THREE WEEKS 'TIL ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000195 SIPDIS SIPDIS WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, KBEAMER; CA/VO CBODEK, TSMITH; INL/LP DIANNE GRAHAM, ASMITH; ECA/PE/V/R/W METIENNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2028 TAGS: PREL CASC ECON SNAR PGOV PA SUBJECT: THREE WEEKS 'TIL ELECTIONS REF: ASUNCION 181 Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Please see Action Requests contained in paragraph 18. ¶2. (C) With three weeks remaining before the April 20 national elections, Colorado Party candidate Blanca Ovelar represents the status quo and the continuation of 61 years of uninterrupted Colorado rule. Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC) candidate and former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo enjoys a narrow lead in the polls, due largely to respect for his association with the Church and his status as a political outsider. Former coup plotter General Lino Oviedo is the dark horse to watch in this race, while Beloved Fatherland Party candidate Pedro Fadul continues to place a distant fourth place. ¶3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: We can expect to see some pre-elections vote buying during coming weeks. On election day, we should see strong voter turnout, accompanied by organizational hiccups and minor fisticuffs. We do not expect to have overnight clarity of a result accepted by all candidates. Ovelar, Lugo and Oviedo remain locked in essentially a three-way tie, with a significant number of still-undecided voters. The most likely outcomes for the April 20 election are 1) the National Electoral Court (TSJE) declares Ovelar the winner (by a narrow margin) and the opposition contests the results, but the Colorados pull out the win in the courts; 2) Lugo (or even Oviedo) wins by a small margin but the Colorados work their magic in the courts and the TSJE declares Ovelar the winner; and 3) Lugo (or Oviedo) wins by a larger margin and Colorado challenges ultimately fail. ¶4. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The USG-supported International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) mission provided the TSJE with its recommendations March 24; the TSJE seems fairly SIPDIS receptive to date. While the electoral process will be somewhat complicated by using paper ballots at a record number of polling stations, IFES believes the TSJE is technically capable of handling the election. Irrespective of who wins, the Embassy does not anticipate dramatic changes negatively affecting U.S. interests in first six months of any new administration. In response to Washington's informal queries about how it can support Post's efforts in coming months, Post requests assistance with a post-elections public diplomacy strategy; the president-elect's visa application; a Washington envoy to visit Paraguay in May to make clear Washington's interest in closer relations; an International Visitors Program in June for select members of the president-elect's cabinet; and a cabinet-level representative to lead the U.S. delegation to the August 15 inauguration. The election now appears to be Lugo's to lose, either due to missteps or empty coffers. Whoever wins, the race will be close. END SUMMARY. -------------- HANDICAPPING THE HORSES -------------- ¶5. (C) Paraguay's constitution does not permit a second round runoff election. Thus the candidate with the largest vote count April 20 is to be sworn in August 15. Colorado Party candidate Blanca Ovelar represents the status quo and the continuation of 61 years of uninterrupted Colorado rule. While a bright and well-educated technocrat (as President Duarte's Minister of Education),she lacks political experience and her own political base, even within her own party. Moreover, she struggles to find her own way and shake off the influence of her mentor, President Duarte, and other powerful Colorado Party "mafia" members who are engaged in many of the countries' corrupt activities. Ovelar's biggest challenge is that she still hasn't won over Luis Castiglioni's faction of her own party (much less Castiglioni himself - a relationship further poisoned by Castiglioni's knowledge that he lost the primary in December only via vote counting fraud in January). Overall, the Colorado Party is not enthused with Ovelar's candidacy, but will nevertheless mobilize its powerful machine on her behalf because she's their candidate. ¶6. (C) Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC) candidate and former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo enjoys a narrow lead in the polls, due largely to respect for his association with the Church and his status as a political outsider. APC insiders report Lugo needs to raise USD 3 million to keep his campaign afloat; Lugo is known for his ineffective management style and his campaign is plagued by disorganization and overprogramming (demonstrated by a last-minute no-show for a March 27 presidential debate). Questions remain about where he is going and how he will get there. At heart, Lugo leans left (although he has recently stated both that he's not a leftist and that he is a socialist). His biggest challenge is holding his diverse Alliance (including the center-right Liberal Party and several leftist political parties and movements) together. Of the three leading candidates, Lugo is the most vulnerable to outside influences, including Venezuela. He is also the only candidate with (weak) ties to former PPL members per sensitive reporting. Liberal Party officials worry Lugo will use their support to win the presidency but sever ties on April 21. While Embassy maintains contact with all three major campaigns, it is most focused on Lugo's camp in an effort to gain insights and build influence should he win. ¶7. (C) Former coup plotter General Lino Oviedo is the dark horse to watch in this race. The only candidate who is a real politician, Oviedo works tirelessly on the campaign trail, reportedly sleeping only 2-3 hours per night. He is dynamic and politically astute (he recently flew a helicopter with campaign propaganda over the "clasico" pitting Paraguay's best two soccer teams against each other) and is immensely popular with the poorest of Paraguay's poor, perhaps because he has the strongest Guarani of all four candidates. Oviedo's major appeal: Paraguayans know him as a strong military figure and a former Colorado. Voters looking to improve Paraguay's security situation or seeking change view him as a comfortable means to that end. At this point, Oviedo seems to have a ceiling of around 25-30 percent of the popular vote, but is running a smart public relations campaign. ¶8. (C) Beloved Fatherland Party candidate Pedro Fadul continues to place a distant fourth place in polling. As aptly stated by a local political analyst, "those who could govern Paraguay can't get elected; those who get elected can't govern." This adage applies best to Fadul, who is by far the candidate most prepared to govern Paraguay and to steer it through its final years of democratic transition. Fadul, who speaks English (having studied in Texas) and looks and sounds like a U.S.-style politician, won 21 percent of the vote in the 2003 national elections. Unfortunately, unless another candidate drops from the race, Fadul has little chance of winning more than around 5 percent. -------------- POSSIBLE SCENARIOS: PRE-TO-POST-ELECTIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) In coming weeks before the elections, all sides will engage in vote-buying, as well as buying (or attempted buying) of the political party representatives who will sit at each polling station on election day. No one does this better than the Colorados. Castiglioni supporters predict the Colorados will steal around 100,000 votes at roughly 700 polling stations (where they already dominate) by altering the electoral tally sheets ("Actas"). Most agree (and history proves) that this is easy to do and difficult to prove, since the ballots are destroyed once voting ceases and the Actas are signed. ¶10. (C) On election day itself, we expect to see fairly strong voter turnout (for the 2003 national election, turnout was 64.29 percent). Voting is obligatory but there are no sanctions for failing to vote. There will be some organizational hiccups on April 20, particularly since paper ballots (vice electronic voting) haven't been used for many years. Minor fisticuffs are likely, and could result, as in the December/January primaries, in a re-vote in some areas a week or two after April 20. We also expect to see long lines and a fairly slow process, as voters will each deposit up to six ballots for President/Vice President, separate slates of Senators, Deputies, and Mercosur parliamentary representatives, and state governors. Because there will be 22 lists of Senate candidates alone, the ballots are being referred to as "sheets" due to their unusually large size. ¶11. (C) We do not expect overnight clarity of a result accepted by all candidates; in fact, it may be weeks before the TSJE announces final results. The panorama remains unclear about what will be announced and when -- the TSJE will do a quick count (called the TREP) and IFES will do a parallel vote count, but we do not yet know what other actors might conduct exit polls and quick counts. We assume preliminary results will be announced by various (authoritative and other) sources on elections night in an effort to shape (and distort) public opinion. Without a clear, advance agreement with the TSJE, it is likely some (or all) political parties will prematurely declare victory, as happened in the primaries. ¶12. (C) Ovelar, Lugo and Oviedo remain locked in essentially a three-way tie, although the latest poll gives Lugo a 6-point lead (Lugo 34.8 percent; Ovelar 28.9 percent, and Oviedo 23 percent). All polls suggest a still significant number of undecided voters (around 11 percent),while many others have only shallow support for their current choice. The two most likely outcomes for the April 20 election are as follows: --Ovelar wins: The TSJE declares Ovelar the winner by less than 10 percentage points of difference. Lugo's Alliance and/or Oviedo allege electoral fraud (at the polling station or in the vote count) and refuse to accept defeat. The Colorados fight every electoral tally sheet ("Acta") in the TSJE and courts, which they control, and prevail. SIPDIS --Opposition wins but loses: Lugo (or