SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR LAGON'S SEPTEMBER 1-3

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 001203 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 TAGS: GR PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR LAGON'S SEPTEMBER 1-3 VISIT TO GREECE Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DEBORAH MCCARTHY. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Welcome to Athens. Your visit is an excellent opportunity to press Greece to show progress on TIP issues if it wishes to avoid a Tier-Two Watch-List rating. Your visit comes at a particularly delicate moment in U.S.-Greece relations. A NATO ally and EU member, Greece has been helpful in some areas, such as its support for our naval facility at Souda Bay, while also taking positions at odds with U.S. interests, such as moving closer to Russia on energy pipeline deals. Bilateral relations have been particularly difficult since Greece vetoed the Republic of Macedonia's NATO accession at the Bucharest Summit in April. You will face interlocutors who are reluctant to believe that U.S. criticism of Greece's TIP record is anything other than retribution for the Macedonia veto. YOUR MEETINGS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In line with the requests we received from your office, we are arranging several meetings with government officials and NGOs, as well as visits to a shelter. These meetings include Secretary General of the MFA Agathocles, Minister of Justice and Public Order Hatzigakis, and members of the Inter-Government TIP Committee. NGOs you will see include the European Women's Network (ENOW),Klimaka, and ACT UP, among others. We also hope you will agree to present, along with Ambassador Speckhard, an award to NEW Life's Emma Skjonsby-Manousaridis, one of the 2008 TIP Heroes. We are also planning a press event where you will have the opportunity to talk about the importance of human trafficking as a global challenge. ¶3. (SBU) During your visit you will have n opportunity to highlight issues in the G/TIP Action Guide for Greece, including the development of a system for reporting arrests, prosecutions and punishments; increased protection and services for victims and witnesses; increased law enforcement efforts; prosecution of trafficking-related corruption; as well as to encourage the Government of Greece to raise the overall awareness of TIP issues. We have previewed the Action Guide with the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs in anticipation of your visit. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS -------------- ¶4. (U) The Greek Parliament ratified on July 31, 2008, a bilateral agreement with Albania on child repatriation, which had been pending for several years, providing protection and aid to children who have been victims of trafficking. The agreement provides for safe repatriation of children to Albania and appointment of custodians, and measures to combat the root causes of child trafficking, such as improved access to education. The agreement also establishes a Central Coordination Committee that will aim to improve efficiency of state entities devoted to trafficking. It will enter into force when published in the Government Gazette. ¶5. (U) The TIP police (a section of the National Police's Organized Crime Division) issued a report on its activities during its first two years. Key elements include: -- The TIP police investigated 69 cases and dismantled 13 international organized criminal networks in cooperation with INTERPOL and EUROPOL. -- The TIP Police filed court papers against 287 persons in Greece and abroad, on the basis of which 192 Greeks and foreigners were arrested. Of the 192, 117 were charged for participation in a criminal organization; 52 were arrested in Greece, while warrants were issued for the others. Of those arrested in Greece, many are in pre-trial detention or have been released on probation until their cases are heard by the courts. Most cases are pending. Four have been tried on first-degree charges, and sentences of 15-19 years were imposed. -- Protection and aid was offered to 127 men, women, and children, many of whom were voluntarily repatriated. Of the 127, 41 were recognized as trafficking victims by the prosecutor and were placed in NGO shelters. These numbers have decreased slightly from previous years due to conflicting data. ¶6. (SBU) On June 2, governors of border provinces in Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey met as part of their on-going discussions on trafficking issues and re-affirmed their ATHENS 00001203 002 OF 003 commitment to support victims and to strengthen measures against traffickers. ¶7. (SBU) The European Women's Network (ENOW),Klimaka, and the Greek Council for Refugees -- all dynamic NGOs and official partners of the MFA in combating trafficking in persons -- complained to us about delays in receiving funds from the Development Aid Division of the MFA. All three NGOs said cooperation with the Development Aid Division was ad hoc and funds were made available only after very long delays. As a result, Klimaka was forced to close a trafficking victims, shelter in 2007. Nickie Roumbani, President of ENOW, alleged that the government shelter EKKA was also at minimal operation level due to delays in receiving committed funds. ENOW and other NGOs expressed admiration for police work but were very critical of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ¶8. (U) At the same time, however, Hellenic Aid maintained its ongoing commitment to help fund the Transnational Action Against Child Trafficking (TACT) program in Albania, at its accustomed 100,000 Euros/annum levels. USAID is also a major contributor to this program. GREEK MEDIA GUIDE -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In this year's Freedom House survey, the Greek media is rated as "free," albeit near the bottom of the Western Europe group alongside Spain and Italy. In some respects, however, it