SCENESETTER FOR CDR, USCENTCOM VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 ASHGABAT 000093 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR EPET ECON TX SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CDR, USCENTCOM VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN, 25-26 JANUARY 2008 (C) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard Hoagland for reasons 1.4 (B) a nd (D). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Your second visit to Turkmenistan follows the visits in mid-January of Senator Lugar to Ashgabat and of the Turkmenistani Defense Minister and Border Service Chief to NAVCENT HQ in Bahrain. This visit will help continue the ongoing, bilateral dialogue on security issues, while reinforcing the progress made by the United States since December 2006 in "turning a new page" in its overall relationship with Turkmenistan. Although the new president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, is making significant changes in some sectors, it is important to realize the country is at the very beginning of a new era. The wreck of a country left behind by the now-deceased President-for-Life, Niyazov, combined with 70 years of colonial Soviet rule, compounded by nomadic/tribal customs and lack of a nation-state concept, create the need for a new model. Turkmenistan was never North Korea, but it is not yet Denmark. Rather, the current state offers a rare opportunity to develop a new model; a model molded by, and representative of, the proud people of Turkmenistan, with patient but consistent nudges by the international community. ¶2. (SBU) Our security relationship with Turkmenistan continues to develop at a slow and consistent pace. With President Berdimuhamedov's support, the military increasingly is engaging with foreign countries in order to improve its personnel, equipment, and organizational structures. In addition to the United States, cooperation also is increasing with other countries, especially Russia, which is keen to improve its security relationship with Turkmenistan. END SUMMARY. INTRODUCTION ¶3. (SBU) A hydrocarbon-rich state that shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, Turkmenistan is in the midst of an historic political transition. The unexpected death of President Niyazov on December 21, 2006, ended the authoritarian, one-man dictatorship that by the end of his life had made Turkmenistan's government among the most repressive in the world. The peaceful transfer of power following Niyazov's death confounded many who had predicted instability because the former president had no succession plan. President Berdimuhamedov quickly assumed power following Niyazov's death with the assistance of the "power ministries" -- including the Ministries of National Security and Defense, and the Presidential Guard. His position was subsequently confirmed through a public election in which the population eagerly participated, even though it did not meet international standards. NIYAZOV'S LEGACY ¶4. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov inherited a country that former President Niyazov had come close to running into the ground. Niyazov siphoned off much of Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon proceeds into non-transparent slush funds used, in part, to finance his massive construction program in Ashgabat at the expense of the country's education and health-care systems. Politically, his increasing paranoia -- particularly after the 2002 armed attack on his motorcade -- led to high-speed revolving-door personnel changes at the provincial and national level, and an obsessive inclination to micro-manage the details of government. Criticizing or questioning Niyazov's decisions was treated as disloyalty, and could be grounds for removal from jobs, if not worse. Niyazov's "neutral" foreign policy led to Turkmenistan's political and economic isolation from the rest of the world, and his ASHGABAT 00000093 002 OF 008 policies calling for mandatory increases in cotton and wheat production led to destructive agricultural and water-use policies that left some of Turkmenistan's arable land salty and played-out. EDUCATION -- "DIMMER PEOPLE EASIER TO RULE" ¶5. (SBU) Niyazov's attacks on the educational system grew increasingly destructive in his later years. The Soviet-era educational system was broadly turned into a system designed to isolate students from the outside world and to mold them into loyal Turkmen-speaking presidential thralls. President Niyazov famously defended this policy when, in 2004, he told a fellow Central Asian president, "Dimmer people are easier to rule." Niyazov's destruction of his country's education system included cutting the Soviet standard of ten years of compulsory education to nine, firing large numbers of teachers, and introducing his own works as core curriculum at the expense of the traditional building blocks of a basic education. He slashed higher education to two years of study and discouraged foreign study by refusing to recognize foreign academic degrees. Taken together, these steps created a "lost generation" of under-educated youth ill-equipped to help Turkmenistan take its place on the world stage. RULE OF LAW -- A LOW BAR ¶6. (SBU) Niyazov seriously harmed Turkmenistan's political system. His capricious authoritarianism left a legacy of corrupt officials lacking initiative, accountability, and -- in many cases -- the expertise needed to do their jobs. Young officials who came of age after Niyazov's destructive changes to the education system are particularly deficient in skills and broader world vision needed to facilitate Turkmenistan's entry into the international community. Many laws lack transparency and provision for oversight and recourse. The population's lack of understanding of the meaning of rule of law has left the bar low in terms of citizens' expectations of their government. BERDIMUHAMEDOV BEGINS TO REBUILD THE SYSTEM ¶7. