SCENE SETTER FOR ATHENS GREECE (U)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001023 SIPDIS EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2033 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO TU MK GR SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR ATHENS GREECE (U) ¶1. (SBU) Welcome back to Athens, we look forward to your important visit which comes at an important time in the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. Since your visit last July, ADM Fitzgerald (2-3 April),Lt Gen McFann (2 July),and LTG Eikenberry (3 July) visited Athens and met with key Greek military officers and defense officials. Although the discussions were frank, all three visis were cordial resulting in agreement to continue cooperative dialogue. You will have offie calls with the Minister of National Defense, Evangelos Meimarakis, and the Chief of the Hllenic National Defense General Staff, Genera Dimitrios Grapsas. Mr. Meimarakis is close to PM Karamanlis and calculates decisions in terms of political consequences; he has therefore been skeptical about requests for additional support in Iraq and Afghanistan, as these missions are widely unpopular in Greece. The Afghanistan caveats limiting Greek soldiers from operating outside of Kabul and its environs are MOD imposed. General Grapsas, a career Army armor officer, has been in office since August 07 and is viewed as a pragmatic and relatively apolitical leader. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has not used the press to advance Greek positions on such issues as Aegean exercises or to object to U.S. requests for more military assistance in ISAF and Afghanistan. His lower-key approach has been beneficial, and he should be privately thanked. ¶2. (C) Three key factors shape the Greek political-military dynamic and its relationship to the United States. First, the center-right New Democracy government of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis ) re-elected by a slim majority in September 2007 elections ) seeks to maintain good relations with the U.S., though the U.S.-Greece partnership is complex and, at times, tumultuous and the Greeks have accelerated a long-term project of developing closer ties to the Russians. Second, although Greeks have a deep respect and affection for American culture and Americans in general dating to the Marshall Plan and earlier, this is offset by Greek skepticism about the American agenda and projection of U.S. power. Some of this bleeds over into NATO; Greece probably has the lowest levels of popular support for NATO in the Alliance, and as a result, Greece,s participation in NATO operations is politically sensitive. Notwithstanding these facts, U.S.-Greek military-to-military cooperation is good (probably the best aspect of our overall bilateral relationship), particularly at the U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on Crete, which plays a key role in supporting U.S. military operations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, including Iraq. Greece is also among the largest purchasers of U.S. military equipment. ¶3. (SBU) You are likely to find the Greeks to be warm and hospitable hosts but also staunch defenders of their interests, particularly on issues touching on national identity and territory. Some of the Embassy,s priority goals include: 1) promoting stability in the Balkans in light of Kosovo,s declaration of independence and Greece,s veto of the Republic of Macedonia,s bid to join NATO at the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest; 2) further cooperation in combating Greek domestic and international terrorist threats and in strengthening Greek borders against transiting terrorists; 3) increasing Greek-Turkish cooperation and stability in the Aegean and on Cyprus; and 4) expanding trade with the U.S. and encouraging Greece to contribute to European energy diversity as in develops as an energy transit hub. Since your visit last year, there have been several key political events that will undoubtedly influence your discussions with Greek officials and others. MACEDONIA -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Greeks consider the unmodified use of "Macedonia" a usurpation of their heritage and warn that it could encourage irredentism towards Greece's northern province of the same name. We have repeatedly urged both sides to lower the rhetoric and engage in negotiations led by Matthew Nimetz under the auspices of the United Nations and have stated that the U.S. would accept whatever solution Athens and Skopje agreed upon through the negotiations. In the aftermath of Greece vetoing Macedonia,s NATO invitation at the NATO 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, we continue to urge both countries to work for a mutually agreeable solution through the UN/Nimetz process. However, the veto, and the popular perception in Greece that Macedonia has been &intransigent8 in the negotiations as a direct result of &unquestioned U.S. support8 has resulted in disappointment from both sides that has clouded our relationship with Greece. The government of Greece, however, is signaling its desire and intent to move swiftly in finding a solution to the name issue, albeit on its terms. Even those who know that this is not your issue are likely to raise it with you; they just can,t help it. KOSOVO -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, shortly after Serbia,s January 2008 elections. Kosovo has been formally recognized by 43 United Nations Member States, including 20 individual EU member-states, though a number, including Greece, have not. Despite this, Greece maintains substantial military forces in NATO,s Kosovo force and is providing personnel and support to the EU,s &Rule of Law Mission8 in Kosovo, to the International Civilian Office, and to the OSCE Mission. The