Comorans Disagree On How (And If) To Talk

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000606

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN
SUBJECT: Comorans Disagree On How (And If) To Talk

REF: ANTAN 591


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: After two weeks of intense mediation efforts by
African Union Special Envoy Madeira, the Comorans are scarcely
closer to sitting down to plan for inter-island talks. President
Sambi showed his cards September 5, indicating to diplomats he will
hold a referendum to "fix institutional problems" if his political
opponents refuse to talk. END SUMMARY.

President Sambi, "Referendum"
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2. (SBU) President Sambi thanked African Union Special Envoy Madeira
September 5 for his mediation efforts and reaffirmed his will to
honor his promise to the international community to convene an
Inter-Comoran Dialogue. S/E Madeira explained the Technical
Preparatory Committee concept (REFTEL) and reported that the three
island executives and National Assembly had agreed in principle. He
emphasized that Moheli, Grande Comore, and the National Assembly
feared Sambi would seek to extend his mandate beyond May, 2010, thus
slowing progress.


3. (SBU) President Sambi asserted, in plain language, that he will
not seek to remain in office beyond the end of his term, "I do not
have the authority to do this job and thus have no interest in
staying in office beyond my mandate." The President reiterated the
GOC position that the constitution -- with four presidents, four
cabinets, four assemblies -- prevented him from governing
effectively. He complained that the island presidents of Moheli and
Grande Comore, and the National Assembly, have long demanded
dialogue -- but now that it is time to talk, they refuse. President
Sambi said if his "opponents" refuse to participate in preparations
for the Inter-Comoran Dialogue, he will avail himself of his right
to hold a referendum on the constitution, "the international
community supports Comoros' democracy, so I will take the decision
directly to the people." (NOTE: The French Charge (protect)
confided that the Minister of Institutional Reform (who has been
conspicuously absent in our many meetings) has been busy drafting a
new constitution for months. END NOTE).


4. (SBU) Apart from S/E Madeira's report, the assembled diplomats
were in listening mode during the short meeting. The only exception
was the South African Ambassador, who has previously been outspoken
against constitutional revision and on this occasion made a veiled
reference to the consequences in terms of international aid if
Comoros departs from the AU-agreed process.


5. (SBU) The meeting with President Sambi included the Ministers of
Justice, Defense, and Land Reform. The international delegation
included the AU, Arab League, United Nations, United States, France,
South Africa, and Libya. The Chinese Ambassador was ill and La
Francophonie's non-resident representative left last week.

Foreign Minister Jaffar, "AU Is Witness"
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6. (SBU) The night before our meeting with President Sambi, Foreign
Minister Jaffar was at pains to insist that the AU and international
community be "witnesses" to the good will and faith of the Union
Government for making every effort to convene the Inter-Comoran
Dialogue. He expressed no surprise that Moheli, Grande Comore and
the National Assembly were hesitant about convening the Technical
Preparatory Committee. FM Jaffar noted the GOC's prerogative to
hold a referendum (foreshadowing Sambi),but insisted that it was
not their current intention.

"Opposition" Suspicious and Hesitant
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7. (SBU) During the week of September 1, S/E Madeira continued to
shuttle among the Comoros stakeholders, accompanied by international
community representatives from South Africa, Arab League, United
Nations, France, and United States. A sign posted at the tiny
airport in Moheli not so subtly greeted the delegation: "Welcome to
Moheli, it's our turn in 2010." While accepting S/E Madeira's
demarche on a preparatory committee, the Moheli island president and
assembled politicians made clear they would just as soon accept the
status quo, with no talks and no improved governance, to assure
their turn in the rotation in 2010. Still, as a gesture to the AU,
they agreed to send two representative to the Moroni technical
committees. Our message was easily received in Anjouan, where
Sambi's candidate won the June island president election.


8. (SBU) Grande Comore's island president and the President of the
National Assembly, openly in an "opposition" bloc with Moheli,
mounted the most resistance to Madeira's plan. They requested
various written guarantees, expressing fear and hesitating to commit
to talks. S/E Madeira insisted, "you are to sit down together to
discuss what it is you need to discuss." At week's end, neither
Grande Comore nor the National Assembly had officially agreed to

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participate in preparatory talks, claiming to be consulting their
colleagues before replying to Madeira.

Madeira's Mandate
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9. (SBU) S/E Madeira hoped to convene the Technical Preparatory
Committee September 5, put the affair in the hands of the Comorans,
declare victory and go home. However, given the obstacles, he will
return September 8 to continue negotiations with Grande Comore and
the National Assembly (Comment: One hoped that his efforts will be
enlivened by the new motivation that if he fails, Sambi will move
forward to hold a referendum. End Comment). S/E Madeira's mandate
from the AU Peace and Security Council, embodied in the several AU
Ministerial Declarations of 2007, is to get the Comorans to sit down
for inter-island talks. He is eager to report to Addis Ababa that
the process remains on track, with the preparatory committee
convening to develop a budget and plan for a series of meetings
leading up to the Inter-Comoran Dialogue in early 2009.

COMMENT:
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10. (SBU) President Sambi's explicit statements about not prolonging
his term and about the referendum are both new; and neither has been
made public. When EmbOff suggested September 4 to FM Jaffar that a
public GOC statement -- promising Moheli would get their turn in
2010 -- would eliminate the biggest obstacle to dialogue, he
promised nothing. The Union Government prefers to have S/E Madeira
do all of their talking for them. It would appear the opposition
bloc is playing nicely into Sambi's hands: by refusing talks (out
of fear) they give the President the excuse he wants to hold a
referendum (what they really fear).


11. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: Sambi is not very popular at present,
but he would likely try to improve socioeconomic conditions a bit
before holding his referendum. Most notably, a new oil supply
contract appears to be near completion (SEPTEL). The referendum's
prospects would be good, the electorate either going to the polls to
vote yes or not bothering to vote at all. Just before our September
5 meeting, 20 "notables" emerged from Sambi's office, just a
fraction of the hundreds of village elders with whom the President
is in regular contact. The opposition bloc has neither the network
nor the resources to mount much of a "no" campaign, and the
Mohelians, the Comorans most concerned about the stakes involved,
are too few to matter in a national election. END COMMENT.

MARQUARDT