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov still pays nominal lip service to maintaining his predecessor's policies, but he has started reversing many of the most destructive, especially in the areas of education, health, and social welfare. He has restored -- and in many cases -- increased old-age pensions that Niyazov had largely eliminated. The president is embarking on a course of hospital-building, with the main focus on improving medical facilities in Turkmenistan's five provinces. To this end, he has already authorized construction of five provincial mother-and-children (maternity) hospitals. He has also publicly committed to improve rural infrastructure and to ensure that every village has communications, electricity and running water. ¶8. (SBU) In education, Berdimuhamedov is reversing many of the policies Niyazov ordered him to implement while he served as Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers for Education. Since his inauguration, Berdimuhamedov has ordered a return to the compulsory standard of ten years' education, a return of universities to five years of classroom study, and a new emphasis on exchange programs and the hard sciences. In January 2008 Berdimuhamedov decreed the restoration of graduate degree training at Turkmen institutes and universities, which his predecessor had ended in 1998. On July 13, 2007, he called for recognition of foreign academic degrees, a major step which would allow exchange students to receive credit for their overseas study. The goal is to ASHGABAT 00000093 003 OF 008 repair Turkmenistan's broken education system as quickly as possible and to give the country the educated workforce that it needs to compete commercially. These efforts, however, are hampered by old-thinking bureaucrats, especially in the Ministry of Education, who sometimes block or otherwise impede foreign assistance programs. This may perhaps be a legacy of the culture of xenophobia Niyazov had encouraged. ELIMINATING THE CULT OF PERSONALITY ¶9. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has incrementally started dismantling Niyazov's cult of personality. Huge posters of the deceased president are beginning to be removed from public buildings. References to Niyazov's "literary" works, especially the Ruhnama, are less frequent and probably will fade away over time. The new president has banned the huge stadium gatherings in his honor and requirement for students and government workers to line the streets, often for hours, along presidential motorcade routes. That said, in some places, Niyazov's picture has been replaced by Berdimuhamedov's, and the new president's quotes are now replacing Ruhnama quotations on newspaper mastheads. However, these are practices common in Central Asia. One hopeful trend is that Berdimuhamedov appears to be signaling that the country should draw its inspiration from its history rather than from the cult of the leader. Posters of Turkmen historical figures have started to appear. In addition, all but one of the new currency banknotes scheduled to be introduced in 2009 will carry pictures of historical and cultural figures (the largest bill will still have Niyazov on it). FIRST STAGES OF POLITICAL REFORM ¶10. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has begun replacing the ministers he inherited from Niyazov. His focus seems to be on finding better-qualified individuals. On August 24, he established a "Human Rights Commission" to help bring the practices and policies of Turkmenistan's government agencies into line with international standards and human rights conventions. He has established a state commission to review complaints of citizens against law enforcement agencies, which has become a vehicle for pardoning at least some of those imprisoned ) including for complicity in the 2002 attack on the presidential motorcade ) under Niyazov. Berdimuhamedov pardoned 11 prisoners, including the former Grand Mufti of Turkmenistan, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, in early August, and promised he would pardon more in the future. Berdimuhamedov has also agreed to allow UNDP to provide human rights training to police, and in December established a Law Institute and Special Commission to help law drafters improve Turkmenistan's legislation. ¶11. (SBU) In addition, he has slowly begun to walk back some of the most restrictive controls on movement within the country, first removing police checkpoints on the roads between cities, then, on July 13, eliminating the requirement for Turkmenistan's citizens to obtain permits to travel to border zones (however, the permit system remains in force for foreigners). Although the president has been slower to strengthen the rule of law, correct Turkmenistan's previous human rights and religious freedom record, and promote economic reform, he has told U.S. officials he wants to "turn the page" on the bilateral relationship and is willing to work on areas that hindered improved relations under Niyazov. He has approved an unprecedented number of