even Oviedo) wins (or is publicly perceived as the winner) by less than 10 percentage points. As in the scenario above, the Colorados fight every Acta in the courts and eventually win but without legitimacy. --Opposition wins: Lugo (or Oviedo) wins by over a 10 percentage point margin. Colorados attempt some challenges but ultimately accept defeat. ¶13. (C) Under all scenarios, the candidates will be tempted to involve the military to protect the democratic system. To date, Armed Forces Commander Soto has kept his troops on the democratic straight and narrow; Post has confidence that he will continue to do so. (NOTE: Police Commander Isasa, on the other hand, is under investigation for ordering his officers to vote for Ovelar. END NOTE). Other countries do not figure prominently into either scenario; Brazil has sparred with Lugo over re-negotiating Itaipu Dam Treaty (Brazil says "no way"). Neither Brazil nor Argentina has a preferred candidate. Sensitive reporting indicates Venezuelan financial support to Lugo's campaign manager, but to date support has been extremely low profile. Despite scattered Bolivarian sympathies, Venezuela seems to have gained little traction here. ¶14. (C) Beyond the three most likely scenarios, other, more far-fetched possibilities exist. They include reinstituting criminal charges against Oviedo (thus rendering his candidacy legally invalid) or President Duarte pressuring him to drop out of the race pursuant to any agreement they may have struck (we judge the latter highly unlikely in light of Oviedo's ego, ambition and current polling numbers). Others speculate (including Oviedo himself) that someone might attempt to assassinate Lugo and blame Oviedo (as he allegedly was the mastermind behind the assassination of Vice President Argana in 1999). Still others speculate that although Lugo survived the period which allowed for challenges to his candidacy, he could be criminally charged with involvement in "terrorist" acts (related to the PPL or the new EPP; reftel) in time to disqualify him. Conspiratorial rumors swirl constantly in Asuncion; Post discounts most of them. The Colorados have to know that attempting to disqualify Lugo or Oviedo at this late date would be tantamount to inviting just that which has been absent here thus far: massive social protests against continued Colorado rule. -------------- US ELECTORAL SUPPORT -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The USG-supported International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) mission, led by Pablo Galarce, provided the TSJE its recommendations March 24 (based on its February 25-March 1 visit). IFES recommended that political parties, civil society and the media refrain from disseminating unofficial preliminary elections results. IFES urged the TSJE to overcome its internal conflict (two pro-Colorado judges currently refuse to speak to the third, a Liberal) and to conduct itself as an independent, balanced and impartial institution. IFES suggested development of a massive civic education campaign, as well as the establishment of clear guidelines and training for elections observers and polling station representatives. Regarding the TSJE's quick count, IFES recommended use of an external audit SIPDIS to improve transparency and credibility. Finally, IFES recommended the TSJE publicize partial elections results as they come in (well before voting totals reach 80 percent, which has historically been the trigger for releasing partial results),and digitize and post to the Web all polling station tallies ("Actas") on election day. ¶16. (SBU) While the electoral process will be somewhat complicated by a return to paper ballots and an increase in the number of polling stations (to a record 14,305),IFES believes the TSJE (despite its clear politicization) is technically capable of handling the election. To date, the TSJE has been fairly receptive to IFES' recommendations. Now SIPDIS that the presidential tickets have been finalized, the TSJE has begun the process of printing the ballots. -------------- -- LOOKING BEYOND ELECTIONS: THE FIRST SIX MONTHS -------------- -- ¶17. (C) Irrespective of who wins, the Embassy does not anticipate any dramatic changes negatively affecting U.S. interests in first six months of the new administration. For all of his faults, President Duarte has put the country on a solid macroeconomic track. Paraguay is locked into Mercosur, and its small percentage of exports to the United States (2 percent) is not likely to vary. All of the candidates say they support the Threshold Program to fight Paraguay's twin plagues of corruption and informality and (should they win) will apply for Phase II by July 31. All have indicated desire for increased counter-narcotics cooperation and aid from the United States. The biggest check on presidential power in the next year will be a fractured Congress in which no party has a majority. Such a divided Congress will force whoever wins to rule by coalition/consensus. Should that prove impossible, however, pressures will inevitably rise to move to a constituent assembly (as all major candidates have proposed) and/or to clip Congress' wings and rule by decree. -------------- -- ACTION REQUESTS: