GREEK MFA ON IRAN ISSUES

S E C R E T ATHENS 000123 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018 TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL PGOV CASC KDEM IR IZ GR SUBJECT: GREEK MFA ON IRAN ISSUES REF: A. ATHENS 32 ¶B. ATHENS 61 ¶C. SECSTATE 2881 Classified By: DCM Thomas Countryman. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) On January 24, DepPolCouns met with MFA A6 Directorate for Middle East Affairs deputy head Giorgos Ayfantis to discuss various Iran issues, including a readout of the Iranian DFM Bagheri's January 14 visit to Athens, Greece's overall posture towards Iran, and Iran's role in Iraq. DFM Valinakis's discussion with Bagheri regarding the case of Amcit Levinson missing in Iran was reported earlier (ref b). BAGHERI -------------- ¶2. (S) On January 14, Bagheri held a short meeting with FM Bakoyannis, longer meetings ith DFM Valinakis and DFM Doukas, and was honoed at a lunch hosted by a deputy speaker of Prliament. Ayfantis said Bagheri clearly had as a goal the breaking of the EU consensus on Iran. Citing the U.S. NIE on Iran's nuclear program, Bagheri told Bakoyannis, according to Ayfantis, "we're not making a bomb, so why don't we get back to business as usual?" Ayfantis said FM Bakoyannis pushed back, advising Bagheri that Iran needed to stop enrichment activities and cooperate with IAEA DG ElBaradei. According to Ayfantis, Greece believed that Iran was not creating large quantities of enriched uranium, but this needed to be confirmed by ElBaradei. Bagheri said that Iran would work with ElBaradei but there could be no direct negotiations with the EU 3 regarding Iran's nuclear program. Ayfantis commented that Bakoyannis believed additional sanctions to encourage Iran to cooperate with the IAEA would not work, but Greece nonetheless would not oppose EU consensus policy. RELATIONS WITH IRAN -------------- ¶3. (S) Ayfantis said Bakoyannis believed it was important not to challenge directly the legitimacy of the Iranian regime. Such a course alienated the Iranian leadership and left no one with whom to negotiate. Greece saw itself as a bridge for dialogue with Iran, according to Ayfantis. He cited the example of human rights issues. Greece had been trying to convince the Iranian leadership that the use of defense lawyers was not forbidden by Islamic law. "If you want us to roar and threaten, we can," Ayfantis glibly stated, "but it won't work." ¶4. (S) At the same time, Ayfantis also noted the more practical influence of Greek shipping interests on the GOG's attitude toward Iran. He said Greek shippers -- who control the largest merchant marine fleet in the world -- have to work with Iran. If the GOG pushed too hard on Iran, Ayfantis argued, the Iranians could make life difficult for Greek shippers in the Persian Gulf. Greece did not want to lose this business to the Chinese. Thus, there was great pressure on the MFA to take a moderate approach toward Iran. ¶5. (S) There were limits, however, to such cooperation. Ayfantis noted that two Iranian ships were scheduled to dock in Pireaus in February. The Iranians had wanted to conduct joint exercises with the Greek Navy, but the GOG refused. Bagheri had also offered to Bakoyannis for the Iranians to act as an intermediary between Greece (and presumably other Western countries) and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Bakoyannis did not respond to this offer. IRAN IN IRAQ -------------- ¶6. (S) DepPolCouns took the opportunity of Ayfantis's claim of Greece's "bridge" role with Iran to push for help with Iran's nefarious activities in Iraq (ref c). He noted, in particular, the terrible impact of car bombs on U.S. and Iraqi personnel and Iranian training of insurgents. Ayfantis agreed on the very serious nature of these concerns and promised to pass them to FM Bakoyannis with a recommendation that Greece try to influence Iranian behavior in Iraq. SPECKHARD