visits by U.S. delegations since he took office, including those directed toward promoting change. ECONOMY AND FINANCE ASHGABAT 00000093 004 OF 008 ¶12. (SBU) Turkmenistan's economy is closely controlled by the state and is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenue. Although the government for many years regularly proclaimed its wish to attract foreign investment, it made little effort up until now to change the state-control mechanisms, restrictive currency exchange system and dual currency exchange rates that created a difficult foreign investment climate. However, in recent months, we have seen greater willingness among upper-level personnel at Turkmenistan's main economic and financial institutions, including both the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank, to acknowledge that reforms are necessary. Part of this new attitude is linked to the president's growing frustration, expressed publicly during a number of cabinet meetings, with Turkmenistan's complex opaque web of on and off budget funds which make a thorough accounting of state income and disbursements/expenses virtually impossible. And in fact, President Berdimuhamedov's frustration with the lack of accountability in the budget was one of the key factors that led in late July to the creation of a Supreme Auditing Chamber. Growing interest in investing in Turkmenistan among western businessmen is also providing an incentive for change. FOREIGN POLICY: A NEW FOCUS ON ENGAGEMENT ¶13. (SBU) Notwithstanding his statements that he plans to continue the "neutrality" policies of his predecessor, Berdimuhamedov -- probably at the advice of Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Foreign Minister Rashit Meredov -- has put a virtually unprecedented emphasis on foreign affairs. Indeed, Berdimuhamedov has met or spoken by telephone with all the leaders in the region -- including with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, with whom Niyazov maintained a running feud. He has exchanged visits with Russia's President Putin, and held a high-profile gas summit with Putin and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in Turkmenistan's Caspian seaside city of Turkmenbashy (Krasnovodsk). China has a strong and growing commercial presence in Turkmenistan, and continues to court Berdimuhamedov through a series of high-level commercial and political visits. In mid-July, Berdimuhamedov made a state visit to China focused mainly on natural gas and pipeline deals. While Turkey has given Berdimuhamedov top-level treatment, including an invitation to Ankara, its relationship with Turkmenistan continues to be colored more by the image of its lucrative trade and construction contracts that are siphoning hundreds of millions of dollars away from state budgets here than by generous development assistance or fraternal support. ¶14. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has also held positive meetings with high-level U.S. State Department officials and leaders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations to discuss areas of potential assistance. He met with UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Louise Arbour in May, the Head of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),Christian Strohal, and agreed to a visit by the UN's Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom at an as-yet undetermined date. He made his first trip to the United States as president to participate in the UNGA session during September where he also met with Secretary of State Rice. In October 2007, Secretary of Energy Bodman met with Berdimuhamedov in SIPDIS Ashgabat. And in November 2007, Berdimuhamedov traveled to EU and NATO headquarters in Brussels. ENERGY RESOURCES ¶15. (SBU) Turkmenistan has world-class natural gas reserves, ASHGABAT 00000093 005 OF 008 but Russia's monopoly of its energy exports has left Turkmenistan receiving less than the world price and overly beholden to Russia. Pipeline diversification, including both a pipeline to China proposed for 2009 and the possibility of resurrecting plans for Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghanistan pipelines that would avoid the Russian routes, and construction of high-power electricity lines to transport excess energy to Turkmenistan's neighbors, including Afghanistan, would not only enhance Turkmenistan's economic and political sovereignty, but also help fuel new levels of prosperity throughout the region. Berdimuhamedov has told U.S. interlocutors he recognizes the need for more options and has taken the first steps to this end, but he also took the first steps needed to increase the volume of gas exports to Russia -- agreeing in principle to build a new littoral pipeline -- during the May tripartite summit in Turkmenbashy. He will require encouragement and assistance from the international community if he is to maintain a course of diversification in the face of almost certain Russian efforts to keep Turkmenistan from weaning itself away from Russia. OPPOSITION IN TURKMENISTAN ¶16. (SBU) Fifteen years of Niyazov's authoritarianism, along with Russian black propaganda touting the dangers of civil society, have left Turkmenistan without an internal opposition and convinced that U.S. NGO efforts to develop civil society represent a plan to promote a so-called "color revolution." Threatened with imprisonment in the past, most who disagree with the system either learned to turn inwards or left the country. While there are