GREEK VIEWS ON SEPTEMBER GAERC ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001287 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM GR RS SU ZI YI EUN SUBJECT: GREEK VIEWS ON SEPTEMBER GAERC ISSUES REF: A. 9/6/08 GIAUQUE E-MAIL WITH GAERC POINTS ¶B. ATHENS 1261 ¶C. SECSTATE 96598 Classified By: A/POLCOUNS JEFFREY HOVENIER. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) DepPolCouns delivered ref A and C points on the September 15-16 meeting of EU foreign ministers (GAERC) to MFA European Correspondent Ant/nia Katzourou and took the oppo2tunity 4o ask for a readout of the September 5-6 G9mnich meeting. On the latter, Katzourou said 3he had ngt gotten a detailed brief because French FM Kouchner was eager to maintain the informal character of the closed meeting and thUs did no4 wish to allow many details to be made public. On the trans-Atlantic relationship, Katzourou said the ministers had agreed to draft specific points to push with the new U.S. administration. The focus would be on issues that all parties could agree on, and constructively engage in. Overall, the EU members were eager to improve relations with the U.S. ¶2. (C) On the upcoming GAERC, Katzourou's responses are keyed to the subjects discussed in the demarche points: -- Zimbabwe: The EU hoped to find ways to pressure Mbeki to get tougher with Mugabe, but thus far had met with little success. The fact was, Mugabe was unlikely to relinquish any real power and change would likely have to await his passing. The EU had expanded its targeted sanctions list and was prepared to extend sanctions further, as the situation warranted. -- Somalia: Katzourou noted that the EU naval operation could not properly be called an ESDP mission, because it was really an action by individual EU members states. Accordingly, a "Coordination Center" had been set up in Brussels to coordinate member states' efforts. -- Serbia: Overall, Katzourou thought Serbia's movement toward the EU was going well. She noted that even Serb radicals appeared willing to move forward. The quieter the process, the more likely this positive movement would continue. On Belgrade's proposal for a new UNSCR for EULEX, Katzourou opined that this simply was unrealistic. Though Greece generally supported the idea of UN resolutions to provide legality, in this case Serbia could not expect further UNSC action. On Serbia's pursuit of an ICJ advisory opinion request, Greece was still studying the idea (ref B). Greece had begun looking at the proposal earlier in August, but the Russia/Georgia crisis had pushed this and other issues to the back burner. Now Greece was re-focusing. There had been no EU discussion on it, and Katzourou thought, perhaps, there never would be because of its sensitive nature. -- Turkey: Turkey was not on the GAERC agenda. Greece's position was unchanged, well-known, and reflected the EU letter to Turkey last year. Katzourou argued that Greece understood Turkey's desire for closer cooperation, but Turkey had to face the fact that the EU consisted of its 27 member-states. Turkey's blocking Cyprus' cooperation with NATO was also unhelpful. -- Georgia: This item would obviously occupy much of the GAERC meeting. The president would brief on the Sarkozy-Barroso-Solana mission to Moscow, and the GAERC would have to take a decision on sending the 200 observers to Georgia (who were scheduled for deployment on October 1). On whether Greece would contribute to the EU observers mission, Katzourou said the MFA had recommended it, but the decision would be made by PM Karamanlis. ¶3. (C) DepPolCouns took the opportunity of the Georgia discussion to press Katzourou on Greece's emerging policy line on Russia/Georgia, namely to support in words the EU's political support for Georgia's territorial integrity, while in deed continuing to do "business as usual" with Russia on energy pipelines and other economic issues. Katzourou defended the Greek position with arguments that "isolating" Russia would not be productive and that maintaining good relations with Russia was important to Greece beyond pipelines. DepPolCouns countered that no one wished to see Russia isolated, but Russia needed to understand that there were consequences for bad behavior or it would be encouraged to a repeat performance in a few years in such places as Crimea in Ukraine. This was particularly important for Greece, which would assume the OSCE Chair-in-Office in January 2009. Katzourou appeared to take the latter argument on board, conceding that Greece would find it very difficult to follow its traditional strategy of splitting the difference between bigger powers at the OSCE -- particularly on such issues as ODIHR eection-observer missions and core democratic rinciples. SPECKHARD