C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000025

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ADDIS FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE
DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF/FO
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MOPS CN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SAMBI DETERMINED TO LIBERATE ANJOUAN

REF: ANTANANARIVO 004 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR R. NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D


1. (C) SUMMARY: Following Assistant Secretary Jendayi
Frazer,s first visit to the Union of the Comoros (septel),
Ambassador Marquardt held a number of meetings with President
Sambi, high-level Union Government officials, and members of
the international community to discuss the possibility of a
Union Army (also known as the Army of National Development,
AND) landing to "liberate8 the island of Anjouan from
Colonel Mohamed Bacar. While Sambi, under pressure from the
military and elsewhere, seems decided on military action and
confident it will succeed, other officials expressed concern
that the AND,s lack of resources and manpower will lead to a
debacle. The international community in Moroni continues to
back the African Union,s (AU) remediation efforts but lacks
consensus on &next steps,8 given their ineffectiveness to
date. Bacar continues to consolidate his control over
Anjouan in the face of imminent invasion, reportedly
positioning his forces at the main hospital in hopes the
civilian presence will deter AND forces from attacking; Bacar
has also begun arresting his opponents, including President
Sambi,s cousin (septel). END SUMMARY.

PRESIDENT ALTERNATELY CONFIDENT, CONCERNED, AND RESIGNED
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) In his January 10 meeting with the Ambassador (the
day after meeting with A/S Frazer), President Sambi was
determined that military action is the only way to
&liberate8 Anjouan. The AU,s inability to enforce
sanctions or to find a solution throughout nine months of
negotiations convinced him the only option is to &impose8
elections in Anjouan. While Sambi believes he has accepted
humiliation throughout the AU negotiation process by agreeing
to cater to Bacar,s demands, in his opinion, Bacar has just
toyed with the international commu

nity to buy time. Why
consider another round of talks if AU Envoy Madeira already
said in the September Cape Town Communique that all
diplomatic means have been exhausted? Sambi insisted the AU
is missing out on an opportunity to make a big name for
itself by failing to resolve this relatively small problem.
He asked, &Why is it the international community demands
democracy but will not help us hold free and fair elections?
I sometimes feel we are the victims of the politics of big
nations.8


3. (C) President Sambi,s tone alternated between bravado
that an armed landing would succeed, concern of bloodshed if
Bacar,s men resist, and resignation over having no other
option. He assured the Ambassador the forces would be sent
to provide security for the elections, not to retaliate
against the Anjouanese. While he insisted Anjouanese
residents will themselves blockade roads to stop Bacar from
fleeing, he is also concerned that if the force is comprised
only of AND soldiers, Bacar,s men will try to resist. Sambi
would much prefer AU troops going in; he insists Bacar,s men
would drop their weapons and flee. Sambi was confident the
landing would succeed with only 300 to 400 (preferably AU,
but if not, AND) soldiers. He estimated only 60 or 70 of
Bacar,s men are loyal enough to fight back. Only 15 of
those have military training; the rest are young men armed
with Kalishnikovs.


4. (C) Sambi said the Union Army has enough arms but needs
assistance with logistics and transport. With the AU hanging
back, Sambi claims he has secured pledges of manpower and
limited equipment through his own lobbying, although he was
ambiguous whether these pledges still stand under a
unilateral Union Army operation. According to Sambi, over
the past several weeks the Senegalese President pledged 100
soldiers to join the AU force; the Libyans promised a plane
(NFI); Sudan pledged soldiers; and the Tanzanian President
offered the use of Tanzanian soldiers already present in the
Comoros. The Arab League is also &ready to contribute,8
according to Sambi.


5. (SBU) President Sambi believes Bacar,s main interest in
holding onto Anjouan is financial. Bacar,s wife resides in
their home in France, where his bank accounts hold millions

ANTANANARI 00000025 002 OF 003


of dollars siphoned off from Anjouan,s port activities, the
selling of offshore bank licenses and other illicit
activities. If new island presidential elections were held
on Anjouan, Sambi would accept Bacar,s candidacy as he is
confident Bacar would lose. But with Bacar,s reputation
with Comorans rapidly plummeting after increasing
arrests/beatings of his opponents and retribution therefore
lielly, Sambi believes he will need to leave the Comoros
after the crisis is resolved for at least a few years if he
hopes to survive.


