kosovo and
Georgia. On the latter, he said no new ground was covered,
but both sides reiterated "their known positions."


8. (U) In a press availability following his September 9
meeting with FM Bakoyannis, Kyprianou noted that "a bizonal,
bicommunal solution would be a massive concession for Cyprus,
as there was never a geographic demarcation before the
(Turkish) invasion." Bakoyannis publicly reiterated that any
solution must be "just, viable, and functional."
SPECKHARD