Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ASHGABAT9
2008-01-04 07:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON EPET SCUL OREP TX 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0009/01 0040747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040747Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9977
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3182
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0997
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0871
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 1445
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 000009 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, H (RADEMACHER AND DIGGS)
PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR'S STAFF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EPET SCUL OREP TX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN OF
SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR, JANUARY 11-13

ASHGABAT 00000009 001.2 OF 006


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ASHGABAT 000009 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, H (RADEMACHER AND DIGGS) PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR'S STAFF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EPET SCUL OREP TX SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TURKMENISTAN OF SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR, JANUARY 11-13 ASHGABAT 00000009 001.2 OF 006 ¶1. Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Ashgabat warmly welcomes the visit to Turkmenistan of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Your visit will advance our bilateral dialogue on energy issues, while reinforcing the progress made by the United States since December 2006 in "turning a new page" in its overall relationship with Turkmenistan. Although the new president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, is making significant changes in some sectors, it is important to realize the country is at the very beginning of a new era. The wreck of a country left behind by the now-deceased President-for-Life Niyazov, combined with 70 years of colonial Soviet rule, compounded by nomadic/tribal customs that lacked a modern nation-state concept, create the need for a new model. Turkmenistan was never North Korea, but it is not yet Denmark, and probably never will be. Although the foreign minister told a senior U.S. official in October Turkmenistan would "follow its own path,", we believe patient but persistent nudges by the international community will move the country closer to international standards and practices. END SUMMARY. TURKMENISTAN POST-NIYAZOV ¶3. (SBU) A hydrocarbon-rich state that shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, Turkmenistan has been undergoing an historic political transition. The unexpected death of President Niyazov on December 21, 2006, ended the authoritarian, one-man dictatorship that by the end of his life had made Turkmenistan's government among the most repressive in the world. The peaceful transfer of power following Niyazov's death confounded many who had predicted instability because the former president had no succession plan. President Berdimuhamedov quickly assumed power following Niyazov's death with the assistance of the "power ministries" -- including the Ministries of National Security and Defense, and the Presidential Guard. His position was subsequently confirmed through a public election in which the population eagerly participated, even though it did not meet international standards. NIYAZOV'S LEGACY
; ¶4. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov inherited a country that former President Niyazov had come close to running into the ground. Niyazov siphoned off much of Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon proceeds into non-transparent slush funds used, in part, to finance his massive construction program in Ashgabat at the expense of the country's education and health-care systems. Politically, his increasing paranoia -- particularly after the 2002 armed attack on his motorcade -- led to high-speed revolving-door personnel changes at the provincial and national level, and an obsessive inclination to micro-manage the details of government. Criticizing or questioning Niyazov's decisions was treated as disloyalty, and could be grounds for removal from jobs, if not worse. Niyazov's "neutral" foreign policy led to Turkmenistan's political and economic isolation from the rest of the world. His policies calling for mandatory increases in cotton and wheat production led to destructive agricultural and water-use policies that left some of Turkmenistan's arable land salinated and played-out. EDUCATION -- "DIMMER PEOPLE EASIER TO RULE" ¶5. (SBU) Niyazov's attacks on the educational system grew increasingly destructive in his later years. The Soviet-era educational system was broadly turned into a system designed to isolate students from the outside world and to mold them into loyal Turkmen-speaking presidential thralls. President Niyazov famously defended this policy when, in 2004, he told a fellow Central Asian president, "Dimmer people are easier to rule." Niyazov's destruction of his country's education system included cutting the Soviet standard of ten years of ASHGABAT 00000009 002.2 OF 006 compulsory education to nine, firing large numbers of teachers, and introducing his own works as core curriculum at the expense of the traditional building blocks of a basic education. He slashed higher education to two years of study and discouraged foreign study by refusing to recognize foreign academic degrees. Taken together, these steps created a "lost generation" of under-educated youth ill-equipped to help Turkmenistan take its place on the world stage in the 21st century. RULE OF LAW -- A LOW BAR ¶6. (SBU) Niyazov seriously harmed Turkmenistan's political system. His capricious authoritarianism left a legacy of corrupt officials lacking initiative, accountability, and -- in many cases -- the expertise needed to do their jobs. Young officials who came of age after Niyazov's destructive changes to the education system are particularly deficient in the skills and broader world vision needed to facilitate Turkmenistan's entry into the international community. Many laws lack transparency and provision for oversight and recourse. The population's lack of understanding of the meaning of rule of law has left the bar low in terms of citizens' expectations of their government. BERDIMUHAMEDOV BEGINS TO REBUILD THE SYSTEM ¶7. