NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION TO PARAGUAY-VENEZUELA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000721 SIPDIS PASS TO NSC DFISK, STATE FOR WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN AND MDASCHBACH E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2028 TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV PA SUBJECT: NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION TO PARAGUAY-VENEZUELA AGREEMENTS REF: ASUNCION 720 Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Paraguay and Venezuela signed 13 agreements August 16 which attempt to establish the framework for extensive Venezuelan activity in Paraguay. Constitutionally, Congress is required to authorize agreements with a foreign government, and reproached the Executive for not submitting the documents within the prescribed 30 day limit. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Maduro made a low-key visit the first week of September, ostensibly to follow up on the agreements. Congress and the press have been critical of Lugo's non-transparent handling of the agreements and publicly questioned their benefits. By signing several "letters of intent," Chavez hoped to make an end-run around Paraguay's Congress. However, debate on the agreements is dominating press coverage. All in all, the agreements open a lot of doors for Venezuelan activity in Paraguay, but few will positively impact Lugo's socio-economic agenda. Lugo's delay in sending the agreements to Congress may signal his hesitation to expend political capital on this issue, given that Congressional approval is not a sure thing. The question, then is not whether but how Chavez will expand operations in Paraguay: via the front door or the back door. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Less than 24 hours after President Fernando Lugo's August 15 inauguration, Lugo and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez signed 13 agreements which attempt to establish the framework for extensive Venezuelan activity in Paraguay. The executive branch took 47 days after the agreements were signed to officially notify Congress (and even then, the Senate continues to claim it was not notified). To date, the executive branch has sent only one agreement -- on energy (October 23) -- to Congress for actual approval. Lugo's legal advisor and the MFA claim they are still reviewing the agreements and will submit the rest to Congress in due time. While the agreements were signed in a rushed manner, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamed Franco (implausibly) cited the August crunch as the reason for his government's two-month delay in notifying Congress about the agreements. The MFA first claimed the accords (a collection of agreements, memorandums of understanding, and letters of intent) did not need congressional approval because they are not legally binding. Congress, however, maintained that constitutionally all agreements with a foreign government require congressional approval within 30 days. ¶3. (SBU) Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolas Maduro made a low-key visit to Paraguay the first week of September. He attended the September 9 Paraguay-Venezuela soccer game (Paraguay won easily) and rode a tourist train with Lugo to Aregua, but otherwise did not make his agenda public, leading to widespread speculation about the purpose of his visit. When pressed, FM Hamed stated October 20 that Maduro visited Paraguay to follow up with the MOUs. ¶4. (SBU) Congress and the press have been critical of Lugo's non-transparent handling of the agreements and have publicly questioned their benefits. Social groups announced October 20 their intention to pressure Paraguay's Congress to approve the agreements. Venezuela Ambassador to Paraguay Nora Uribe announced October 4 that Venezuela's congress approved the agreements September 25. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: By signing several "letters of intent," Chavez hoped to make an end-run around Paraguay's Congress. However, debate on the agreements has dominated press coverage in past weeks, and has included extensive debate about whether Congress must approve the agreements. While Lugo credits Venezuela and the agreement on energy as preventing a Paraguayan gas shortage in August, the benefit of the agreements is not readily apparent. All in all, the agreements open doors for increased Venezuelan activity in Paraguay without many firm commitments by Venezuela. As such, only a few will positively impact Lugo's socio-economic agenda. Lugo's delay in sending the agreements to Congress may signal his hesitation to expend political capital on this issue, given that Congressional approval is not a sure thing. The real question, then is whether Chavez will expand operations in Paraguay via the front or the back door. END COMMENT. ¶6. (SBU) A brief summary of each agreement follows: --General Cooperation Framework: A five-year general framework MOU that defines the areas of bilateral cooperation, and gives each country the flexibility to expand if necessary. The areas mentioned include: health, education, culture, energy, food security, industrial development, trade, rural development, investment, agriculture, infrastructure, petrochemicals, information technology, communications, tourism, and the environment. --Financing Mechanisms: A one-year letter of intent to define a joint Implementation Commission that will establish the financing mechanisms to implement projects and activities. --Energy Security: A five-year MOU that seeks to form a bilateral energy company, PETROSURAMERICA, to work in oil and gas exploration, refining, petrochemicals, transport infrastructure, storing and distribution, electricity, renewable energy, and fluvial transport. Said company could also explore and exploit oil reserves in Venezuela,s Orinoco basin. It also seeks to maximize the production of hydroelectricity, encourage the substitution of liquid fuels, upgrade and expand Paraguay's Petropar by making a joint stock Petropar-PDVSA company, and promote oil-for-food initiatives. --Modification of the 2004 Energy Cooperation Agreement: A modification to increase the amount of diesel PDVSA will supply to Paraguay from 18,600 barrels per day to up to 25,000 barrels per day. (NOTE: Former President Duarte Frutos and President Hugo Chavez signed the 2004 Energy Cooperation Agreement. END NOTE.) --Information and Communications: A three-year general framework for the flow of information and communications from Paraguay to Venezuela, and vice-versa, making explicit reference to New Television of the South (TELESUR) and Radio of the South. -- Participation in TELESUR: A one-year letter of intent that seeks to make Paraguay a shareholder of TELESUR (amount not defined). It asks Paraguay to link to Venezuela's TELESUR signal by satellite, promote the channel and the signal distribution, and establish a subsidiary in Paraguay. (NOTE: TELESUR current shareholders are Venezuelan (51 percent), Argentine (20 percent),Cuban (19 percent),Uruguayan and Ecuadorian (10 percent each). Brazil did not participate and Bolivia said it will buy shares. END NOTE.) --Child and Youth Protection: A four-year general framework of cooperation to promote information exchanges, education programs, and technical expertise about child and youth protection. --Agro-ecological Institute. A one-year letter of intent to seek the creation of a Paraguayan Agro-ecological Institute where each country will equally share the cost of implementation. --Environment and Water: A one-year letter of intent to conduct feasibility studies of Paraguay's water resources. (NOTE: The central role assigned to social groups and civil society raised concerns in Congress about a development of Paraguay's hydro-resources with a social instead of an economic growth agenda. END NOTE.) --Education: A one-year letter of intent that provides the general framework for bilateral cooperation in education, with an emphasis on promoting the values of Venezuelan Simon Bolivar and Paraguayan Francisco Solano Lopez. The agreement also provides for the exchange of flags, books and literature between the two countries. --Food Security: A four-year MOU that presents the general framework of bilateral cooperation to increase the trade of agriculture goods. It seeks to explore joint production in several agriculture areas including staples, grains and cattle. --Miracle Mission II: A one-year letter of intention that expands on the ongoing Venezuela funded project Miracle Mission I (reftel),with the plan to open two new ophthalmology centers. (NOTE: Mission Miracle has been publicly criticized as a Venezuela ideological front.) --Trade and Commerce: A MOU that reiterates Venezuela,s commitment to trade and commerce with Paraguay, and Venezuela's intention to enter MERCOSUR. Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/asuncion AYALDE