expatriate opposition groups, especially in Europe, those groups have a history of disunity and a reputation for promoting self-interested agendas as much as human rights. Although there is no quantifiable method to assess the popularity of these groups, numerous conversations with local people have yielded little, if any, support. Instead, most simply refer to the leaders of the overseas opposition -- a number of whom have been tainted by the perception that they committed financial crimes in their earlier incarnations as office holders in Turkmenistan -- as "the ones who made it out before they were imprisoned." This leaves Turkmenistan without a nascent Vaclav Havel or Nelson Mandela who could serve as a rallying point for a democratic opposition, meaning that promoting engagement with the current president may be the best and only strategy for promoting a more democratic system. INFECTIOUS DISEASE SAFETY ¶17. (SBU) Under President Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has begun to engage with the U.S. government on infectious disease identification and safety. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU) are participating in a multi-donor avian influenza project led by the World Bank that supports modernization of the avian flu laboratories in Ashgabat and Turkmenbashy. As part of this effort, CDC purchased and delivered to Ashgabat equipment for identification of H5N1 virus and other diagnostic equipment which was installed in the Ashgabat lab at the beginning of November. NAMRU is delivering bio-safety equipment and disposables within the same project. NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES ¶18. (SBU) Turkmenistan is a potential transit country for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It does not and has not had any nuclear, chemical or biological production facilities. Based upon this and the country's neutrality, the government has not signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction ASHGABAT 00000093 006 OF 008 (CTR) Agreement with the United States. Consequently, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's CTR office is not working in Turkmenistan and has no presence here. The EXBS program in conjunction with the Department of Energy has placed radiation portal monitors at all official crossing points on the Iranian and Afghan borders. The program has also provided personal radiation pagers, handheld radiation detectors and contraband detection kits. Regarding biological work, the United States knows only that Turkmenistan once had Anthrax medical samples. SECURITY ¶19. (S) Turkmenistan Armed Forces. General of the Army Agageldi Mammetgeldiyev has remained the Minister of Defense since 2002. Mammetgeldiyev is a trained medical doctor and previously was the Chief of the State Border Service (SBS). His primary deputy and acting Chief of the General Staff, COL Muhammetguly Atabayev, is also a medical doctor. The only general officer in the ministry is the minister. Since taking office, President Berdimuhamedov has initiated several changes affecting the military, which Niyazov previously maintained as a non-threatening institution and source of cheap labor for traffic safety, area beautification, hospital orderlies, and other enterprises. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) are in the process of transferring emergency response-related responsibilities to a new organization, the State Service for Emergency Situations. The standing MOD practice of supplying conscripts for civilian medical services and other civilian enterprises also may be changing. The military, however, largely remains a parade force that performs one "major" battalion-level exercise annually, and only now may be receiving additional presidential attention to repair and upgrade its aging Soviet-era equipment. President Berdimuhamedov's decision to allow cabinet ministers to travel abroad opens the door for General Mammetgeldiyev to visit the United States and participate in foreign events, which he previously was forced to decline. Since this decision, Mammetgeldiyev has visited at least Russia, Belarus, and China. Both the MOD and SBS Chief accepted the NAVCENT Commander's invitation to visit Bahrain, which is scheduled for January 13-17. ¶20. (SBU) U.S. Defense Cooperation. Turkmenistan continues to occupy a strategic location in the War on Terrorism. Niyazov's UN-endorsed policy of "positive neutrality" kept Turkmenistan at arm's length from Russian military encumbrances -- and from Iranian maneuvering; Niyazov used his minimal security relationship with the United States to show his "independence" from Moscow. ¶21. (C) OEF Support. Turkmenistan remains an important conduit for the U.S. military to Afghanistan, and maintenance of overflights and the military refueling operation at Ashgabat Airport remain key embassy goals. In late November 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs renewed the 2008 restricted blanket overflight clearance, but only after initially refusing to renew it days before it was due to expire. MFA's reasons for the incident are unclear, but were possibly related to a combination of foreign influence and a desire to have the United States follow Turkmenistan's standing overflight procedures, which is unrealistic based on the volume of U.S. military overflights. Although Turkmenistan is not an option for basing, during your last meeting with President Berdimuhamedov, he confirmed that the Turkmenistan government's