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov still pays nominal lip service to maintaining his predecessor's policies, but he has started reversing many of the most destructive, especially in the areas of education, health, and social welfare. He has restored and -- in many cases -- increased old-age pensions that Niyazov had largely eliminated. The president is embarking on a course of hospital-building, with the main focus on improving medical facilities in Turkmenistan's five provinces. To this end, he has already authorized construction of five provincial mother-and-children (maternity) hospitals. He has also publicly committed to improve rural infrastructure and to ensure that every village has communications, electricity and running water. ¶8. (SBU) In education, Berdimuhamedov is reversing many of the policies Niyazov ordered him to implement while he served as Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers for Education and Health. Since his inauguration, Berdimuhamedov has ordered a return to the compulsory standard of ten years' education, a return of universities to five years of classroom study, and a new emphasis on exchange programs and the hard sciences. On July 13, he called for recognition of foreign academic degrees, a major step which would allow exchange students to receive credit for their overseas study. The goal is to repair Turkmenistan's broken education system as quickly as possible and to give the country the educated workforce that it needs to compete commercially. These efforts, however, are hampered by old-thinking bureaucrats, especially in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of National Security, who sometimes block or otherwise impede foreign assistance programs. This may perhaps be a legacy of the culture of xenophobia Niyazov had encouraged. ELIMINATING THE CULT OF PERSONALITY ¶9. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has incrementally started dismantling Niyazov's cult of personality. Huge posters of the deceased president are beginning to be removed from public buildings. References to Niyazov's "literary" works, especially the Ruhnama, are less frequent and probably will fade away over time. The new president has banned the huge stadium gatherings in his honor and requirement for students and government workers to line the streets, often for hours, along presidential motorcade routes. Tellingly, the activities for the one-year commemoration of Niyazov's death were the bare minimum consistent with Turkmenistan's cultural and religious traditions. However, in some places, Niyazov's picture has been replaced by Berdimuhamedov's, and the new ASHGABAT 00000009 003.2 OF 006 president's quotations have replaced Ruhnama quotations on newspaper mastheads -- a practice not uncommon in Central Asia. One hopeful trend is that Berdimuhamedov appears to be signaling that the country should draw its inspiration from its history rather from the cult of the leader. Posters of Turkmen historical figures have started to appear. In addition, all but one of the new currency banknotes scheduled to introduced in 2009 will carry pictures of historical and cultural figures (the largest bill will still have Niyazov on it). FIRST STAGES OF POLITICAL REFORM ¶10. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has replaced some of the ministers he inherited from Niyazov. His focus seems to be on finding better-qualified individuals. On August 24, he established a "Human Rights Commission" to help bring the practices and policies of Turkmenistan's government agencies into line with international standards and human rights conventions. He has established a state commission to review complaints of citizens against law enforcement agencies, which has become a vehicle for pardoning at least some of those imprisoned (including for complicity in the 2002 attack on the presidential motorcade) under Niyazov. In August, Berdimuhamedov pardoned 11 prisoners, including the former Grand Mufti of Turkmenistan, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, and promised more would be pardoned. Several other prisoners of concern were freed in the October amnesty. Berdimuhamedov has also agreed to allow UNDP to provide human rights training to police, and in December established a Law Institute and Special Commission to help law drafters improve Turkmenistan's legislation. ¶11. (SBU) Niyazov's police state, especial on freedom of movement, has all but disappeared. Berdimuhamedov has recoved police checkpoints on the roads between cities and eliminated the requirement for Turkmenistan's citizens to obtain permits to travel to border zones, although, the permit system remains in force for foreigners. While the president has been slower to strengthen rule of law, correct Turkmenistan's previous human rights and religious freedom record, and promote economic reform, he has told U.S. officials he wants to "turn the page" on the bilateral relationship and is willing to work on areas that hindered improved relations under Niyazov. He has approved an unprecedented number of visits by U.S. delegations since he took office, including those directed toward promoting change. ECONOMY AND FINANCE ¶12. (SBU) Turkmenistan's economy is closely controlled by the state and is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenue. Although the government for many years regularly proclaimed its wish to attract foreign investment, it made little effort up to now to change the