WHAT WASHINGTON CAN DO TO HELP -------------- -- ¶18. (C) In response to Washington's informal queries about how it can support Post's efforts in coming months, Post requests the following assistance: --That Washington work with Post on a post-elections public diplomacy strategy. Such a strategy should consider how we will respond to electoral fraud and/or delays in results, and should call for a peaceful and orderly post-elections process and transition. Washington should be prepared to quickly congratulate the winner and give special consideration to what it will say if Oviedo wins, given his murky democratic credentials (septel). --That Consular Affairs be prepared to grant Paraguay's president-elect a visa almost immediately after April 20. Of the four main candidates, General Lino Oviedo's visa application will be problematic (in light of an Interpol hit, a 3B ineligibility, and a 00 hit). If he wins, he will want to travel ASAP, as he has already approached Post about a visa. Post's Consul has been in touch with Consular Affairs, but Post would like to ensure that this effort is in train. --That Washington plan to send an envoy (perhaps Assistant Secretary Shannon) in the period immediately following SIPDIS elections (early-to-mid May) to make clear Washington's interest in close relations with Paraguay's president-elect. --That Washington assist Post in scheduling an International Visitors Program for six cabinet member- designates in the time period immediately following elections, and well in advance of the August 15 inauguration. Post has been working closely with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' Office of International Visitors and has tentatively identified June 2-15 as the optimal time frame for this program, which will focus on areas in which the president-elect will likely require assistance (e.g., drafting its MCC Threshold II proposal, finance, trade, and banking issues, and national security and police issues). Flexibility will be key to quickly designing a helpful program tailored to the president-elect's needs, and Post wants to ensure that bureaucratic obstacles do not result in a lost opportunity. --That the MCC explore ways to assist Paraguay with its second Threshold Program proposal (July 31 deadline). Ambassador has briefed all four major presidential candidates on the Threshold Program and timeline, and all are keenly interested in designing a proposal. Offering an extra hand on the MCC program will be of great assistance to the new government. --That Washington select a cabinet-level representative to lead the U.S. delegation for the August 15 inauguration. If Lugo wins, Washington should send a clear and immediate message that it is interested in Paraguay and wants close relations. If we fail to take advantage of the opportunity, we will risk ceding space to Venezuelan President Chavez or others who will not miss the chance to show their early and immediate support for Paraguay's next president (in all likelihood, by personally attending the inauguration). --That Washington consider inviting the President-elect for an early state visit to Washington. President Duarte's was the first state visit in President Bush's second term. --That Washington be prepared to offer some other kind of assistance package if Lugo wins, to include organizing his government and working with Congress (which has a very strong role under Paraguay's constitution). Washington should be prepared to respond to requests for increased assistance on counter-narcotics, intellectual property rights, mil-to-mil issues. It should also be prepared to offer training for the president-elect's personal security detail. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶19. (C) The election currently appears to be Lugo's to lose, either due to missteps or empty coffers. Ovelar, while sagging somewhat in the polls, has the benefit of the Colorado machine, which should not be underestimated. And Oviedo continues to campaign quietly and tirelessly, and could attract many still-undecided voters. Whoever wins, the race will be close. Ovelar told us March 18 she HOPED for a big win; but no candidate EXPECTS to win by a large margin. Electoral fraud will likely impact results, and may lead to sporadic, small-scale civil unrest in the first 48 hours following the April 20 election. However, if the political parties exacerbate tensions by prematurely declaring victory or if the TSJE delays results, thus strengthening existing perceptions that electoral fraud will occur, unrest could escalate. Strong public messages from IFES and the OAS mission (led by Colombian Maria Emma Mejia) will be of critical importance on April 20 and thereafter; both should be prepared to apply public pressure to keep the TSJE on track. Department and Post will have to stay in very close contact as the post-electoral situation unfolds to coordinate messages of support to the OAS and IFES. Washington should be prepared to assist Paraguay's new president; if Lugo is elected, that assistance should be particularly quick and decisive as a sign of the U.S.'s continued interest in warm relations with Paraguay. END COMMENT. Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/asuncion CASON