offer to use Mary Northeast Military Airbase as an emergency divert location for distressed U.S. military aircraft would remain verbal and not ASHGABAT 00000093 007 OF 008 be formalized in a written agreement. U.S. aircraft have not had to use Mary airfield either before or since. ¶22. (S//NF) Turkmenistan agreed to deny overflight rights for Iranian flights from North Korea, at the behest of the United States. Turkmenistan has denied North Korean overflights in June 2005, July 2006, and June 2007. Turkmenistan's cooperation on denying overflights is based on strict confidentiality. The United States does not discuss Turkmenistan's decisions with other governments. Turkmenistan has publicly approved the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative and agreed to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. ¶23. (SBU) CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation. Turkmenistan also appreciates the extensive cooperation with the U.S. military through CENTCOM's annual Program of Security Cooperation (PSC). The FY08 program was signed for the first time with Turkmenistan's main participating organizations -- the MOD and SBS. The program is the largest ever and includes over 90 events involving the MOD, SBS, MVD, and Ministry of National Security (MNB). Through the State Partnership Program and PSC program, Turkmenistan has a long-standing relationship with the Nevada National Guard focused on disaster preparedness. Turkmenistan marginally participates in NATO and EUCOM exchanges, but has participated in Marshall Center programs since 1994. CENTCOM's first permanent SAO will arrive in late-February 2008 to enable CENTCOM and the embassy to manage this increased level of security cooperation. ¶24. (C) Since March 2007, the Defense Ministry has expressed interest in U.S. support for the development of its non-existent navy. During your last visit both the President and Minister of Defense expressed interest in developing the Caspian Sea fleet. Berdimuhamedov said Turkmenistan was willing for the U.S. military to discuss equipment and training issues with the MOD and SBS. As a result, NAVCENT is sponsoring maritime events on navy base development, port security, hydrographic survey, and a Maritime Capabilities Assessment. SBS interest in close cooperation with the U.S. military, especially maritime cooperation, is less clear. Nevertheless, the SBS remains pleased with continued U.S. support to keep operational the former USCG Cutter Point Jackson, a U.S. Excess Defense Article donation. ¶25. (SBU) CENTCOM provided $5 million in counter-narcotics funding for the construction of two border crossing stations. The Altyn Asyr border station on the Iranian border was opened in November 2006. The Imamnazar border station on the Afghanistan border opened on 13 August 2007. CENTCOM provided $8M to build a third border crossing station at Farap on the Uzbekistan border and to purchase communications equipment to link border posts with Ashgabat. Two more border stations are planned for 2009 along the Iranian border. The Embassy hopes to continue working with CENTCOM in the important areas of border security and counter-narcotics, primarily focused on the Afghanistan border. ¶26. (SBU) U.S. Security Assistance. Current security assistance programs focus on improving the communications capability of the Turkmenistan armed forces in the areas of emergency response and border security, English language ability, and in building a future leadership with western principles. FMF/IMET projections for FY08 are $0/$300K. The United States government is re-looking security assistance to Turkmenistan for FY09. The Embassy has requested $2.8M/$500K. Turkmenistan has participated in FMF/IMET since ¶1997. ASHGABAT 00000093 008 OF 008 ¶27. (SBU) The Turkmenistani government strictly controls contact between the U.S. military through the U.S. Defense Attache Office and Turkmenistan's security forces. Relations are cordial, but not close. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs approves all events and activities via diplomatic note. No direct correspondence is allowed, although the coordination of MFA-approved events has become slightly less bureaucratic. U.S. POLICY ¶28. (SBU) U.S. policy in Turkmenistan is three-fod: -- Encourage democratic reform and increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including support for improvements in the education and health systems; -- Encourage economic reform and growth of a market economy and private-sector agriculture, as well as diversification of Turkmenistan's energy export options; and -- Promote security cooperation. ¶29. (SBU) Many countries seek increased cooperation with Turkmenistan on energy and security, but its human rights record in the past has made this cooperation problematic. In raising human rights concerns, the United States: -- Encourages the elimination of Niyazov-era abuses and restrictions on freedom of movement; -- Promotes greater religious freedom, including registration of unrecognized groups like the Roman Catholic Church, and making legal provision for conscientious objectors; and -- Advocates the growth of civil society by urging the government to register non-governmental organizations. ¶30. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel James Zink, USA, Defense and Army Attach, USDAO Ashgabat, Voice: (993)12-35-0045, Cell: (993)66-30-9606, classified email: dizinjf@dia.smil.mil and unclass email: zinkjf@state.gov. HOAGLAND