Comorans Disagree On How (And If) To Talk

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000606 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN SUBJECT: Comorans Disagree On How (And If) To Talk REF: ANTAN 591 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: After two weeks of intense mediation efforts by African Union Special Envoy Madeira, the Comorans are scarcely closer to sitting down to plan for inter-island talks. President Sambi showed his cards September 5, indicating to diplomats he will hold a referendum to "fix institutional problems" if his political opponents refuse to talk. END SUMMARY. President Sambi, "Referendum" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) President Sambi thanked African Union Special Envoy Madeira September 5 for his mediation efforts and reaffirmed his will to honor his promise to the international community to convene an Inter-Comoran Dialogue. S/E Madeira explained the Technical Preparatory Committee concept (REFTEL) and reported that the three island executives and National Assembly had agreed in principle. He emphasized that Moheli, Grande Comore, and the National Assembly feared Sambi would seek to extend his mandate beyond May, 2010, thus slowing progress. ¶3. (SBU) President Sambi asserted, in plain language, that he will not seek to remain in office beyond the end of his term, "I do not have the authority to do this job and thus have no interest in staying in office beyond my mandate." The President reiterated the GOC position that the constitution -- with four presidents, four cabinets, four assemblies -- prevented him from governing effectively. He complained that the island presidents of Moheli and Grande Comore, and the National Assembly, have long demanded dialogue -- but now that it is time to talk, they refuse. President Sambi said if his "opponents" refuse to participate in preparations for the Inter-Comoran Dialogue, he will avail himself of his right to hold a referendum on the constitution, "the international community supports Comoros' democracy, so I will take the decision directly to the people." (NOTE: The French Charge (protect) confided that the Minister of Institutional Reform (who has been conspicuously absent in our many meetings) has been busy drafting a new constitution for months. END NOTE). ¶4. (SBU) Apart from S/E Madeira's report, the assembled diplomats were in listening mode during the short meeting. The only exception was the South African Ambassador, who has previously been outspoken against constitutional revision and on this occasion made a veiled �A;reference to the consequences in terms of international aid if Comoros departs from the AU-agreed process. ¶5. (SBU) The meeting with President Sambi included the Ministers of Justice, Defense, and Land Reform. The international delegation included the AU, Arab League, United Nations, United States, France, South Africa, and Libya. The Chinese Ambassador was ill and La Francophonie's non-resident representative left last week. Foreign Minister Jaffar, "AU Is Witness" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) The night before our meeting with President Sambi, Foreign Minister Jaffar was at pains to insist that the AU and international community be "witnesses" to the good will and faith of the Union Government for making every effort to convene the Inter-Comoran Dialogue. He expressed no surprise that Moheli, Grande Comore and the National Assembly were hesitant about convening the Technical Preparatory Committee. FM Jaffar noted the GOC's prerogative to hold a referendum (foreshadowing Sambi),but insisted that it was not their current intention. "Opposition" Suspicious and Hesitant - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) During the week of September 1, S/E Madeira continued to shuttle among the Comoros stakeholders, accompanied by international community representatives from South Africa, Arab League, United Nations, France, and United States. A sign posted at the tiny airport in Moheli not so subtly greeted the delegation: "Welcome to Moheli, it's our turn in 2010." While accepting S/E Madeira's demarche on a preparatory committee, the Moheli island president and assembled politicians made clear they would just as soon accept the status quo, with no talks and no improved governance, to assure their turn in the rotation in 2010. Still, as a gesture to the AU, they agreed to send two representative to the Moroni technical committees. Our message was easily received in Anjouan, where Sambi's candidate won the June island president election. ¶8. (SBU) Grande Comore's island president and the President of the National Assembly, openly in an "opposition" bloc with Moheli, mounted the most resistance to Madeira's plan. They requested various written guarantees, expressing fear and hesitating to commit to talks. S/E Madeira insisted, "you are to sit down together to discuss what it is you need to discuss." At week's end, neither Grande Comore nor the National Assembly had officially agreed to ANTANANARI 00000606 002 OF 002 participate in preparatory talks, claiming to be consulting their colleagues before replying to Madeira. Madeira's Mandate - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) S/E Madeira hoped to convene the Technical Preparatory Committee September 5, put the affair in the hands of the Comorans, declare victory and go home. However, given the obstacles, he will return September 8 to continue negotiations with Grande Comore and the National Assembly (Comment: One hoped that his efforts will be enlivened by the new motivation that if he fails, Sambi will move forward to hold a referendum. End Comment). S/E Madeira's mandate from the AU Peace and Security Council, embodied in the several AU Ministerial Declarations of 2007, is to get the Comorans to sit down for inter-island talks. He is eager to report to Addis Ababa that the process remains on track, with the preparatory committee convening to develop a budget and plan for a series of meetings leading up to the Inter-Comoran Dialogue in early 2009. COMMENT: - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) President Sambi's explicit statements about not prolonging his term and about the referendum are both new; and neither has been made public. When EmbOff suggested September 4 to FM Jaffar that a public GOC statement -- promising Moheli would get their turn in 2010 -- would eliminate the biggest obstacle to dialogue, he promised nothing. The Union Government prefers to have S/E Madeira do all of their talking for them. It would appear the opposition bloc is playing nicely into Sambi's hands: by refusing talks (out of fear) they give the President the excuse he wants to hold a referendum (what they really fear). ¶11. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: Sambi is not very popular at present, but he would likely try to improve socioeconomic conditions a bit before holding his referendum. Most notably, a new oil supply contract appears to be near completion (SEPTEL). The referendum's prospects would be good, the electorate either going to the polls to vote yes or not bothering to vote at all. Just before our September 5 meeting, 20 "notables" emerged from Sambi's office, just a fraction of the hundreds of village elders with whom the President is in regular contact. The opposition bloc has neither the network nor the resources to mount much of a "no" campaign, and the Mohelians, the Comorans most concerned about the stakes involved, are too few to matter in a national election. END COMMENT. MARQUARDT