Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ASTANA2249
2008-11-13 11:19:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION POLITICIANS PESSIMISTIC ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPAO RS KZ 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002249 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPAO RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION POLITICIANS PESSIMISTIC ON
DEMOCRACY, URGE ACTION TO COUNTER RUSSIAN MEDIA

ASTANA 00002249 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002249 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPAO RS KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OPPOSITION POLITICIANS PESSIMISTIC ON DEMOCRACY, URGE ACTION TO COUNTER RUSSIAN MEDIA ASTANA 00002249 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with leaders of four key opposition parties in Almaty on November 6. They told him that while they expect "great change" from the new U.S. Administration, they do not foresee any drastic shifts in U.S.-Kazakhstani relations. All agreed that Kazakhstan's political future "is not bright," but they had divergent views on what role, if any, the United States and OSCE could play to encourage greater political progress. They stressed the need for alternative Russian-language news sources to begin to address Russia's media dominance in Kazakhstan. All four suggested how the Ambassador could play a positive role in Kazakhstan. With the exception of the Communist Party chairman, none seems to have a truly viable national party. END SUMMARY. CHANGES EXPECTED IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ¶3. (SBU) On November 6, the Ambassador met in Almaty with leaders of four key opposition parties -- Azat head Bulat Abilov, Communist Party Chairman Serikbolsyn Abdildin, National Social Democratic Party (OSDP) deputy head Amirzhan Kosanov, and Alga President Vladimir Kozlov. When one commented that the U.S. ambassador is the only ambassador who meets with them, Abdildin demurred and said he has met with the Russian ambassador. In this introductory meeting, the Ambassador asked the party leaders how they see the future of Kazakhstan and what they would like to see from U.S.-Kazakhstan relations. Somewhat reserved at the outset, they grew more frank and open as the conversation progressed. ¶4. (SBU) The Communist Party's Abdildin congratulated the Ambassador on the U.S. elections and a "peaceful transition" to a new administration. He said that the world "expects drastic change" from President-elect Obama, specifically that he will "end the war in Iraq, gain control in Afghanistan, and, most importantly, improve relations with Russia." "No one needs a new Cold War," stressed the Communist leader. On U.S.-Kazakhstani relations, Abdildin said, "It is in our interest" to maintain the close ties established since Kazakhstan's independence. He lamented, however, that Kazakhstan has failed to become a democracy since its
independence. "FUTURE OF KAZAKHSTAN IS NOT BRIGHT" ¶5. (SBU) Picking up on the democracy theme, Azat's Abilov told the Ambassador that "the future of Kazakhstan is not bright." He claimed that corruption, clan politics, and the advancing age of President Nazarbayev are weighing down the Kazakhstani ruling party, which in turn has "increased the pressure" on the opposition "much as Putin has done in Russia." Abilov said he expects little from Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship -- "it's been two years since we were promised the chairmanship and one year since we got it, and yet nothing has been done" on political liberalization. (NOTE: He is not taking into account the onerous and long-drawn-out bureaucratic process of reaching consensus on reform legislation. The government sent its reform draft legislation to parliament on November 11. END NOTE.) He asserted that Kazakhstan's external environment has only gotten worse in the meantime. Russia's growing aggression carries serious implications for Kazakhstan and its large ethnic-Russian minority. In Abilov's view, this "narrows Nazarbayev's playing field" and pushes him closer to Russia, "especially since Russia does not criticize Nazarbayev's government." U.S ROLE IN KAZAKHSTAN: "IMPORTANT TO BE CONSISTENT" ¶6. (SBU) Abilov told the Ambassador in somewhat pointed ASTANA 00002249 002.2 OF 003 terms that he was not counting on "much help from Washington," arguing that President-elect Obama will be dealing with much larger issues and "won't have time for Kazakhstan's human rights situation." Abilov -- who had attended the Democratic Party convention in Denver and was sporting an "Obama for President" pin -- asserted that McCain's election would actually have been better for Kazakhstan because McCain "dislikes Nazarbayev's regime." (NOTE: The opposition parties have long maintained that McCain -- or at least his Senate staff -- has ties to Kazakhstani oppositionist Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister currently living comfortably in exile in London. And they have good reason to think so. Earlier in this decade, Kazhegeldin, with the help of Washington lobbyists he employed, mounted a public relations effort to present himself as a champion of democracy and was well-received on Capitol Hill. END NOTE.) Abilov complained that the United States does not do enough to defend publicly the opposition or criticize Kazakhstan's human rights record. He pointed as an example to Vice President Cheney, who during his 2006 visit to Kazakhstan, publicly "praised Nazarbayev for his progress" and, in a separate meeting with the opposition, "ignored" the stories linking the government with suspicious murders of two opposition leaders. "We have few expectations" of the United States, said Abilov; but when it comes to democracy, "it is important for the United States to be consistent." ¶7. (SBU) OSDP's Kosanov disagreed somewhat with Abilov's pessimistic views. In his opinion, the OSCE chairmanship will focus international attention on Kazakhstan and force greater liberalization. The United States can also play a positive role, he maintained, by supporting NGOs and independent media. The four opposition parties "are united in the belief that Kazakhstan needs to move toward the West." Access to alternative views, like increased Russian- and Kazakh-language programming on Radio Free Europe or Voice of America, and broader party-building activities by the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute would all "help us build a democracy," he said. THE OPPOSITION "MUST BECOME A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE" ¶8. (SBU) Alga's Kozlov agreed with Abilov's point that corruption and elite infighting are undermining the ruling party, arguing that "corruption permeates all aspects of life, from education to health." "The regime's hours are numbered," he claimed. At the same time, he emphasized that it is up to the opposition parties themselves, and not outside actors, to build a strong platform and present an alternative model. The oppositionists should not count on the United States to drastically change its policy toward Kazakhstan, he said, and "the onus is on us to become a viable alternative." INFORMATION VACUUM ¶9. (SBU) The Communist Party's Abdildin lamented that Nazarbayev "runs the whole country and doesn't allow a single outlet" for the opposition, with the state media spinning everything to benefit the President. (COMMENT: Abdildin is exaggerating. Opposition-identified newspapers like "Respublika" regularly publish what we would call op-eds blasting the government. END COMMENT.) Referring to an interview the Ambassador gave to national TV news following a meeting with a senior government official, Abdildin quipped that the state TV slanted the report to "make you seem like Nazarbayev's press spokesman." Abilov broke in to stress that Kazakhstan needs an alternative to the Russian news and information that dominates in Kazakhstan. "Voice of America brought down the Soviet Union" because it presented an alternative media view, he asserted. "Right now we are in an ASTANA 00002249 003.2 OF 003 information vacuum," stressed Abilov, "Ukraine, Kosovo, Georgia -- all these issues are covered from Russia's point of view." The Ambassador emphatically agreed, saying that he has long advocated for alternative Russian-language news sources for Central Asia. ADVICE FOR THE NEW AMBASSADOR ¶10. (SBU) The Ambassador explained that while he does not want to be perceived as Nazarbayev's mouthpiece, he cannot be the opposition's spokesman either. He asked the four for their views about the appropriate middle ground. They enthusiastically picked up the topic, telling the Ambassador that he should be measured in his comments about President Nazarbayev. "It's okay to express support, but don't praise him," said Abdildin. Abilov advised meeting with the opposition before meetings with the government "to get a balanced view." Taking it a step further, Kosanov laid out a media-outreach plan for the Ambassador, arguing that he should do more interviews in the Kazakh-language press, make more appearances at cultural events (especially ethnic Kazakh events),do more travel to regions outside Almaty and Astana, and, not surprisingly, show support for the opposition by, for example, personally attending trials of opposition leaders, should there be any. ¶11. (SBU) Kozlov added that the United States also "needs to publicize the lack of progress on the Madrid commitments." The Ambassador said that pending legislation on elections, political parties, and the media is unlikely to satisfy everybody and asked what would be an acceptable middle ground that could still be judged as a solid step forward. All agreed that having ODIHR review the legislation, even if it means the laws would not go into effect by year's end, as promised, would be the best option. ¶12. (SBU) COMMENT: We have been told that the only opposition President Nazarbayev truly takes seriously is the Communist Party. We were impressed by the common-sense positions of its elderly and gentle chairman, Abdildin -- but maybe he calculated what he thought we wanted to hear. The other views expressed seemed to be "all or nothing," although Kosanov consistently demonstrated common sense and good humor, and Abilov, as a former government official and successful entrepreneur, exhibits both intelligence and drive. We strongly recommend the new U.S. administration pay close attention to these politicians' exhortations that the United States begin to take seriously Russia's near-total domination of the information space in Central Asia and seek to restore gutted public-diplomacy resources for this purpose. ¶13. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: With the possible exception of Abdildin, whose Communist Party legacy function confers on him a certain national status, none of these politicians has built a truly national party. Of course, this is to a fair degree due to government of Kazakhstan/ruling party interference. We suspect the next generation of political leaders will come from the ranks of the thousands of young Kazakhstanis who have been educated in the West via the Bolashak program and who are currently rising in the public and private sectors. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

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