is more reminiscent of the Middle East, with a tendency toward sensationalism and conspiracy theories. Editorial and reporting lines largely support the economic and political interest of the various medial outlets owners. The issue of trafficking has been the subject of sporadic Greek media attention for the past several years, usually within the larger context of migration. Recent examples include a mid-July report during the prime-time newscast of a popular TV station, which noted neither Russia nor Greece has an adequate legal framework to address sex trafficking. This was part of a series on increased Russian tourism and travel here. ¶10. (SBU) For your roundtable discussion, we plan to invite Greek diplomatic correspondents from both print and broadcast outlets who are familiar with our annual TIP report and U.S. policy in general. Nevertheless, you may wish to spend up to several minutes at the start of the discussion to put the TIP issue in global context, as well as to convey information about Greece and your meetings here, including the award presentation to the director of the NGO "Nea Zoi." The off-camera discussion will be in English, with the local staff available to assist with any Greek translation needs that may arise for individual reporters. OTHER ISSUES -------------- ¶11. (C) Although these and other TIP issues will be the focus of your meetings, we also provide the following background on other topical issues that could emerge -- even informally -- in your discussions. U.S.-Greece relations are decidedly mixed. On the positive side, Greek-U.S. military-to-military cooperation and the work between our law enforcement officials remains strong. The U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete is a growing hub for transport and logistics in the Middle East theater, and Greece is among the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment. The Greeks have also been good partners on domestic and international counterterrorism issues, and we are working hard to ensure that the overall political environment does not undermine this cooperation on the security front. In Kosovo, Greece is providing personnel to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULUX), the International Civilian Office (ICO),the OSCE Mission, NATO (KFOR),and has ongoing dialogue with Kosovo authorities. At the same time, U.S. and Greek positions on a number of key issues have diverged. MACEDONIA -------------- ¶12. (C) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece objected to the Republic of Macedonia's name. At the April NATO Summit, Greece blocked the invitation of Macedonia into the Alliance under its constitutional name "The Republic of Macedonia" -- a top U.S. priority. Since the Summit, we have continued to urge both Athens and Skopje to work rapidly for a solution. Greek/Macedonian relations have been dealt an additional setback by a tart exchange of letters between Macedonian PM Gruevski and Greek PM Karamanlis on questions related to the "Macedonian minority" in Greece. ATHENS 00001203 003 OF 003 KOSOVO -------------- ¶13. (C) Greece does not appear likely to recognize Kosovo in the immediate future but is playing a reasonably constructive role behind the scenes. Greece has been among the most active players in the EU in engaging with Serbia post-Kosovo independence and in encouraging Serbia's European and Euro-Atlantic perspective. RUSSIA/GEORGIA -------------- ¶14. (S) PM Karamanlis has pursued a policy of an enhanced relationship with Russia. This is evident in deals on energy pipelines but also in Greek purchases of Russian military equipment, numerous reciprocal high-level visits, and expanding trade and cultural ties. But Greece also has historical ties to Georgia. The Russian/Georgian crisis has put Greece in a tight spot. The GoG has come out in suSarkos with Russian defense industry officials and the ratification in September of the Southstream gas pipeline agreement. The Embassy has pushed the GoG hard to cancel or delay these ill-advised moves. ¶15. (C) It is important to stress, however, that while the GoG has been rhetorically supportive of Southstream, it has taken concrete steps to realize the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (TGI). This is the first pipeline to carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through Russian-controlled pipelines. TGI is an important step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy diversity and security for Europe. Thus, Greece has found itself in the cross hairs of an intense effort by Russian Gazprom to minimize the flow of Azerbaijani gas through Greece. We believe that Gazprom's Southstream pipeline, which is designed to follow the same route as TGI, is designed to undermine TGI. GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS -------------- ¶16. (C) Greece's role in the Aegean continues to impact its rapprochement with Turkey and the Cyprus dispute. The Greek/Turkish bilateral relationship has improved in recent years, repeatedly evidenced by Athens, ongoing support for Ankara's EU membership and PM Karamanlis' January visit to Turkey. There has, however, been no tangible progress on long-standing disputes over continental shelf and the status of islands in the Aegean. ¶17. (SBU) Although the Cyprus issue has been stymied since the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN-brokered Annan plan to reunify the island in a 2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots accepted the Plan),the election of Cypriot President Christofias and his engagement with his Turkish-Cypriot counterpart is widely seen as a new opportunity to reach a comprehensive solution on the island. While Greece has unique influence with the Greek Cypriots, it does not have the same level of influence as Turkey has with the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greeks remain suspicious that Turkey may not be as committed to achieving a permanent settlement to the issue. MCCARTHY