TURKMENISTAN: MSG DETACHMENT: REQUEST FOR

S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000407

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS, L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2028
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: MSG DETACHMENT: REQUEST FOR
GUIDANCE

REF: A. ASHGABAT 0403

B. SNELSIRE-HOAGLAND E-MAIL DTD 03/29/08

Classified By: CDA RICHARD E. HOAGLAND: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (SBU) This is an action request. See para six below.


2. (S) On March 20, Embassy Ashgabat received a diplomatic
note of the same date concerning defensive weapons possessed
by the Marine Security Guard detachment. The diplomatic note
makes the following key points (see para eight below for
Embassy's informal translation of the full text):

-- Bringing firearms to Turkmenistan by U.S. Marines and
using them is being carried out without standard-procedure
prior arrangement with the Government of Turkmenistan.

-- Bringing military-type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed
with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan.

-- Bringing firearms into Turkmenistan for security but
without prior arrangement is a violation of paragraph 1 of
Article 41 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Missions.

-- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly requests the U.S.
Embassy comply with the legislation of Turkmenistan and
expects an official response on this issue.


3. (S) During a March 31 meeting with Foreign Minister
Rashid Meredov (ref A),Charge presented him with a copy of
the diplomatic note as an aide memoire. The minister read
every word of it as if he had never seen it before. When he
was done reading, he commented that this is simply standard
practice because Turkmenistan must keep tabs on every weapon
brought into the country. He pointed out that when
high-level visitors arrive with security agents, a list of
the agents, weapons and their serial numbers is always given
to the government. Charge pointed out the U.S. Embassy's
permanent Marine Security Guard detachment is quite different
from a high-level visit.


4. (C) Charge added he was aware this had been an issue at
the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, and that Meredov and
then-Ambassador Jacobson had had discussions about the issue.
Since that time, we had heard nothing until this new
diplomatic note. Charge asked Meredov why it is now again an
issue. Meredov replied, &From time to time we go through
our files to find unresolved issues, and we noticed this one
was still open.8 (COMMENT: We would be mildly surprised if
the severely understaffed Foreign Ministry has the time and
human resources to "go through its files from time to time."
END COMMENT.) Meredov then volunteered in his most animated
comment of the entire meeting, &It has nothing to do with
the political situation, nothing to do with regional issues,
nothing to do with other major powers.8


5. (S) Charge told Meredov he is fully committed to solving
this to the satisfaction of both sides. Meredov suggested we
simply submit a list of weapons and their serial numbers.
Based on the Department's cleared informal talking points
provided in ref B, Charge told Meredov that cannot be done.
He explained whatever weapons the MSG detachment might
possess would be minimal in number and solely for defending
the sovereign territory of the Embassy. Any information
about them is part of the inviolable archives of the
diplomatic mission. Meredov said he understood, but asked
the Charge to query Washington on the possibility of
providing, at a minimum, the number of weapons as a potential
compromise. Charge said he would convey that request to
Washington.


6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Ashgabat requests cleared
language to use in a diplomatic note reply to the Foreign
Ministry's March 20 diplomatic note.


7. (S) COMMENT: If we are not mistaken, Meredov seemed a
bit uncomfortable with this issue. He seemed to take the
lowest-possible-key approach, and gave no indication this is
a crisis. However, we point out the pattern of the
Surveillance Detection Program being shut down in April 2007,
an anonymous letter of February 23 (delivered February 28)
allegedly from within the Embassy's Local Guard Force, and

now this March 20 dip note. The anonymous letter, which is
currently the subject of an internal preliminary inquiry, is
especially troubling because it was back-channeled to the
Charge by hand from the Foreign Ministry, which is aware of
its contents. Further, on March 26, the head of the
America's Department in the Foreign Ministry speculated to
the Charge that the letter and diplomatic note might be
related. END COMMENT.


8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT of Embassy's informal translation of
Government of Turkmenistan diplomatic note dated March 20:

(Complimentary opening) and has the honor to bring the
following to the Embassy's attention.

According to information available to the Turkmen side, the
internal security of the Embassy of the United States of
America in Turkmenistan is provided by eight (sic) contracted
marines of the United States Marine Corps. While on duty,
they use several kinds of firearms. Bring firearms to
Turkmenistan by the U.S. marines and using them is being
carried out without prior arrangement in the proper order
with the Government of Turkmenistan.

Bringing military type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed
with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan.

The fact that the United States Diplomatic Mission in
Turkmenistan has brought firearms to Turkmenistan for the
purpose of ensuring its security without proper arrangements
is in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Missions.

Taking into account the above mentioned, the Ministry
strongly request (the U.S. Embassy) to comply with the
legislation of Turkmenistan and informs that the Ministry is
expecting an official response from the Embassy on this issue.

(Complimentary closing.)

END TEXT.
HOAGLAND