TURKMENISTAN'S BERDIMUHAMEDOV ONE YEAR ON: LET'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000223

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RICHARD E. HOAGLAND
STATE FOR D, P, E, SCA/CEN
PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON
COMMERCE FOR HEUPER
USAID/W FOR EE/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN'S BERDIMUHAMEDOV ONE YEAR ON: LET'S
SEIZE THE MOMENT

REF: ASHGABAT 0219

Classified By: CDA RICHARD E. HOAGLAND: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) When "The Eternally Great Saparmurat Turkmenbashi"
Niyazov died on December 21, 2006, U.S. foreign policy took
the opportunity to approach Turkmenistan's soon-to-be new
president, offering to "turn the page" in our bilateral
relations. To the extent Turkmenistan was ready to engage
with us, we were ready to engage without pre-conditions. It
was a wise and far-sighted decision. The past year has shown
that Turkmenistan's new president wants to move in a
different direction from his destructive predecessor, but is
not clear how to do it. This is our moment, and we must
seize it.

THE TURN-AROUND


2. (C) Since his inauguration on February 14, 2007,
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov has returned Turkmenistan to the
family of nations. Whereas former President Niyazov operated
as if the nation existed solely to serve his deranged
delusions, Berdimuhamedov has clearly stated that the
government exists to serve the people. By authoritarian
Central Asian standards, Berdimuhamedov has positioned
himself as a reasonable leader. He has

-- ended Turkmenistan's diplomatic isolation, making over a
dozen foreign trips in his first year and receiving hundreds
of diplomatic and business delegations;

-- begun to repair frozen relations with Uzbekistan and
Azerbaijan, positioning himself as a partner in regional
cooperation and integration;

-- consistently but without any fanfare gutted Niyazov's
bizarre personality cult and has not advanced himself as a
replacement; instead he increasingly portrays himself as a
man of the people, traveling extensively around the country
to meet workers from all sectors;

-- started to turn around Niyazov's depredations of
education, health care, and culture;

-- stated clearly to U.S. visitors he wants Turkmenistan to
develop a Western-style market economy;

-- created government bodies intended to impose fiscal
responsibility and transparency;

-- begun to unify the dual exchange rates, a cash cow for
corrupt insiders;

-- invited Western firms to submit "serious concrete
proposals" to help develop Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon wealth,
hosted Turkmenistan's first successful International Oil and
Gas Exposition in many years, and has said explicitly he
wants a Trans-Caspian Pipeline;

-- empowered the formerly empty shell of the Institute of
Democracy and Human Rights to determine how to bring
Turkmenistan into compliance with international standards;

-- established a commission to review prisoners' convictions
and other abuses by law-enforcement agencies, and has
released some political prisoners incarcerated by the
previous regime; and

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-- maintained Turkmenistan's quiet but essential support for
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with blanket
over-flight clearances for about 1,500 aircraft a year and a
refueling operation at Ashgabat International Airport that
annually services about 120 aircraft with humanitarian cargo.
(NOTE: For a more extensive discussion of the changes
during Berdimuhamedov's first year, see reftel. END NOTE.)

CONSTRAINTS


3. (C) But Berdimuhamedov faces formidable constraints.
Most fundamental, Turkmenistan missed 15 years of reform and
international contact, and had 70 years of only Soviet
experience before that. The corrosive impact of this
isolation should never be under-estimated. Niyazov's
capriciously draconian regime caused a brain drain of an
estimated 4,000 of Turkmenistan's own best and brightest as
Niyazov sank ever further into solipsistic and occasionally
homicidal delusion. The permanent bureaucracy that survived
by keeping its head down and mouth shut still seems to prefer
to scrabble sideways to implement decrees from the top rather
than to innovate from the bottom up. The destructive culture
of Soviet corruption is all-pervasive.


4. (C) The Kremlin is determined that Turkmenistan be part
of its "exclusive sphere of influence," and continually warns
against the disaster and chaos that come with democracy.
China shows by example that international political power,
economic growth, and great wealth are possible without
political reform.


5. (C) Less concrete but still a powerful constraint is
international opinion that still too often thinks of
Turkmenistan in terms of the reputation it developed under
Niyazov as "Stalin's Disneyland," worthy only of being
laughed at with a shudder and written off. Although it's
partly Turkmenistan's fault for not yet welcoming foreign
journalists with open arms, the international media still get
it wrong. As recently as January 23, "The New York Times,"
reporting from Moscow, not from Ashgabat, placed Turkmenistan
geographically on the Black Sea and skeptically wondered
"whether Berdimuhamedov's reforms will lead to greater
liberalization or simply a recasting of the ubiquitous
statues to the former leader in his own image." The writer
quoted only non-resident "international human rights
experts." Turkmen exiles, mostly in Europe and with their
own understandable axes to grind, dominate Internet
discussions of Turkmenistan, and Russian web sites still
regularly rub Ashgabat's nose in its past.

THE POWER OF RESPECT


6. (C) We believe Berdimuhamedov himself is sincerely
interested in transforming Turkmenistan -- not ceding power
while doing it, but bringing Turkmenistan into the modern
world -- but he doesn't know how. Most of what we take for
granted in modern management, business, and education is
alien to him, yet he still feels the imperative to change.
This is our moment. A detailed, sustained, intensive
engagement with the still-questing Turkmen president will pay
dividends for the United States for a generation to come.
But this demands a new level of U.S. commitment.


7. (C) Berdimuhamedov is well-disposed toward the United
States. During his September 2007 visit to New York for the
UN General Assembly, he met with students at Columbia

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University, academics at the Harriman Center, and business
leaders at a Eurasia Group-sponsored luncheon. He is fond of
telling trusted U.S. interlocutors that he was frankly
surprised by the positive and respectful way he was received,
and he reminisces freely about the energy and political
engagement of American students. By contrast, he comments
about his less-than-satisfactory reception in Brussels where
he says he felt snubbed and belittled. He contrasts his
reception in New York with his treatment in Brussels as "the
difference between heaven and earth." The key word is
respect.


8. (C) Well aware of their status in the world, Turkmen
officials are enormously insecure. The great ace of American
diplomacy is, by and large, we show honest respect for our
interlocutors. An invitation now to Berdimuhamedov to visit
Washington would establish a new level of rapport with him
and signal -- to him and to others -- that we take him
seriously. It would show recognition for his positive goals
and would encourage him to do more and go further. By
contrast, setting benchmarks he must meet to be "rewarded"
with a Washington visit would be counter-productive. A White
House meeting would be the high point of the visit, but such
a visit should be a much larger introduction to official
Washington, including in all three branches of government. A
side-trip to Chicago, Houston, or elsewhere should be part of
the mix. We have the opportunity to make an impact in a way
that rarely occurs. Let's rise to the challenge now,
vigorously, creatively.
HOAGLAND