Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA748
2008-04-22 09:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: STOPPING TRAVEL TO ANNUAL PKK TERRORIST

Tags:  KTFN PTER PREL IZ TU 
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VZCZCXRO4347
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAK #0748 1130938
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 220938Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6000
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0351
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0947
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 8839
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1212
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4279
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0260
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3230
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0243
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1305
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 1699
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0228
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 4415
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 4148
S E C R E T ANKARA 000748 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: KTFN PTER PREL IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: STOPPING TRAVEL TO ANNUAL PKK TERRORIST
MEETING

REF: A. STATE 36799


B. VIENNA 538

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T ANKARA 000748

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2018
TAGS: KTFN PTER PREL IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: STOPPING TRAVEL TO ANNUAL PKK TERRORIST
MEETING

REF: A. STATE 36799


B. VIENNA 538

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S) Turkey is appreciative of USG efforts to raise the
level of attention paid by European and regional governments
to the potential for PKK members to travel to northern Iraq
to participate in the group's annual conference, as
instructed in ref a. MFA Department Head for the PKK Ceren
Etiz told us April 14 during an initial contact on the issue
and in a follow-on April 21 meeting that the GOT does not
specifically reach out to European and other governments
during this time frame, but rather constantly reminds its
European partners of their responsibilities to interdict
known terrorists as they attempt to travel. Etiz said they
have a "standing talking point in every demarche they
deliver," regardless of the issue, in which they press the
Europeans to do more to arrest PKKers.


2. (S) Etiz asked whether we have any further information on
individuals the Iraqi and/or Kurdish Regional Government
authorities have either arrested or turned around upon
arrival at Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports. We noted reports
we had heard regarding two turn-arounds in November and four
more in December 2007 at Erbil Airport. Etiz said Iraqi
authorities have never shared that information with the GOT.
The Turks would appreciate any details they or we might be
able to provide. We believe it would be most helpful if the
GOI can share this information directly.


3. (S) Etiz also asked whether the USG is providing specific
information to host countries about PKK members in their
territories known to be traveling to northern Iraq and how we
share that information. We responded that we were not aware
of specific information sharing through this current
demarche, but rather anticipated that information about such
travelers would already be in data systems available to
European and other governments based on information on
suspected PKK terrorists shared by Turkey and the U.S. in the
past. Etiz said the GOT has yet to be informed of any
successful operations/interdictions deriving from the new
cash courier regulation adopted by the EU and looks forward
to receiving such information when/if actions related to the
PKK occur. She noted that she had heard from USG sources
about the Danes having stopped possible PKK members from
boarding flights in Copenhagen in May 2007 and cash having
been confiscated. She claimed, however, the Danish
government had not provided specific details of the
individuals to the GOT, or at least the information had not
made it to her office.


4. (S) Etiz has notified Turkish embassies in all the
countries in which we have reached out on this issue and GOT
officials there may reach out to USG colleagues to discuss
host country responses. Etiz noted, for example, that
Turkish embassy officers in Vienna had discussed the issue
and the Austrian response with U.S. diplomats there (ref b).

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WILSON