Mission to Anjouan - Bacar Still Intransigent

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000157 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS ADDIS FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/FO, INR/AA, AND DRL DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF/E RMEDRANO PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN SUBJECT: Mission to Anjouan - Bacar Still Intransigent ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Anjouan renegade Colonel Mohamed Bacar remained intransigent before an international delegation delivering an ultimatum February 27. The delegation later informed Union President Ahmed Sambi who was unsurprised, disappointed, and intent on a military solution to restore the Union. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The five person international delegation to Anjouan February 27 comprised: Ambassador Mourad Taiti, AU Representative to Comoros; Ambassador Christian Job, French Ambassador to Comoros; Abdul Hakin El Rifai, Arab League Political Counselor; LtCol Let Dieng Gueye, Senegalese military officer seconded to AU; and George Sibley, U.S. Charg d'Affaires. Ultimatum Delivered - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Riding between the airport and the meeting, life in Anjouan appeared normal with no outward signs of tension or overt military preparations. Colonel Bacar, sitting in the "Presidential Seat," was accompanied by five of his associates. Bacar did not introduce them, but one was his island Interior Minister and one was his choice as "interim island President" in 2007. AU ResRep Mourad told Bacar the delegation had come to deliver an ultimatum and expected a reply before they left. He emphasized the African Union had decided to address the Comoros crisis and approved of "friendly nations" helping the Union Government. Mourad said Tanzania, Senegal, Sudan and Libya were preparing with Union forces for the military option. ¶4. (SBU) Mourad explained the AU mandate in the Comoros had been expanded to include elections organization, imposition of sanctions on Anjouan, and restoring legitimate Union authority. Mourad told Bacar that he had three choices: 1) He could allow elections under the conditions indicated by the MAES mandate, participating as a candidate; 2) He could go into exile; 3) Or, he could choose the path of confrontation in which case he, Bacar, would be responsible for the outcome. ¶5. (SBU) Mourad asked each member of the Mission (except the Senegalese) to speak in turn. Ambassador Job pointed out that France had pushed for a negotiated solution, but was now presenting an ultimatum. Job indicated the same three options with some slight differences. In terms of exile, he made it clear that it was not/not the preference of France that Bacar seek exile there. However, he also indicated that if Bacar specifically requested asylum there the French, reluctantly, would probably accept him. Job said his government was concerned that France had been wrongly portrayed as supporting Bacar. Accepting him in exile might - in some minds at least - reinforce that impression. In addition Job noted that if Bacar remained intransigent, France would not only give up on the negotiated solution, but would actively assist in the logistics of moving friendly African forces into the region to displace him. ¶6. The Arab League's El Rifai echoed Mourad and Job, also asking Bacar to consider the suffering the people of Anjouan and of the Comoros would endure if he did not accept elections or exile. ¶7. Charge Sibley spoke last, making the point that U.S. policy so far supported a peaceful and democratic outcome. However, if Bacar did not accept either elections or exile, U.S. policy would no longer stand in the way of a military solution to the crisis. The Charge then appealed to Bacar's wisdom and compassion to choose the path to peace, possible even at this late date. Bacar Replies - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Bacar replied emotionally, personally attacking AU ResRep Mourad and AU Special Envoy Madeira who he deemed as biased and unacceptable to bring him messages. (Note: Madeira did not go along for the reason that his own relationship with Bacar was difficult. End Note). Charg Sibley advised Bacar not to personalize the issue and to understand that this ultimatum was agreed by all AU members with the full support of the international community. ¶9. (SBU) Bacar surprised no one with his intransigence; Mourad and Job left the room having taken the answer as "no." El Rifai and Charge Sibley stayed briefly to encourage Bacar to choose peace. ANTANANARI 00000157 002 OF 003 Bacar launched into legalistic complaints - as is his wont - about Sambi's violations of the constitution. He said Union and island responsibilities must be discussed. Charg Sibley agreed such discussions were needed, but that Bacar was not legitimately elected and thus could not represent Anjouan at such talks. On Bacar's "legalistic argument," the Charg replied on principle: elections must be free, fair, and transparent; Bacar's were none of these. ¶10. (SBU) In the end it was fruitless. The Charg left the window open for Bacar to choose exile; perhaps coming to his senses when he sees the forces arrayed against him. Read-Out To President Sambi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. The members of the delegation to Anjouan, plus AU Envoy Madeira, briefed Union President Sambi soon after their return to Moroni. South African Ambassador Mabeta also attended. The Comoros side included Foreign Minister Jaffar, Defense Minister Dossar, and Presidential Advisor Nakchami. Members provided a detailed account of the mission to Anjouan. ¶12. (SBU) President Sambi listened, then wondered aloud if Bacar were not mentally deranged in some way. Sambi appeared surprised Bacar had made such a personal attack on Mourad and Madeira. He could not understand why Bacar would remain defiant even as international forces aligned against him. President Sambi said he was both sad and relieved. He was sad, in that he hoped that we might have been successful and thereby prevented bloodshed in the Comoros. He was relieved, in that any remaining ambiguity regarding how to handle Bacar's intransigence seems to have evaporated. All interested parties now agree that Bacar will not budge except by military force. Sambi expressed appreciation to all present for our support and for the effort that we had made to resolve the problem peacefully. ¶13. (SBU) Next, Sambi spoke of the need for rapid military action. He described how expensive it was for him to keep his troops in Mohel. Sambi said the Union troops were impatient, the second helicopter was operational, and he was "95 percent ready to go." Sambi expressed confidence his Union Army for National Development could defeat Bacar alone and they wanted to prove their worth to the Comoran people. ¶14. (SBU) That said, Sambi acknowledged that a more robust force, reinforced by the Tanzanians and the Senegalese, might be even more successful. "If I can save just one life, it is worthwhile," he said. Charg Sibley reinforced that notion. He announced that the United States is providing 5,000 pounds of medical supplies for dealing with casualties; adding our hope these supplies might end up having peacetime uses instead of treating casualties of war. Charg Sibley urged Sambi to be patient enough to allow an overwhelming force to be assembled, one that Bacar's forces would likely run away from rather than fight against. ¶15. (SBU) Sambi accepted this argument, but with some reluctance. Then Jaffar spoke up to urge swift arrival into the Comoros of at least some portion of the foreign troop reinforcements. He pointed out that this would allow the Comoran Government to point to tangible progress on the road to the military solution and thereby defuse some of the pressure for immediate action. In this regard, Jaffar looked directly to the French Ambassador to seek prompt action by the French in fulfilling their commitment to provide the logistical assistance to move the troops. Ambassador Job took note of the request and promised to refer it to Paris forthwith. COMMENT: - - - - - ¶16. (SBU) Bacar remains confident he can call the AU's bluff; after all, it has worked for eight months. This may change given the force Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe intends to amass to both help Comoros and establish AU credibility. Embassy suggests the Department consider encouraging South Africa or France to keep the door open for exile if Bacar finally blinks. ¶17. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: No one, including Sambi, is confident the AND can succeed alone. Nor does anyone really think, with friendly forces arriving to help, that Sambi would decide to try it alone. Still, Sambi's urgency is very real as is his ANTANANARI 00000157 003 OF 003 expectation that significant Tanzanian and other troops will arrive and take action in the near future. END COMMENT. CASEBEER