Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ASUNCION260
2008-04-18 20:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asuncion
Cable title:  

MILITARY COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Tags:  PINS MOPS ASEC CASC SNAR PGOV PA 
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VZCZCXRO2238
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHAC #0260/01 1092000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 182000Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6827
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000260 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, KBEAMER; CA/VO CBODEK, TSMITH;
INL/LP DIANNE GRAHAM, ASMITH; ECA/PE/V/R/W METIENNE;
DS/IP/WHA; DS/OSS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2028
TAGS: PINS MOPS ASEC CASC SNAR PGOV PA
SUBJECT: MILITARY COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

REF: A. 03 ASUNCION 534


B. ASUNCION 195

ASUNCION 00000260 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASUNCION 000260 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, KBEAMER; CA/VO CBODEK, TSMITH; INL/LP DIANNE GRAHAM, ASMITH; ECA/PE/V/R/W METIENNE; DS/IP/WHA; DS/OSS/ITA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2028 TAGS: PINS MOPS ASEC CASC SNAR PGOV PA SUBJECT: MILITARY COMMITTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS REF: A. 03 ASUNCION 534 ¶B. ASUNCION 195 ASUNCION 00000260 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Paraguayan Armed Forces Commander General Soto stated publicly April 16 that the military would respect the electoral process. The military played a major role in past elections, but efforts by Soto to institutionalize and professionalize the military -- banishing politics from the ranks -- appear to be working. The National Police have been relatively ineffective in recent years at containing large demonstrations, and the military may be called upon to back them up in the event of significant civil unrest. The commander in charge of Paraguay's Election Day mission confided that the military may not be adequately prepared to do so (an assessment Post shares). Overall, Post is confident in General Soto's commitment to the democratic process. In the event things take a turn for the worst, we would expect the Paraguayan security forces to be able to restore order, albeit with some difficulty. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Paraguayan Armed Forces Commanding General Bernardino Soto Estigarribia stated publicly April 16 that the military would respect the electoral process. He announced that the Armed Forces would be confined to their barracks mid-day April 20. He emphasized that the military would only deploy if necessary to assist the National Police in quelling civil unrest. Paraguayan Military Forces Director of Operations Colonel Adelberto Garcete told Embassy's DATT that 5,000 military personnel are assigned to Asuncion and that 3,000 of these would be assigned to support the military's Election Day mission -- remaining ready in the barracks to deploy if necessary. General Soto assigned BG General Victor Picagua -- an outstanding, apolitical commander -- to lead the mission. Military persQnel will be allowed to vote on the morning of April 20 but must report to their barracks by noon. They will remain quartered in their barracks until released by the military forces commander. ¶3. (SBU) The military played a major role in past elections. Indeed, Stroessner ensured int
egration of the State, the Party, and the Army as his power base. But the Army's political influence significantly diminished with the 1992 constitution -- and further still since President Duarte's 2003 election. Military personnel were required to belong to the Colorado Party until the 1992 Constitution, and during past elections were deployed en masse on Election Day to support the Colorado machine and maintain order. Even as recently as the 2003 election, the military served as a major power broker (ref A). ¶4. (C) The National Police have been relatively ineffective in the past two years containing large demonstrations, and the military may be called upon to back them up in the event of significant civil unrest. Their December 2006 response to the Ycua Bolanos trial decision was an unmitigated disaster. The police responded forcefully to a small, impromptu campesino protest April 14 that left 15 people injured, indicating that the police could overreact or find themselves overwhelmed should widespread demonstrations break out in Asuncion. Moreover, Police Commander Fidel Isasa has been openly campaigning for the Colorado Party, and urging the police to support the status quo. Isasa is sending 1,500 police officers to rural San Pedro, the perceived stronghold of Fernando Lugo's Patriotic Alliance. ¶5. (C) Efforts by General Soto to institutionalize and professionalize the military -- banishing politics from the ranks -- appear to be working. The Colorado Party has not been able to harness the military's operations this election cycle for political gain. A confidential source told DCM April 17 that President Duarte ordered the military's leadership to support the Colorado machine during an April closed-door meeting. The source confirmed that the president told the group, "If I lose, I may go to jail, but I'll come back as president. If I lose, you lose everything and you won't ever come back." The source stated that the military officials (most due to retire in any event) reacted negatively to President Duarte's attempt to use them for political ends. One Division Commander told the president that the Colorado machine is weak in the countryside. Duarte expressed frustration that Colorado campaign money had been siphoned off by political operators and not used to grease the machine. ASUNCION 00000260 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) BG General Picagua confided to the DATT that the 12,000-member Paraguayan military may not be adequately prepared to back up police in confronting situations of civil unrest. He noted that General Soto shares his concern that the military has not received any civil unrest training (or equipment). However, the military leadership developed a detailed Election Day mission plan and has taken steps to execute it as planned. Colonel Garcete told DATT that BG General Picagua will oversee military response forces at ten locations in Asuncion, including providing security support to the National Elections Tribunal (TSJE). The mission also addresses appropriate chains of command and contains assurances that mobilization would only occur by a signed decree from President Duarte. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Post is confident in General Soto's commitment to the democratic process (but less confident with respect to Police Commander Isasa). In the event things take a turn for the worst, we would expect the Paraguayan security forces to be able to restore order, albeit with some difficulty. (ref B). Army Commander Juan Bautista Gomez, who has closely aligned himself with President Duarte and is vulnerable to political influence, is a wild card who could deploy troops for political purposes if ordered to do so by the president. Ultimately, the military's role in this election will depend on whether the National Police can effectively maintain order in the first place. If they can, the military should remain safely in their barracks. END COMMENT. Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/asuncion CASON

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