KAZAKHSTAN: PROGRESS ON PFP TRAINING CENTER, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN M. O'MARA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018
TAGS: KZ NATO PREL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PROGRESS ON PFP TRAINING CENTER, BUT
CONCERNS REMAIN ON NATO COOPERATION


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Steven Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Kazakhstan appears poised to move forward
on opening up a Partnership for Peace (PfP) training
center, as it had promised to do by the end of 2008.
However, concerns remain about progress in Kazakhstan's
cooperation with NATO. End Summary.


2. (C) Tugay Tuncer, Astana-based NATO liaison officer for
Central Asia, told polecon chief on January 9 that
Kazakhstan appears ready to move forward in opening up a
regional Partnership for Peace (PfP) training center.
Tuncer had previously informed polecon chief in November
that the training center effort was largely stalled, as
Kazakhstan did not take part in the annual PfP training
center meeting in Monterey in October and had moved the
proposed site of the training center to a building in
extremely bad condition.


3. (C) According to Tuncer, Deputy Defense Minister
Sembinov assured a visiting NATO School assessment team in
December that Kazakhstan was committed to opening up the
training center by the end of 2008, as it had originally
promised, and that Defense Minister Akhmetov firmly
supported adhering to this timetable. The assessment team
and the Defense Ministry came to an agreement on next
steps. The Kazakhstanis promised to upgrade the training
center building, finalize a curriculum by March, and
expeditiously appoint training center personnel. NATO in
turn will send experts to assist each month for the next
three months, and another assessment team will come to
Kazakhstan in April to review where things stand.


4. (C) Tuncer explained to polecon chief that while the
latest news regarding the PfP training center is a positive
sign, he remains concerned about other developments in
Kazakhstan's cooperation with NATO. Tuncer said that
Kazakhstan intends to subscribe to only 80 Individual
Partnership Plan (IPP) activities this year, down from 180
last year. (Note: The Kazakhstanis told Tuncer that 180
was too many given their capabilities. They only managed
to actually participate in about 90 activities last year.
This, they stressed, is the reason they are subscribing to
fewer this year. End Note.) In addition, Tuncer claimed
that Sembinov had intended to visit NATO headquarters in
Brussels in late January to reinforce Kazakhstan's
commitment to NATO, but Akhmetov decided to nix the trip.


5. (C) Tuncer also reminded polecon chief that the Ministry
of Defense last year reduced the size of its NATO
cooperation office from ten staffers to just three.
Minister Akhmetov told NATO Special Representative Robert
Simmons in November that he had made this staffing cut
because the quality, not the quantity, of the personnel is
what matters most. However, according to Tuncer, the three
current staffers are weak in comparison with staffers
previously assigned to the office.


6. (C) Comment: Tuncer contends that there have been
increasing problems with Kazakhstan-NATO cooperation since
Akhmetov replaced Mukhtar Altynbayev as defense minister in
January 2007. Akhmetov's actions -- he took, for example,
eight trips to Moscow during his first eight months as
minister -- certainly indicate that he has pro-Russian
inclinations. That said, we believe the principal problem
with Akhmetov is that he does not have the breadth of
professional experience to fully understand the potential
benefits of enhanced cooperation with western partners,
including NATO. In contrast, Deputy Defense Minister
Sembinov has gradually come to grasp the pluses from
productive mil-mil ties with the U.S. and West, and has
been a staunch supporter of both our Humvee and Huey-II
helicopter programs. Akhmetov and Sembinov's differing
views on this issue are reflected in the internal rivalry
in the Defense Ministry between their respective factions
-- a rivalry which complicates our ability to work
effectively with the ministry. End Comment.
ORDWAY