Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA87
2008-01-16 09:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY: OPPOSITION TO DIALOGUE WITH KRG SLOWLY
how-toVZCZCXRO3237 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHAK #0087 0160938 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 160938Z JAN 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4951 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
S E C R E T ANKARA 000087
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION TO DIALOGUE WITH KRG SLOWLY
DIMINISHING?
REF: A. BAGHDAD 67
B. BAGHDAD 106
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
S E C R E T ANKARA 000087
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION TO DIALOGUE WITH KRG SLOWLY
DIMINISHING?
REF: A. BAGHDAD 67
B. BAGHDAD 106
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (S) Repeated and ongoing efforts to convince the GOT to
engage directly with Iraqi Kurds, beginning with President
Talabani and eventually include Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) officials, appear gradually to be gaining traction.
GOT Deputy Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik (please protect) is
increasingly optimistic that opposition to openly starting
such a direct dialogue is beginning to wane. While initial
GOT outreach to KRG officials via intelligence channels in
mid-December was reportedly well received by the Iraqis, that
effort was effectively negated by large-scale airstrikes
against PKK targets located deep inside northern Iraq by the
Turkish military on December 16. Ozcelik lamented at the
time that senior GOT officials seemed solely focused on the
need for a military response to PKK terrorism.
2. (S) According to Ozcelik, President Gul used the last
meeting of the National Security Council on December 28 to
make clear the need for the GOT to begin engaging with the
GOI "from top to bottom." Gul also went out of his way at
the meeting to say he wanted to hear from backbench MFA
officials not sitting at the main table about how they think
Turkey should be moving forward in approaching the Iraqis and
the KRG. Ozcelik characterized the meeting as "the best he
has attended or heard about" from the standpoint of the GOT's
Iraq policy and an openness to fundamentally changing the
character of the Turkey-Iraq relationship. Most striking
from Ozcelik's point of view was Chief of Defense General
Buyukanit's remark that "if Turkey wants to see a unified
Iraq, the country will need cement, and that cement is the
United States," underscoring the need for the GOT to work
closely with us on Iraq beyond the narrow scope of
military/intelligence cooperation.
3. (S) COMMENT: Ozcelik has been the most active and vocal
proponent in MFA for moving forward in a constructive manner
to forge a new relationship between Turkey and Iraq, as well
as with Iraqi Kurds. He recognizes his conviction in this
regard has not been broadly shared by other policy actors,
though he has always viewed President Gul as the figure most
likely to push the envelope. Ozcelik's newly-found optimism
is an indication that he believes others are gradually
catching on. His positive assessment of how Gul is starting
to drive the NSC train, long moribund under former President
Sezer who lacked the requisite political skills, is also
encouraging.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2028
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: OPPOSITION TO DIALOGUE WITH KRG SLOWLY
DIMINISHING?
REF: A. BAGHDAD 67
B. BAGHDAD 106
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (S) Repeated and ongoing efforts to convince the GOT to
engage directly with Iraqi Kurds, beginning with President
Talabani and eventually include Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) officials, appear gradually to be gaining traction.
GOT Deputy Iraq Coordinator Murat Ozcelik (please protect) is
increasingly optimistic that opposition to openly starting
such a direct dialogue is beginning to wane. While initial
GOT outreach to KRG officials via intelligence channels in
mid-December was reportedly well received by the Iraqis, that
effort was effectively negated by large-scale airstrikes
against PKK targets located deep inside northern Iraq by the
Turkish military on December 16. Ozcelik lamented at the
time that senior GOT officials seemed solely focused on the
need for a military response to PKK terrorism.
2. (S) According to Ozcelik, President Gul used the last
meeting of the National Security Council on December 28 to
make clear the need for the GOT to begin engaging with the
GOI "from top to bottom." Gul also went out of his way at
the meeting to say he wanted to hear from backbench MFA
officials not sitting at the main table about how they think
Turkey should be moving forward in approaching the Iraqis and
the KRG. Ozcelik characterized the meeting as "the best he
has attended or heard about" from the standpoint of the GOT's
Iraq policy and an openness to fundamentally changing the
character of the Turkey-Iraq relationship. Most striking
from Ozcelik's point of view was Chief of Defense General
Buyukanit's remark that "if Turkey wants to see a unified
Iraq, the country will need cement, and that cement is the
United States," underscoring the need for the GOT to work
closely with us on Iraq beyond the narrow scope of
military/intelligence cooperation.
3. (S) COMMENT: Ozcelik has been the most active and vocal
proponent in MFA for moving forward in a constructive manner
to forge a new relationship between Turkey and Iraq, as well
as with Iraqi Kurds. He recognizes his conviction in this
regard has not been broadly shared by other policy actors,
though he has always viewed President Gul as the figure most
likely to push the envelope. Ozcelik's newly-found optimism
is an indication that he believes others are gradually
catching on. His positive assessment of how Gul is starting
to drive the NSC train, long moribund under former President
Sezer who lacked the requisite political skills, is also
encouraging.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON