RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000198 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ER SUBJECT: RARE INSIGHTS FROM PFDJ INSIDER Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Hagos Ghebrehiwot gave subtle signals to the ambassador that the Eritreans were ready to work with, rather than against, the United States on bilateral and regional interests. Considered to be strictly the bagman and CEO of party-run enterprises, Hagos displayed surprising political knowledge and adroitness, leaving the impression that he is a driving force behind the Government of the State of Eritrea's (GSE) overall political strategy. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In an April 2 meeting with the ambassador, Hagos reiterated that all GSE/USG issues stem from the border dispute with Ethiopia, stating he was "100% sure if the issue is resolved most bilateral problems will disappear." He also said GSE policies were not simply an excuse to keep the Peoples' Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) in power adding, "why would anyone choose to do things the way we do?" and characterizing current policies as pragmatic, not ideological. ¶3. (C) When repeating the standard party-line list of GSE policy rationalizations and grievances against the United States, Hagos' delivery seemed more puppet master than puppet. The ambassador put Hagos on the spot by asking if he knew the USG's position vis-a-vis the border, to which Hagos promptly replied with a nearly verbatim restatement of the policy. Hagos went on to highlight differences between the USG's stated policy, i.e., the parties need to work between themselves to implement an agreement, and what he characterized as the USG's "actual" policy, which he claimed is biased in favor of Ethiopia. ¶4. (C) Although Hagos referred to himself as a "hardliner" in regards to GSE/USG relations, he noted most high officials want bilateral relations improved. He cited counter-terrorism as an area of common interest, mentioning efforts to engage the USG in the 1990s and Eritrean support for the United States after September 11, 2001. He also listed a number of disagreements with USG policies in the region in a frank but refreshingly diplomatic manner. ¶5. (C) Comment: The frank meeting with Hagos is a possible step toward improved communication. Hagos' offer for a meeting was sudden and surprising, given rebuffs to Emboffs' requests for dialogue for over a year. The overture may be linked to a letter dispatched from President Isaias to President Bush on the border issue. End Comment. MCMULLEN