Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ASTANA2534
2008-12-23 03:56:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: NSDP LEADER TUYAKBAY - AN HONORABLE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002534 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NSDP LEADER TUYAKBAY - AN HONORABLE
MAVERICK?

REF: ASTANA 2522

ASTANA 00002534 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002534 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NSDP LEADER TUYAKBAY - AN HONORABLE MAVERICK? REF: ASTANA 2522 ASTANA 00002534 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a December 18 meeting with the Ambassador in Almaty, the chair of the National Social Democratic Party (NSDP) Zharmakhan Tuyakbay argued that Kazakhstan's democratic hopes were dashed in mid-1990s when President Nazarbayev suspended the parliament and concentrated power in his office. He averred Nazarbayev trusts no one in his inner circle, fostering competition among his advisors to make sure no one becomes too powerful. He speculated on several candidates who might succeed Nazarbayev, but warned the list can always change. Tuyakbay wondered if the growing economic crisis might conceivably lead to ethnic conflict, especially between the "Slavic cities" and the Kazakh countryside. On opposition politics, Tuyakbay argued that an open constructive dialogue with the ruling elite will go further toward effecting real change than radical demands. Tuyakbay is an impressive and seemingly honorable maverick, once part of the Soviet establishment who now finds himself in opposition to the government. END SUMMARY. PLURALISM "DASHED" IN MID-1990S ¶3. (SBU) Tuyakbay told the Ambassador that Kazakhstan is unique among Central Asian states in its closer cultural alignment with Western values. The country's multi-ethnic nature and lack of religious extremism presented a positive platform for democratization after independence, but that hope was quickly dashed in 1995 when President Nazarbayev dissolved the parliament and "seized" the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. No law comes into being without the President's approval, which means that in reality, all branches of the government report to the President. [COMMENT: While this is true, we should also note the veto power of the U.S. presidency. END COMMENT.] Such political control is unnecessary, in Tuyakbay's opinion, since Kazakhstan is a peaceful and politically stable country, rich in natural resources. The only reason "for the President to govern this way," maintained Tuyakbay, "is to protect his wealth and personal security" (reftel). PRESIDENT'S CIRCLE OF DISTRUST ¶4. (SBU) Tuyakbay asserted that the President is "more afraid of his own people than of the opposition." He k
nows the psyche of those around him and "trusts no one, not even his children and sons-in-law." Nazarbayev fosters competition within his inner circle to make sure no one becomes too powerful. Tuyakbay would not speculate on the reasons behind the December 15 dismissal of billionaire oligarch and inner-circle political operative Bulat Utemuratov from the post of Chief Manager of Presidential Facilities, but wondered whether it had something to do with Utemoratov's ties to the opposition: he was close to the President and often tried to mediate between Nazarbayev and the opposition. However, Utemuratov will not fall far, maintained the NSDP leader, because he "knows too much about the President's personal business." ¶5. (SBU) Asked who might eventually succeed Nazarbayev, Tuyakbay said it was hard to say with certainty but doubted it would be a family member. The current likely candidates, Tuyakbay speculated, might be Senate Chairman Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev, Prime Minister Karim Masimov, the President's billionaire son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, and Astana mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov. All could assure the President's security upon leaving office. FUTURE PREDICTIONS ¶6. (SBU) Tuyakbay laid out several predictions for Kazakhstan's political future. First, the President will hold power until the end of his life, although Tuyakbay hinted that there might be some "radical" insider elements who could move to unseat him. Second, the growing gap between the rich and poor could lead to a social crisis. Unemployment is increasing, and the situation for pensioners and rural residents is growing worse. The financial ASTANA 00002534 002.2 OF 003 crisis is exacerbating the situation: unskilled migrant workers who come from the villages to the cities can no longer count on lucrative construction jobs and are returning to their villages to "drink all day." The economic crisis has disproportionately affected ethnic Kazakhs, not because they lack education and skills, but because most live in rural areas, where the economic downturn is felt the most. The main cities tend to have larger Slavic populations. This situation, alleged Tuyakbay, could lead to inter-ethnic discord and light the fires of ethnic Kazakh nationalism. ¶7. (SBU) Tuyakbay commented that "at least with President Nazarbeyev in place there is no instability." He noted Narzarbayev was lucky to rule during an oil boom, and at a time when the United States was "too preoccupied by Iraq and Afghanistan." When asked what role Russia plays in Kazakhstan's political equations, Tuyakbay said, "Kazakhstan is like a mirror - it does whatever Russia is doing." Many of Nazarbayev's political ideas come from Russia, alleged the NSDP leader, although simply by affinity, not through direct pressure from the Kremlin. He related Putin's alleged comment to Nazarbayev in 2003 that there is "no need for many political parties: one is sufficient." ANOTHER RUN FOR OFFICE? ¶8. (SBU) Asked if he will run in the next election, Tuyakbay demurred and said, "We'll see." He said he had not expected to win in 2005, when he ran as the opposition's joint candidate for President, but said it was important to run "to set an example and show an alternate way to develop the country." He lamented the high levels of corruption and "moral degradation" in Kazakhstan. Many young people, the future generation of Kazakhstan, are "growing up in a moral darkness," and this corrupted mentality will be hard to fix, he said. ¶9. (SBU) In Tuyakbay's view, the people's political awareness is growing, albeit slowly. He said that while on the campaign trail in 2005, he heard many critical comments against President Nazarbayev, both from ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs, with people asking questions that had typically never been raised "outside the kitchen." While political awareness is growing, there is still no civil society to verbalize the concerns and "take people to the streets." Kazakhstanis are too afraid to express their political sentiments, in part because of the passivity of their Soviet past, but also because "fear is in their blood" - meaning they fear losing their jobs and social positions. WHAT IS THE OPPOSITION TO DO? ¶10. (SBU) There are two possible tactics for the opposition, said Tuyakbay. The first is to criticize harshly the ruling elite and push for radical change. This approach will certainly educate the population on the issues; however, in Tuyakbay's opinion, it would not be very effective. In his view, persistent engagement with the ruling elite is the better approach - i.e., working for change from within. He stressed the importance of keeping dialogue open and proposing concrete measures rather than launching fiery criticisms. Most importantly, parliament should be used as a vehicle for change, and this change must come from within. Tuyakbay noted that Kazakhstan has a one-party parliament, despite much international criticism. International criticism can only go so far if democratic instruments are not in place in the country, asserted Tuyakbay, adding that only by limiting the powers of the President can real political change take place. Asked whether parliament would be willing to tackle this question, Tuyakbay admitted that currently only the President has the authority to limit his own power. He ruminated that perhaps a radical social movement or an uprising could lead to some changes, but quickly added that he could never support a violent solution for Kazakhstan's current political problems. ¶11. (SBU) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: Of the "political opposition leaders," Tuyakbay is the most impressive: he seems rather Senator-McCain-like - an amalgam of patriot, insider, and maverick. ASTANA 00002534 003.2 OF 003 However, the other "opposition leaders" tend to tar him as a stooge because he maintains ties among the ruling elite. He appears to take principled positions that confound both sides. On December 17, at a rally commemorating the 1986 student demonstrations in Almaty in which a number of young Kazakhstanis were killed and injured, he apologized for having been "on the wrong side of the barricades" - he was the Soviet Deputy Prosecutor General at that time. He called for full access to archival documents about that event, which are are kept in Moscow. As Tuyakbay left our meeting, he commented to his local escort, "Why did I tell him so much? I don't even know him!" END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

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