state-control mechanisms, restrictive currency-exchange system and dual currency exchange rates that created a difficult foreign investment climate. However, in recent months, we have seen greater willingness among upper-level personnel at Turkmenistan's main economic and financial institutions -- including both the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Central Bank -- to acknowledge that reforms are necessary. Part of this new attitude is linked to the president's growing frustration, expressed publicly during a number of cabinet meetings, with Turkmenistan's complex, opaque web of on- and off-budget funds, which have made a thorough accounting of state income and disbursements/expenses virtually impossible. And, in fact, President Berdimuhamedov's frustration with the lack of accountability in the budget was one of the key factors that led, in late July, to the creation of a Supreme Auditing Chamber. Growing interest in investing in Turkmenistan among western businessmen is also providing an incentive for change. FOREIGN POLICY: A NEW FOCUS ON ENGAGEMENT ASHGABAT 00000009 004.2 OF 006 ¶13. (SBU) Despite his statements that he plans to continue the "neutrality" policies of his predecessor, Berdimuhamedov has put an unprecedented emphasis on foreign affairs to repair Turkmenistan's international and regional relations. He has met or spoken by telephone with all the leaders in the region -- including with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, with whom Niyazov had maintained a running feud. He has exchanged visits with Russia's President Putin, and held a high-profile gas summit with Putin and Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in Turkmenistan's Caspian seaside city of Turkmenbashy (formerly Krasnovodsk). China has a strong and growing commercial presence in Turkmenistan, and continues to court Berdimuhamedov through a series of high-level commercial and political visits. In mid-July, Berdimuhamedov made a state visit to China, focused mainly on natural gas and pipeline deals. While Turkey has given Berdimuhamedov top-level treatment, including a visit to Turkmenistan by President Gul in December and an invitation to Ankara, its relationship with Turkmenistan continues to be colored more by the image of its lucrative trade and construction contracts that are siphoning hundreds of millions of dollars away from state budgets here than by generous development assistance or active political support. ¶14. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov has held positive meetings with high-level U.S. officials and leaders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations to discuss areas of potential assistance. He met with UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Louise Arbour in May, the Head of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),Christian Strohal, and agreed to a visit by the UN's Special Rapporteur on Religious Freedom at an as-yet undetermined date. He made his first trip to the United States as president to participate in the UNGA session in September, where he also met with Secretary of State Rice. In October, Secretary of Energy Bodman met with Berdimuhamedov in Ashgabat. November 5-7, Berdimuhamedov made his is first visit to EU and NATO headquarters in Brussels. ENERGY RESOURCES ¶15. (SBU) Turkmenistan has world-class natural gas reserves, but Russia's near monopoly of its energy exports has left Turkmenistan receiving much less than the world price and overly beholden to Russia. Pipeline diversification, including both a pipeline to China proposed for 2009 and the possibility of resurrecting plans for Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghanistan pipelines that would avoid the Russian routes, and construction of high-power electricity lines to transport excess energy to Turkmenistan's neighbors, including Afghanistan, would not only enhance Turkmenistan's economic and political sovereignty, but also help fuel new levels of prosperity throughout the region. Berdimuhamedov has told U.S. interlocutors he recognizes the need for more options and has taken the first steps to this end, but he also took the steps needed to increase the volume of gas exports to Russia -- signing a tripartite agreement (with Russia and Kazakhstan) in Moscow on December 20 to enlarge a Soviet-era Caspian littoral pipeline. He will require encouragement and assistance from the international community if he is to maintain a course of diversification in the face of ongoing Russian efforts to keep Turkmenistan from weaning itself away from Russia. TURKMENISTAN'S "OPPOSITION" ¶16. (SBU) Fifteen years of Niyazov's authoritarianism, along with Russian black propaganda touting the dangers of civil society, have left Turkmenistan without an internal opposition and convinced that U.S. NGO efforts to develop civil society represent a plan to promote a so-called "color revolution." Threatened with imprisonment in the past, most who disagree with the system either learned to turn inwards, or left the country. While there are expatriate opposition groups, especially in Europe, those groups have a history of ASHGABAT 00000009 005.2 OF 006 disunity and a reputation for promoting self-interested agendas as much as human rights. Although there is no quantifiable method to assess the popularity of these groups, numerous conversations with local people have yielded little, if any, support. Instead, most simply refer to the leaders of the overseas opposition -- a number of whom have been tainted by the perception that they committed financial crimes in their earlier incarnations as office-holders in Turkmenistan -- as "the ones who made it out before they were imprisoned." This leaves Turkmenistan without a nascent Vaclav Havel or Nelson Mandela who could serve as a rallying point for a democratic opposition, meaning that promoting engagement with the current president may be the best and only strategy for promoting a more democratic system. INFECTIOUS DISEASE SAFETY ¶17. (SBU) Under President Berdimuhamedov, Turkmenistan has begun to engage with the U.S. government on infectious disease identification and safety. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU) are participating in a multi-donor avian influenza project led by the World Bank that supports modernization of the avian flu laboratories in Ashgabat and Turkmenbashy. As part of this effort, CDC purchased and delivered to Ashgabat equipment for identification of H5N1 virus and other diagnostic equipment, which was installed in the Ashgabat lab at the beginning of November. NAMRU is delivering bio-safety equipment and disposables within the same project. Related to this, a CDC delegation of lab experts will be in Turkmenistan January 7-11 to assess the level of bio-safety and to recommend measures to improve existing security in avian influenza laboratories. ¶18. (SBU) Additionally, in response to a September 11, 2007, request for assistance from the Deputy Minister of Health and Medical Industry in designing a new infectious disease lab, USAID helped to organize a visit by a joint U.S.-Canadian team of specialists from the Department of State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, the Canadian Global Partnership (CGP),and U.S. Centers for Disease Control. The delegation will discuss laboratory design plans, visit several public health labs, and meet with scientists to assess the level of safety and security and determine what assistance can be provided by either the U.S. government or the CGP. The team planned to visit Turkmenistan January 23-26, but USAID was advised unofficially on January 2 that the proposed dates were "not timely" due to "technical problems" with the plans to construct the laboratory. Post awaits official confirmation of the postponement and acceptable dates for the delegation to travel to Turkmenistan. NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES ¶19. (SBU) Turkmenistan is a potential transit country for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It does not and has not had any nuclear, chemical or biological production facilities. Based upon this and the country's neutrality, the government has not signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement with the United States. Consequently, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's CTR office is not working in Turkmenistan and has no presence here. The EXBS program in conjunction with the Department of Energy has placed radiation portal monitors at all official crossing points on the Iranian and Afghan borders. The program has also provided personal radiation pagers, handheld radiation detectors and contraband detection kits. About biological weapons, the United States knows only that Turkmenistan once had Anthrax medical samples. SECURITY ¶20. (SBU) The U.S. security relationship with Turkmenistan continued unabated through the period of the presidential ASHGABAT 00000009 006.3 OF 006 transition, and the Defense Ministry is cooperating at a slow and consistent pace. Competition for the time and attention of security officials is increasing, however, as other countries are also keen to improve their security relationships with Turkmenistan. The military largely remains a parade force that only now may be receiving additional presidential attention to repair and upgrade its aging Soviet-era equipment. ¶21. (SBU) Turkmenistan continues to occupy a strategic location in the Global War on Terrorism. Although basing is not an option, Turkmenistan remains an important conduit for the U.S. military to Afghanistan. Maintaining blanket overflight permission and the military refueling operation at Ashgabat Airport remains a key U.S. goal. CENTCOM and the Turkmen military maintain a robust annual military-to-military cooperation plan that has grown from 20 events in FY05 to over 90 events in FY08. With the assistance of the Embassy's EXBS program, the State Border Service operates the former U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Point Jackson, a U.S. Excess Defense Article donation. Turkmenistan marginally participates in NATO exchanges, but has participated in Marshall Center programs since 1994. The Nevada National Guard, through the State Partnership Program and CENTCOM's military cooperation program, has a long-standing and productive relationship with Turkmenistan. Nevada's current areas of emphasis are disaster preparedness and response, fire prevention and response, and counter-narcotics activities. ¶22. (SBU) CENTCOM's counter-narcotics program has funded the construction of border-crossing stations on the Iranian and Afghan borders. One project on the Uzbekistan border is underway and two more are scheduled for 2009. The embassy hopes to continue working with CENTCOM and the Nevada National Guard in the important areas of border security and counter-narcotics, primarily focused on the Afghanistan border. U.S. POLICY ¶23. (SBU) U.S. policy in Turkmenistan is three-fold: -- Encourage democratic reform and increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including support for improvements in the education and health systems; -- Encourage economic reform and growth of a market economy and private-sector agriculture, as well as diversification of Turkmenistan's energy export options; and -- Promote security cooperation. ¶24. (SBU) Many countries seek increased cooperation with Turkmenistan on energy and security, but its human rights record in the past has made this cooperation problematic for some. In raising its human rights concerns, the United States: -- Encourages the elimination of Niyazov-era abuses and restrictions on freedom of movement; -- Promotes greater religious freedom, including registration of unrecognized groups like the Roman Catholic Church, and making legal provision for conscientious objectors; and -- Advocates the growth of civil society by urging the government to register non-governmental organizations. HOAGLAND

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