Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08ANKARA965 | 2008-05-21 13:35:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara |
VZCZCXRO9713 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHAK #0965/01 1421335 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211335Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6348 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 4235 RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000965 |
1. (C) Summary. Turkey is acutely aware of the Al Qaeda Network (AQN) threat and is actively collecting against it, an MFA official told us May 20. Turkey cannot, however, engage in broad "profiling" of young male travelers. Urged to consider new border security and information-sharing arrangements with the United States and regional partners, he noted both political and technical considerations. Separately, he observed that a review of Turkey's counterterrorism laws was "on going." The upcoming visit of DHS Secretary Chertoff offers a prime opportunity to press for closer counterterrorism cooperation. End summary. Enhanced Collection on AQN -------------------------- 2. (C) Turkey is already highly focused on intelligence collection against possible Al Qaeda Network (AQN) facilitators, financiers and recruiters within Turkey, MFA Security Affairs official Metin Ergin told us May 20. The Turkish government is acutely aware of the AQN threat. While many people focus on the bombings in London and Madrid, Istanbul, too, was the site of major AQN attacks in 2004, he reminded us. Increased Regional Information Sharing -------------------------- 3. (C) Asked about increased regional information sharing, Ergin responded that Turkey already enjoys robust information sharing on terrorists with key relevant countries. Pressed about the nature of those relationships, he acknowledged they were largely informal arrangements between law enforcement officials and intelligence agencies. We urged that Turkey continue to strengthen those ties, including through more formal arrangements. Increased Screening of Young Male Travelers to Countries of Concern -------------------------- 4. (C) Asked whether Turkey had increased its scrutiny of young male travelers destined for Syria and other countries of concern, as requested by S/CT PDAS Urbancic in early February (Ref B), Ergin insisted that Turkey's immigration officials maintain good border controls, including through the use of specific information provide by the United States. Pressed about special screening for young male travelers headed to Syria and possibly Iraq, Ergin stated that for both political and diplomatic reasons, Turkey cannot impose "profiling" by broad categories, such as "males between the ages of 17-25," for example. More specific information or more narrow criteria are needed. He recalled that Turkey used broad profiling against Kurds in its war against the PKK in the 1990s, and soon learned such an approach was counter-productive. "Targeting" a certain male age group would have diplomatic consequences, he asserted. He invited the United States to provide more specific information, including more recent statistics on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Improved Travel Documents -------------------------- 5. (C) When asked about Turkish efforts to enhance the quality of its travel documents and increase vigilance against the use of fraudulent documents, Ergin stated that Turkey is working to improve its own documents and ward against their misuse. Fraudulent foreign travel documents, he admitted, were more difficult problem. We used the discussion to urge GOT consideration of various biometric and other information-sharing arrangements offered by USG agencies in recent months and to argue the need for greater regional biometric sharing on terrorists, as proposed to Turkey and other regional players in at the Amman November 2006 biometrics conference (Ref C). Ergin took the comments on board and promised to share with his superiors, noting that both political and technical decisions were involved. ANKARA 00000965 002 OF 002 Information Campaign to Undercut Public Support for AQN -------------------------- -------------------------- 6. (C) Ergin acknowledged sympathy among many Turkish people for insurgents in Iraq, including, to an extent, for Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). He speculated that public opinion polls likely reflect disapproval of U.S. policy rather than actual support for AQI. He pointed to the lack of positive or constructive media reports on coalition efforts and developments like the "Anbar Awakening." At the same time, the Internet features videos of coalition soldiers using puppies for target practice and similar negative incidents. Asked for suggestions, we proposed encouraging more balanced media coverage, including successes and constructive actions by coalition forces, as well as more coverage of the death and destruction caused by AQI and insurgents groups. Security cooperation with Syria -------------------------- 7. (C) Turkey and Syria have a security cooperation relationship that includes border security cooperation, Ergin explained. Asked to use Turkey's influence to press Syria to stop Syrian citizens from traveling to Iraq to conduct terrorist operations and to stop the transit of foreign fighters, he promised to relay the request to his superiors. Urbancic Follow-up -------------------------- 8. (C) We used the meeting to request an update on other counterterrorism proposals made by S/CT PDAS Urbancic (Ref B), starting with strengthening Turkey's counterterrorism laws. Ergin noted that studies of Turkey's counterterrorism-related laws were "on going"; it was not possible to say, however, whether legislative change would result. Some legal experts argue the current criminal code already allows law enforcement to deal with all actions, even if not defined as "terrorism." The review of the laws was nonetheless ongoing to determine if there were any loopholes. Comment -------------------------- 9. (C) While the PKK continues to pose the most direct terrorist threat to Turkey, Turkish authorities insist they are also focused on AQN. Turkey is now considering several U.S. information sharing arrangements briefed recently in Ankara and Washington. The upcoming visit of DHS Secretary Chertoff offers a prime opportunity to press the Turks on closer counterterrorism cooperation. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey WILSON |