TURKMENISTAN: MSG DETACHMENT: REQUEST FOR

S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000407 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS, L E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2028 TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC TX SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: MSG DETACHMENT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE REF: A. ASHGABAT 0403 ¶B. SNELSIRE-HOAGLAND E-MAIL DTD 03/29/08 Classified By: CDA RICHARD E. HOAGLAND: 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. See para six below. ¶2. (S) On March 20, Embassy Ashgabat received a diplomatic note of the same date concerning defensive weapons possessed by the Marine Security Guard detachment. The diplomatic note makes the following key points (see para eight below for Embassy's informal translation of the full text): -- Bringing firearms to Turkmenistan by U.S. Marines and using them is being carried out without standard-procedure prior arrangement with the Government of Turkmenistan. -- Bringing military-type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan. -- Bringing firearms into Turkmenistan for security but without prior arrangement is a violation of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Missions. -- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly requests the U.S. Embassy comply with the legislation of Turkmenistan and expects an official response on this issue. ¶3. (S) During a March 31 meeting with Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov (ref A),Charge presented him with a copy of the diplomatic note as an aide memoire. The minister read every word of it as if he had never seen it before. When he was done reading, he commented that this is simply standard practice because Turkmenistan must keep tabs on every weapon brought into the country. He pointed out that when high-level visitors arrive with security agents, a list of the agents, weapons and their serial numbers is always given to the government. Charge pointed out the U.S. Embassy's permanent Marine Security Guard detachment is quite different from a high-level visit. ¶4. (C) Charge added he was aware this had been an issue at the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, and that Meredov and then-Ambassador Jacobson had had discussions about the issue. Since that time, we had heard nothing until this new diplomatic note. Charge asked Meredov why it is now again an issue. Meredov replied, &From time to time we go through our files to find unresolved issues, and we noticed this one was still open.8 (COMMENT: We would be mildly surprised if the severely understaffed Foreign Ministry has the time and human resources to "go through its files from time to time." END COMMENT.) Meredov then volunteered in his most animated comment of the entire meeting, &It has nothing to do with the political situation, nothing to do with regional issues, nothing to do with other major powers.8 ¶5. (S) Charge told Meredov he is fully committed to solving this to the satisfaction of both sides. Meredov suggested we simply submit a list of weapons and their serial numbers. Based on the Department's cleared informal talking points provided in ref B, Charge told Meredov that cannot be done. He explained whatever weapons the MSG detachment might possess would be minimal in number and solely for defending the sovereign territory of the Embassy. Any information about them is part of the inviolable archives of the diplomatic mission. Meredov said he understood, but asked the Charge to query Washington on the possibility of providing, at a minimum, the number of weapons as a potential compromise. Charge said he would convey that request to Washington. ¶6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Ashgabat requests cleared language to use in a diplomatic note reply to the Foreign Ministry's March 20 diplomatic note. ¶7. (S) COMMENT: If we are not mistaken, Meredov seemed a bit uncomfortable with this issue. He seemed to take the lowest-possible-key approach, and gave no indication this is a crisis. However, we point out the pattern of the Surveillance Detection Program being shut down in April 2007, an anonymous letter of February 23 (delivered February 28) allegedly from within the Embassy's Local Guard Force, and now this March 20 dip note. The anonymous letter, which is currently the subject of an internal preliminary inquiry, is especially troubling because it was back-channeled to the Charge by hand from the Foreign Ministry, which is aware of its contents. Further, on March 26, the head of the America's Department in the Foreign Ministry speculated to the Charge that the letter and diplomatic note might be related. END COMMENT. ¶8. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT of Embassy's informal translation of Government of Turkmenistan diplomatic note dated March 20: (Complimentary opening) and has the honor to bring the following to the Embassy's attention. According to information available to the Turkmen side, the internal security of the Embassy of the United States of America in Turkmenistan is provided by eight (sic) contracted marines of the United States Marine Corps. While on duty, they use several kinds of firearms. Bring firearms to Turkmenistan by the U.S. marines and using them is being carried out without prior arrangement in the proper order with the Government of Turkmenistan. Bringing military type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan. The fact that the United States Diplomatic Mission in Turkmenistan has brought firearms to Turkmenistan for the purpose of ensuring its security without proper arrangements is in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Missions. Taking into account the above mentioned, the Ministry strongly request (the U.S. Embassy) to comply with the legislation of Turkmenistan and informs that the Ministry is expecting an official response from the Embassy on this issue. (Complimentary closing.) END TEXT. HOAGLAND