UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000157

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN

SUBJECT: Mission to Anjouan - Bacar Still Intransigent



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Anjouan renegade Colonel Mohamed Bacar remained
intransigent before an international delegation delivering an
ultimatum February 27. The delegation later informed Union
President Ahmed Sambi who was unsurprised, disappointed, and intent
on a military solution to restore the Union. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The five person international delegation to Anjouan
February 27 comprised: Ambassador Mourad Taiti, AU Representative
to Comoros; Ambassador Christian Job, French Ambassador to Comoros;
Abdul Hakin El Rifai, Arab League Political Counselor; LtCol Let
Dieng Gueye, Senegalese military officer seconded to AU; and George
Sibley, U.S. Charg d'Affaires.

Ultimatum Delivered
- - - - - - - - - -


3. (SBU) Riding between the airport and the meeting, life in
Anjouan appeared normal with no outward signs of tension or overt
military preparations. Colonel Bacar, sitting in the "Presidential
Seat," was accompanied by five of his associates. Bacar did not
introduce them, but one was his island Interior Minister and one was
his choice as "interim island President" in 2007. AU ResRep Mourad
told Bacar the delegation had come to deliver an ultimatum and
expected a reply before they left. He emphasized the African Union
had decided to address the Comoros crisis and approved of "friendly
nations" helping the Union Government. Mourad said Tanzania,
Senegal, Sudan and Libya were preparing with Union forces for the
military option.


4. (SBU) Mourad explained the AU mandate in the Comoros had been
expanded to include elections organization, imposition of sanctions
on Anjouan, and restoring legitimate Union authority. Mourad told
Bacar that he had three choices: 1) He could allow elections under
the conditions indicated by the MAES mandate, participating as a
candidate; 2) He could go into exile; 3) Or, he could choose the
path of confrontation in which case he, Bacar, wo

uld be responsible
for the outcome.


5. (SBU) Mourad asked each member of the Mission (except the
Senegalese) to speak in turn. Ambassador Job pointed out that
France had pushed for a negotiated solution, but was now presenting
an ultimatum. Job indicated the same three options with some slight
differences. In terms of exile, he made it clear that it was
not/not the preference of France that Bacar seek exile there.
However, he also indicated that if Bacar specifically requested
asylum there the French, reluctantly, would probably accept him.
Job said his government was concerned that France had been wrongly
portrayed as supporting Bacar. Accepting him in exile might - in
some minds at least - reinforce that impression. In addition Job
noted that if Bacar remained intransigent, France would not only
give up on the negotiated solution, but would actively assist in the
logistics of moving friendly African forces into the region to
displace him.


6. The Arab League's El Rifai echoed Mourad and Job, also asking
Bacar to consider the suffering the people of Anjouan and of the
Comoros would endure if he did not accept elections or exile.


7. Charge Sibley spoke last, making the point that U.S. policy so
far supported a peaceful and democratic outcome. However, if Bacar
did not accept either elections or exile, U.S. policy would no
longer stand in the way of a military solution to the crisis. The
Charge then appealed to Bacar's wisdom and compassion to choose the
path to peace, possible even at this late date.

Bacar Replies
- - - - - - -


8. (SBU) Bacar replied emotionally, personally attacking AU ResRep
Mourad and AU Special Envoy Madeira who he deemed as biased and
unacceptable to bring him messages. (Note: Madeira did not go
along for the reason that his own relationship with Bacar was
difficult. End Note). Charg Sibley advised Bacar not to
personalize the issue and to understand that this ultimatum was
agreed by all AU members with the full support of the international
community.


9. (SBU) Bacar surprised no one with his intransigence; Mourad and
Job left the room having taken the answer as "no." El Rifai and
Charge Sibley stayed briefly to encourage Bacar to choose peace.

ANTANANARI 00000157 002 OF 003


Bacar launched into legalistic complaints - as is his wont - about
Sambi's violations of the constitution. He said Union and island
responsibilities must be discussed. Charg Sibley agreed such
discussions were needed, but that Bacar was not legitimately elected
and thus could not represent Anjouan at such talks. On Bacar's
"legalistic argument," the Charg replied on principle: elections
must be free, fair, and transparent; Bacar's were none of these.


10. (SBU) In the end it was fruitless. The Charg left the window
open for Bacar to choose exile; perhaps coming to his senses when he
sees the forces arrayed against him.

Read-Out To President Sambi
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. The members of the delegation to Anjouan, plus AU Envoy
Madeira, briefed Union President Sambi soon after their return to
Moroni. South African Ambassador Mabeta also attended. The Comoros
side included Foreign Minister Jaffar, Defense Minister Dossar, and
Presidential Advisor Nakchami. Members provided a detailed account
of the mission to Anjouan.


12. (SBU) President Sambi listened, then wondered aloud if Bacar
were not mentally deranged in some way. Sambi appeared surprised
Bacar had made such a personal attack on Mourad and Madeira. He
could not understand why Bacar would remain defiant even as
international forces aligned against him. President Sambi said he
was both sad and relieved. He was sad, in that he hoped that we
might have been successful and thereby prevented bloodshed in the
Comoros. He was relieved, in that any remaining ambiguity regarding
how to handle Bacar's intransigence seems to have evaporated. All
interested parties now agree that Bacar will not budge except by
military force. Sambi expressed appreciation to all present for our
support and for the effort that we had made to resolve the problem
peacefully.


13. (SBU) Next, Sambi spoke of the need for rapid military action.
He described how expensive it was for him to keep his troops in
Mohel. Sambi said the Union troops were impatient, the second
helicopter was operational, and he was "95 percent ready to go."
Sambi expressed confidence his Union Army for National Development
could defeat Bacar alone and they wanted to prove their worth to the
Comoran people.


14. (SBU) That said, Sambi acknowledged that a more robust force,
reinforced by the Tanzanians and the Senegalese, might be even more
successful. "If I can save just one life, it is worthwhile," he
said. Charg Sibley reinforced that notion. He announced that the
United States is providing 5,000 pounds of medical supplies for
dealing with casualties; adding our hope these supplies might end up
having peacetime uses instead of treating casualties of war. Charg
Sibley urged Sambi to be patient enough to allow an overwhelming
force to be assembled, one that Bacar's forces would likely run away
from rather than fight against.


15. (SBU) Sambi accepted this argument, but with some reluctance.
Then Jaffar spoke up to urge swift arrival into the Comoros of at
least some portion of the foreign troop reinforcements. He pointed
out that this would allow the Comoran Government to point to
tangible progress on the road to the military solution and thereby
defuse some of the pressure for immediate action. In this regard,
Jaffar looked directly to the French Ambassador to seek prompt
action by the French in fulfilling their commitment to provide the
logistical assistance to move the troops. Ambassador Job took note
of the request and promised to refer it to Paris forthwith.

COMMENT:
- - - - -


16. (SBU) Bacar remains confident he can call the AU's bluff; after
all, it has worked for eight months. This may change given the
force Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe intends to amass to both help
Comoros and establish AU credibility. Embassy suggests the
Department consider encouraging South Africa or France to keep the
door open for exile if Bacar finally blinks.


17. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: No one, including Sambi, is
confident the AND can succeed alone. Nor does anyone really think,
with friendly forces arriving to help, that Sambi would decide to
try it alone. Still, Sambi's urgency is very real as is his

ANTANANARI 00000157 003 OF 003


expectation that significant Tanzanian and other troops will arrive
and take action in the near future. END COMMENT.

CASEBEER