United States has encouraged Greece to recognize Kosovo in the interest of supporting regional stability, but we see little indication Greece will recognize Kosovo in the near future. Greece is playing a constructive role in urging Serbia to take a forward-looking approach to its future in the European and Euro Atlantic community. ENERGY ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Greece is seeking to play a prominent new role as an energy pipeline hub to western Europe. We see the most significant development as the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (TGI),which is the first pipeline to carry Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through Russian-controlled pipelines. It is an important step in realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy diverQhave actively encouragQr gas from Azerbaijan. @reece; whereas currently natural gas supplies coQGI becomes fully opeQendence could be reduceQ ¶7. (SBU) Greek cooperation on energy with Russia has increased significantly over the past two years. On April 29, PM Karamanlis and outgoing Russian President Putin signed an agreement on cooperation on the South Stream gas pipeline. While some view this pipeline as a competitor to TGI, TGI is far more advanced in design and development and likely will not be impacted. Meanwhile, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia have agreed to support the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Bosporus Oil Bypass Pipeline (BAP) and share ownership. We support this initiative insofar as it is commercially feasible. The Embassy and Washington agencies have been actively promoting with Greece the need for increased European energy security and diversification. While normally discussed in the economic circles, the energy diversity issue has enormous national security implications for Greece and Europe. GREECE-TURKEY -------------- ¶8. (C) Although Greece and Turkey still differ on issues such as Aegean air/seaspace demarcation and Greece often complains of alleged Turkish air incursions in the Aegean, rapprochement remains a foundation for their bilateral relations. Against the sway of public opinion, the GOG remains supportive of Turkey's EU accession hopes and understands that a Turkey in the EU is in Greece's long-term strategic interest. The Greeks are quite nervous about the potential &closure8 of the ruling AKP party and what that might mean for democracy in Turkey and for Turkey,s relations with the EU and Greece. The Karamanlis government, in general, believes that their bilateral relations are better off with the Erdogan govenment than any military supported consevative alternative. Similarly, while there now exists political will on Cyprus to resolve that island,s status, the Greek view is that the current constitutional crisis in Turkey is also likely to prevent significant progress. ¶9. (C) As you know, the Greeks were deeply disappointed by the NATO decision not to support NOBLE ARCHER 2008. You can anticipate that all of your interlocutors will want to discuss with you how they might craft an exercise in the future that would overfly Agios Efstrations with NATO support. You can also anticipate that your Greek interlocutors will press you on the decision-making process leading up to NATO's decision not to provide support to NOBLE ARCHER 2008. ¶10. (SBU) On 1 July, Lt Gen McFann met with Gen Grapsas Chief, HNDGS and others and discussed NATO air issues. The inclusion or exclusion of Aegean islands in NATO supported exercises and NATO-led exercises dominated the discussion. Lt Gen McFann reiterated the NATO policy of remaining neutral in these disputes and Gen Grapsas replied that NATO neutrality always favors Turkish interests an$ tha4 They cg5,d see no justification for noT inclUding the island of Agios Efstratios in an exeraise. Lt Gen McFann stated that this is a political and not a military question and encour!eed the Gr%eks to raise this issue with NATO political authorities and to seek written guidance frkm 4(e NATO Secretary General. GWOT CONTRIBUTIONS -------------- ¶11. (C) At every opportunity, and at every level, we encourage the Greeks to contribute more to the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although Greek contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan are limited, Greek contributions to other important GWOT initiatives are substantial and should not be overlooked. Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights a year and participates in OAE/OEF, KFOR, and UNIFIL. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Souda Bay as a support hub for sea and air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southwest Asia. Although it is fine to thank them privately during meetings, Greek public sentiment is strongly anti-war, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they would like to keep private, avoiding any public acknowledgments. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶12. (C) Although it sounds cliche, your visit comes at an important moment. In spite of the mutual disappointment surrounding the name issue, U.S. and Greece share significant common strategic interests. While we should not expect a dramatic improvement in the short run of Greek attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy or NATO, we both stand a lot to lose if the relationship were to significantly deteriorate. Fortunately, following the Secretary,s generally positive meeting with the Foreign Minister last month in Berlin, the relationship has stabilized and we are once again focusing on areas where we can have productive cooperation. Your visit will remind them that they are an important NATO ally, and in spite of the veto at Bucharest, there is a lot of work to be done together in support of our shared values and common objectives. SPECKHARD