6. (C) President Sambi reiterated his belief that
officially, the French government is not supporting Bacar,
but there are French citizens or &networks8 in Mayotte
working with Bacar to traffic goods. He made clear in his
meeting with President Sarkozy in September that this is
unacceptable, and Sarkozy promised to &take the necessary
measures.8 Sambi believes Bacar would back down if the
French pressured him, but so far they have proved unwilling.
He complained that although French Ambassador Job said the
French have identified Bacar,s home in France, it seems
neither his home nor financial assets have been touched.
Sambi rejected French Ambassador Job,s suggestion the
conflict over Anjouan was personal, saying he had always
countered Bacar,s intransigence within the institutional
framework, confident elections would sort the problem out
until Bacar hijacked the process.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY READY FOR A FIGHT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (SBU) In a separate meeting with the Ambassador later on
January 10, AND Chief of Staff Salimou argued even more
forcefully that waiting for an AU solution is useless.
&Nobody wants a war, but no one will help us find another
solution. If the President will listen to me, we will leave
the AU as soon as Anjouan is back.8 At this point, &the
greatest failure would be not to go to Anjouan,8 as the AND
would then also look useless. &The Comoran people will
understand if the effort fails ) but they will not
understand if we continue to do nothing. After January 24, I
assure you things will not be the same.8


8. (C) Salimou was confident the operation will be
successful. He estimated that of Bacar,s several hundred
men, only 100 have professional military backgrounds and only
130 would be willing to die for him because Bacar is paying
them off. There are approximately ten far-flung locations on
Anjouan where the AND could conduct a maritime landing, and
those loyal to Bacar can not protect every site adequately.
Salimou insisted that two or three among those loyal 130 men
are already calling him regularly with insider information,
while others in Bacar,s army have called him to say they
will run away when the &invasion8 happens. Salimou
explained the AND has secured a commercial boat called the
Tresrajar (phonetic), belonging to a friend of the President,
that can carry 200 people plus equipment. More than 10
Zodiacs will be placed on board the ships and used tactically
to secure the LZ,s beforehand. The AND also has two speed
boats, one of which is being repaired. He requested more
equipment from the United States, including military boats
and helicopters. Whether they get the equipment or not, he
plans to move his soldiers to the Itsoundzu military training
camp on Grande Comore this week, then move them to a staging
area on the neighboring island of Moheli. He finished
dramatically, &from there, we will go to Anjouan and dance
in hell,s fire.8


9. (C) Salimou,s suspicion of the French, quite common in
the Comoros, runs far deeper than President Sambi,s. He
agreed Bacar would never win a free and fair election but
believes there are networks in Mayotte supported by France
preparing to get rid of Bacar and put someone else in power,
essentially another warlord, whom they can control. Bacar is
a prisoner of those &lobbies.8 Even under Sarkozy, &do
you think France would invest in a separatist movement for
ten years and just reverse their stance?8

VICE PRESIDENT SKEPTICAL
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


ANTANANARI 00000025 003 OF 003



10. (C) Smarting from a falling out with President Sambi
over an unrelated corruption scandal, Vice President Idi
Nadhoim told the Ambassador he feared an invasion of Anjouan
will end in tragedy. He pointed out Bacar has 1,000 men in
Anjouan, while the AND only has 300, half of whom are new
recruits with less than one year of military experience. AND
soldiers, salaries are six months in arrears, and all they
are asking for in advance is a bonus ) which he dismissed as
proof of their pack of professionalism or patriotism. As an
elected member of the Cabinet, Nadhoim claims he is the only
one daring to speak out, although others reportedly disagree
with the President if asked.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON MORONI AMBIVALENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) Discussions with French Ambassador Christian Job,
South African Ambassador Mabeta, UN Representative Opia Kumah
and Japanese Ambassador Chichii Tadaharu revealed no real
consensus in the international community in Moroni. Given
historical sensitivities, France supports the AU,s efforts
but refuses to get directly involved in a solution. Despite
recently gaining information that the Union Government has
secured two M-6 helicopters with Ukrainian pilots and boats
from Tanzania, Job fears the AND invasion of Anjouan would
result in significant deaths -- &or else this would be the
first time in military history that an armed landing
succeeded when the date was announced beforehand.8 He
believes neither Sambi not Bacar wants to negotiate a
political solution to their personal standoff (UN
Representative Kumah disagreed), but acknowledges an AND
invasion would be legitimate. France would only protest as a
matter of form. He said Bacar would be accepted in France if
he had to leave Anjouan, a la Ratsiraka. Kumah and Mabeta
added that both the UN (which has referred this entire issue
to the AU) and South Africa stand behind the AU to find a
solution. All seemed interested and supportive of potential
U.S. involvement in helping the AU find a solution but
resigned that an armed landing on Anjouan was imminent.


12. (C) COMMENT: With President Sambi publicly stating his
intentions to take back Anjouan by force, Bacar is reportedly
cracking down on Anjouan residents (septel). There is
clearly a wide range of opinion and ample misinformation
surrounding the logistics of an armed landing on Anjouan and
the likelihood of success, but President Sambi,s resolve is
clear. Even with a successful liberation of Anjouan, there
is little thought being given to what should or would happen
in the aftermath. Sambi expressed concern about whether he
can protect Bacar and his people from those seeking to settle
old scores, while Salimou said preventing them from being
harmed or killed &is not my priority.8 Sambi has agreed to
wait until January 24 in the hopes U.S. involvement can help
bring about a peaceful resolution of the problem. But the
Ambassador,s meetings in Moroni showed agreement really on
only one question: &How can one person bring an entire
government and country to its knees, just because he has some
arms?8 END COMMENT.

MARQUARDT


MARQUARDT